

Skopje's Political Efficiency: Converting a National Goal to National Policy

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1.0 Background Information

Although the focus of this paper is Skopje's political efficiency, one must first have a general idea about the formation of a nation's national security policy. I am offering in very general and rudimental terms enough information regarding a country's national security as I deem necessary to establish a reasonable background. Politics and war although differ in means of delivery, they aim at identical objectives, i.e. the imposition of one's will over another. Thus, when one reads a text that in one's mind it is associated with war, one should convert one's thoughts as if the subject refers to politics.

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military thinker who is widely acknowledged as the most important of the classical strategic thinkers stated in his book *On War*, stated, "We see therefore that war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means" is accepted.¹ Nonetheless, it does imply that war and politics have the same point of departure, which is not true. The fact is that war pre-existed politics, since the first human conflicts had to do with hunting grounds, family or clan disputes, not politics. Simultaneously, we must consider that war is not always an act by violent means.

Today we must redefine "war", because it is not always an instrument of political prevalence by violent means. It can also mean prevalence by peaceful means such as world markets, economic growth, renewable resources, and progressive innovations. The series of means that Clausewitz implicitly cited are resources that promote markets, markets that bring growth, growth that generates money, money that stimulates infrastructure, infrastructure that builds stability and stability that fosters security. All of them necessitate democracy and political will.

2.0 The Development of a Nation's National Security Policy and Strategy

The reality of the 21st century has modified the traditional philosophy of what constitutes the national security of a country as guided by the concept of the country's national interests. In order for a country to develop a foreign policy that is right for its needs, i.e. to pre-

¹ Karl Von Clausewitz, "On War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 280.

vent political settings detrimental to it while simultaneously to enhance its international image, its government must have established its national interests. Such interests cannot be in a drafting mode just before danger appears. Then it would be too late.

The contribution of the academia to the National Security policy is imperative. The National Security Council considers academic arguments, but it does not adapt the conclusions unchanged. Clausewitz has argued, "...the human resolve does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties, ..." suggesting, very correctly I might add, that modification to a realistic point of any theory we want to implement is a must. Experience of a situation in reality as opposed to in the abstract is very important because in theory, everything is perfect, whereas in practice one must expect the unexpected.²

But the issue is more complicated than that. Oftentimes theory cannot translate into practice because those in charge do not have the concept of how to do it. To that effect, Antoine Henri Jomini separates those generals who are simply learned men from those who, although never attended a school, have the eye to see the battlefield and understand positions and the outcome before the armies are even assembled.³

The issue on the formulation of the national security policy is extremely complex, meticulous, and voluminous. Scholars spend a lifetime scrutinizing, arguing, offering different views and perspectives, which usually are only a speck of this gigantic concept. From the goals of a nation to the use of national power, i.e. the ability and willingness to "flex its muscles" when necessary in order to achieve the set goals, the process takes time. Of course, power is nominal until tested. One must consider all intended and possibly most preconceived unintended consequences of the policy. Furthermore, one must consider that democratic countries formulate their policies after public debate, which not only slows, it also restricts the process. In a closed political system such as a dictatorship or authoritarianism from either the left or the right, such an issue does not exist.

In general, ideals of a nation are found in philosophical, legal, and religious documents as well as in the customs and morals imbedded in the life of a nation's citizens. In particular, best sources for information related to ideals the citizens of a country value most are in declarations of independence, constitutions, and other similar documents.

For instance, expressed clearly, the ideals that Greeks idolize are found in the declaration of Greece's independence decided and written in Epidavros in 1822. These values are Justice, Personal Freedom, Ownership, and Honor. In addition, one finds values found in ancient writings, and the New Testament are those which have developed the Greco-Christian culture, and in my opinion, they best represent the Modern Greek nation. As one gets deeper into the subject, one cannot but conclude that personal freedom and ownership are the fundamental elements of prosperity, which advances the consolidation of human capital and education. Those two components promote science, technology, and innovation. The

² Karl Von Clausewitz, "On War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 268.

³ Antoine Henri De Jomini, *The Art of War* (St. Paul: MBI Publishing, 1992), 269.

last three elements developed to a balanced and stable economic growth are relevant to national security. They are part of the Greek psyche.

Values determine the goals that the nation wants to achieve in order to feel physically and psychologically secure and prosperous. National goals, in turn, determine national interests, which the pertinent government oftentimes traditionally categorize as vital, critical, and serious and prioritize them as core, contiguous, and peripheral. On the other hand, according to the realist view, one divides national interests by importance (vital vs. secondary), duration (temporary vs. permanent), specificity (specific vs. general), and compatibility (complementary vs. conflicting).

Regardless of the above categories and priorities, national interests are apportioned into two dimensions and two aspects. The dimensions that a country views as its national interests are the official and the pragmatic. On the official dimension, a government builds its domestic and foreign policies. On the pragmatic dimension, the government implements a pragmatic comprehensive policy through which the country aims to pursue a higher position among world powers. Besides the official and pragmatic dimensions, a government maintains high physical and psychological aspects of their citizens' lives.

Physical aspects of the National Security are comprise of security forces (military, paramilitary, police and intelligence that embody the defensive corps), which bestows high morale and national values such as pride for the country and patriotism. Psychological aspects include but are not limited to sociological, economic, monetary, political, educational, and national health, etc. Good governance promotes prosperity and boosts morale thus contributing to the national security of a country, which is perceived distinctly from a different point of view by each country.

Although the duty of the military and paramilitary forces is the defense of the country from conventional, asymmetric and unconventional warfare, the security of the country from domestic enemies are the law enforcement agencies such as the police with its internal intelligence branch. Regarding intelligence that derives from external sources, it can be achieved through a process called the Intelligence Cycle, an ongoing process that includes planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback. Sun Tzu (or Sunzi), the ancient Chinese military general and strategist said:

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.⁴

In the chapter, "Knowledge of the Enemy - Strategic Intelligence" John Keegan explains:

⁴ Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 123.

Alexander the Great, presiding at the Macedonian court as a boy while his father, Philip, was absent on campaign, was remembered by visitors from the lands he would later conquer for his persistence in questioning them about the size of the population of their territory, the productiveness of the soil, the course of the routes and rivers that crossed it, the location of its towns, harbours and strong places, the identity of the important men. The young Alexander was assembling what today would be called economic, regional or strategic intelligence, and the knowledge he accumulated served him well when he began his invasion of the Persian Empire, enormous in extent and widely diverse in composition. Alexander triumphed because he brought to his battlefields a ferocious fighting force of tribal warriors personally devoted to the Macedonian monarchy; but he also picked the Persian Empire to pieces, attacking at its weak points and exploiting its internal divisions.⁵

Open source information (publications and press), diplomatic missions, military attachés, commerce representatives, social media, polls, etc. including a simple feedback on certain events or actions provide information about culture, governance, life in general in other countries, and even possible future events or actions. Such information is relevant and important to the development of intelligence by the pertinent national intelligence agency, which uses the Intelligence Cycle in order to bring the country to an advantageous position vis-à-vis the opponent. The governmental agencies in turn use the analyzed information in order to proceed to its integration with ongoing operations. A never-ending feedback and evaluation are necessary tools for the uninterrupted function of the program.

The crystallization of the national security policy, which splits into domestic and foreign, is cultural and depends on a number of issues all related to national interests. Policies also depend on intelligence received. In governments where prudence prevails, intelligence guides the national security policy; it does not follow the national security policy. The national security policy must be clear and firm, and its realization requires a vision for the future of the country, a strategic intent that clarifies the vision and converts it to a mission.

The development of strategy in an effort to accomplish a successful outcome in the national security presupposes the conclusion of the proper application of theory and combination of the elements of national power (“hard” and “soft”) into strategy. Both must be effective and adaptable in overcoming challenges to a country’s national objectives from state and non-state stakeholders, and transnational threats. Strategy must contain all foreseeable possibilities regardless of the current size, geopolitical situation, economic conditions, diplomatic abilities, or military capabilities of the threat or country, starting with one’s neighbors.

Then the question of what constitutes success comes into play. In traditional warfare, the defeat of the opposing military force constitutes victory, but it may not necessarily translate into a national success. This is the thought behind Clausewitz’s dicta “war is never an

⁵ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: The value and limitations of what the military can learn about the enemy* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 7.

isolated act” and “the result of war is never absolute.”⁶ The end of one war will mean the beginning of another by the defeated power hoping for an anticipatory revanche. Success in a given conflict is mostly dependent on a combination of political, social, and economic conclusions.

The social effect at the conclusion of an exclusively military victory in a traditional sense and a combination of political, social, and economic success separate a bad strategist from a brilliant strategist. Napoleon the Great, despite his initial military successes, proved to be a bad strategist because embracing only his military and neglecting sound domestic and foreign policies, he was defeated in his effort to dominate Europe and indeed the world. The defeat of Napoleon, a militarily brilliant tactician, proved fatal to him and his country. If he had been a brilliant strategist, he would not have died in exile.

On the other hand, the Emperor of Prussia, Frederick the Great of the Prussian House of Hohenzollern demonstrated his strategic genius. He forged appropriate alliances, presided over the construction of canals, and fed his people by introducing new crops such as the potato and the turnip to Prussia while he simultaneously launched wars that expanded his kingdom. “Old Fritz who is remembered for his feats of guile on both the battlefield and the potato field,” is a personality of an excellent strategist.⁷ He died in an armchair in his study at the palace of Sanssouci (Potsdam) on August 17, 1786. The people of Germany remember him by leaving a potato on his grave. The people of Pennsylvania have honored him by naming a city just north of Philadelphia, *King of Prussia*.

The required strategic thought develops the adaptation to changing geopolitical contexts such as traditional state alliances, complex contemporary environment shaped by multifaceted national security, economic, diplomatic, informational, and political co-dependencies. In addition, non-state stakeholders play a more prominent role on the global stage than in previous eras and they are expected to do so in the future. Understanding how the interaction of these evolving factors influences the formulation and execution of strategy enhances the ability of leaders to address emerging challenges.

The product of the national security involves a number of variants that dominate the ever-changing international conventional and asymmetric geopolitical stage and geostrategic importance of stakeholders.

⁶ Karl Von Clausewitz, “On War,” in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 268-271.

⁷ Christoph Niemann, “The Legend of the Potato King”, *The New York Times*, October 12, 2012. URL <http://niemann.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/the-legend-of-the-potato-king/> accessed August 14, 2013.

The National Security Diagram



3.0 Ideologists of Opportunism

Over and above Skopje's efforts to achieve its goal, one must consider the *fifth phalanx* of some die-hard communists of Greece who have not realized that communism as a political system and as a controlled economy have failed. They attack Alexander the Great for not being democratic, as if the same people know the meaning of democracy.

In a convoluted ideological whirlpool, even some members of the Greek Parliament side with Skopje blaming Greece for the problem. The issue of Macedonia as Skopje has embraced it does not allow anyone to embark in costly human capital adventurisms because of their multi-lust fantasy or self-imposed hallucinations. The belief that the people of the two countries are connected with "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" (even without reciprocity) and that the two governments are the problem is outlandish. The people of the FYROM after half a century of education on the Hegelian left, and without a break, fell into the teachings of the Hegelian right. In both cases and for different reasons they were indoctrinated to hate the Greeks. Based on such indoctrination, what are the chances that they would feel and express "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" to the people of Greece?

Lenin's idea of "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" could apply to the behavior among socialist countries. Not only we have nothing of the kind in the relations between Greece and the FYROM, but even when we had the so-called socialist countries, the "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" were just empty slogans. At a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev "revealed that a clash between Stalin and the Chinese government had barely been averted".⁸ As this example indicates, these slogans are rubbish as exemplified by the implementation of "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" in a form of the invasions of East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1978).

Although the focus of this paper is not Marxism – Leninism, I want to emphasize a few things that Communism has advocated. Communism defines democracy as both a political trend and as a state form while it branches it out into *bourgeois*, *petty bourgeois*, and *proletarian socialist*. If we were to apply Marxism – Leninism to the ancient world, the Athenian democracy used slave labor, which, although it was the norm at that time in ancient societies, it was condemned by Marx and Lenin.⁹

Communists who believe that Alexander the Great does not deserve a statue because he was not a democrat should not only study history, but they should study Marxism – Leninism as well. Their understanding of Marxism lacks a practical foundation, as Lenin stated, "it is one thing to know the propositions and formulas of Marxist- Leninist philosophy, and quite another to apply them in science and practice. The latter requires special skill. In turn, this skill presupposes a sustained, strictly consistent devotion to the Party, the adherence to a class point of view."¹⁰ Not one of these simple-minded communists who have re-invented themselves as patriots, freedom fighters, and democrats possesses that "special skill." Those, who cannot comprehend what Marxism had advocated fall into traps, which according to Lenin, "highly eminent Marxists" such as Kautsky, Otto Bauer, and others, even Georgi Plekhanov to a certain degree, had fallen. Lenin declared them all as being ideologists of opportunism.¹¹

By attacking Alexander the Great as not respecting the bourgeois democracy of Athens, *ipso facto* these communists defend the Athenian political system, which according to Marx-Lenin was "corrupt." If one is to apply one's understanding of Marxism-Leninism in order to make one's case against Alexander the Great, it is only fair for one to apply the same philosophy against the ancient Athenian polity. Thus, the simple-minded communists clash against their own political ideology.

To use modern terminology, putting the issue of political ideology and behavior in the right context, important ancient cities such as Megara, Thebes, Sparta along with prominent Greeks, i.e. the Lacedaemonian Leonidas who died fighting the Persian imperialism, did not know the meaning of or did not care about democracy. Not one of the Spartan generals

⁸ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 175.

⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), passim.

¹⁰ *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, Military Soviet Thought (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 294.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), I, passim.

such as Gylippus of Syracuse or Lysander, who forced Athens to capitulation in 404 BC, fought against “democracy.” They all fought against the Athenian hegemony. Non-democratic potentates and generals couldn’t care less about the political system of Athens. They cared about their own benefit and the geopolitical advantage and geostrategic importance of their tribal states. The political system of their tribal states or their own philosophical conviction did not make them more Greek or less Greek.

I also find the argument of some others that Alexander the Great was a conqueror, as insulting the intelligence of all people. The Macedonian king who united Greece, save Lacedaemonia, under his scepter was not Alexander the Great, but his father, Philip II, a fact that indicates the historical irrelevance of these “Greeks.” Nevertheless, the same “democrats” do not think of the Athenians, Thebans, Corinthians, Phocaeans, Spartans et al. as conquerors. By present day standards which these communists invoke, the above Greeks were not only conquerors, but also colonialists. They had colonized the shores of present day Sicily, Italy, France, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, let alone the Middle East. One can still find evidence of Greek presence in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

According to Xenophon, Athens surrendered to Sparta in 404 BC, and its allies surrendered soon after, marking the end of the Peloponnesian War. The capitulation stripped Athens of its walls, its fleet, and all of its overseas possessions. The Athenian hegemony was over. Sparta’s allies, especially the Corinthians and the Thebans, demanded that Athens should be burned to the ground and all its citizens should be enslaved. However, the Spartans, magnanimous as they were, refused to destroy a city that had done a good service at a time of great danger to Greece, alluding to the Persian Wars. This was not just a conquest, but also an occupation.

Let us take the issue of the *helots*, whom the Spartans not only conquered, but enslaved in the harshest manner possible. To this day we use the phrase working “as a helot,” i.e. as a slave. What about Sparta’s neighboring state of Mesina? Weren’t the Spartans conquerors? What can the same people say about the conquest of Sparta over Thebes? How can they explain the issue of the island of Melos? After Athens forced the Melians to surrender, they killed all males capable of bearing arms and sold the women and children into slavery. Then they brought Athenian settlers to the island. Nobody believes that all this had happened in the name of democracy. One can read in Pericles’ Funeral Oration all about the Lacedaemonians who were benevolent enough not to burn Athens to the ground after its capitulation. Where exactly had been the democratic values of the Athenians? Sparta had more democratic values and human compassion than Athens. War colleges of the United States require their students to study the Peloponnesian War in which,

“[At the U.S. Naval War College,] students are required to read Thucydides in their first course, with additional study available. Thucydides also appears on syllabi in required courses at the Army War College. It has been argued that the study of Thucydides was particularly important in neoconservative circles connected with the University of Chicago... Most people’s exposure to Thucydides comes through the Melian Dialogue, a pithy account of a brutal Athenian massacre of the inhabitants of the island of Melos.

The Melian Dialogue is generally taught as an introduction to the unsentimental view of politics adopted by Realist theory, although some professors teach it as an indication of the degradation of Athenian democracy.¹²

In order for one to discern the communist mentality on the name issue, I am offering an anecdote which happened during the USSR years. In one of the USSR's Asian republics, a man named Nikifar made the news for his high productivity. The newspaper *Pravda* or Truth, an official publication of the Soviet Communist Party, publicized Nikifar's success, which made him an overnight hero. But there was a problem. *Pravda* referred to him as Nikifor, not Nikifar. The local Communist Party boss dragged poor Nikifar to Court, where he changed his name to Nikifor so that *Pravda* proved correct. The lesson from this is that *the Communist Party might not be always right, but it is never wrong*. I am certain that although on the façade the issue is democracy, far deep in their minds is the unimplemented *Balkan Soviet Socialist Federation* and Comintern's godchild, the "Macedonian" nation. Comintern might not have been right, but it would never be wrong.

What points directly to the hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness of these particular communists of Greece is the fact that Marx and Engels used Alexander the Great's name as an example of a man who made the world a better place. Engels got the idea of agricultural collectivization from the information provided by Nearchus, Admiral to Alexander the Great.¹³ In addition, the Institute of Marxism – Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR called Alexander the Great, "a great soldier and statesman."¹⁴

One wonders why people who all their lives have argued against Greece's bourgeois democracy and in the past they literally fought against it in an attempt to overthrow it in favor of a proletarian democracy (Greek Civil War), now turn around to the defense of such "decayed" democracy?

The point is that such thoughts indicate narrow-mindedness at best. One may not judge the past using modern-day standards as one cannot blame Gutenberg for not inventing Microsoft Office. Scoring points at home, directed toward their similarly narrow-minded crowd, might be good for the publicity of the petty bourgeois ideologists of opportunism; it does not do any good to Greece. If they do not like the political situation in Greece, they can change it through the democratic process available to them; but they had better think twice, because they might achieve what they have longed for.

One must wonder if Alexander the Great was such an anti-democrat or source of all ills, as communists opine, why do the Skopjans so rabidly want to make him their hero and legendary ancestor? Is it possible that the South Slavs have learned something that the com-

¹² Robert Farley, "Over the Horizon: The Enduring Relevance of Thucydides," *World Politics Review*, Feb 23, 2011. URL <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7975/over-the-horizon-the-enduring-relevance-of-thucydides>, accessed July 10, 2013.

¹³ Frederick Engels, "Origin of the Family, Private Property, and State," *Selected Works*, Fifth Ed, Vol. III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 235.

¹⁴ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Fifth Ed. Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 564.

munists of Greece simply have not learned? Or do the same communists follow their euphoric recall, dreaming the revival of the Balkan Soviet Federation?

On April 12, 1948, in a letter addressed to Stalin, Josip Broz explained:

The experience of a successful revolutionary development should materialize in every country of people's democracies as being an extension and addition to the Great October Revolution, which is something new in revolutionary practice, but it is entirely in the spirit of the science of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁵

Perhaps at that time such thinking was the norm, but today we all know what happened to the USSR and the rest of people's democracies. Even China, despite its official name, has since 1989 taken the road to capitalism. I would remind the communists Pythia's maxim to the Emperor Julian the Apostate's ambassadors in Delphic dialect, "Tell the king that, the ornate flute has fallen down; Apollo has home no more, neither has the seer laurel, nor the spring gurgles; even the babbling water has dried up."¹⁶ Emperor Julian got the message and stopped any attempt to bring the 12 Olympian gods back as the official pantheon of Byzantium. I hope the Greek communists get the message as well.

4.0 Indications and Warnings

As one of the heirs of communist Yugoslavia, Skopje represents not only the old regime, but it has also proclaimed itself the heir of the Bulgarian terrorists, i.e. komitadjis (1893 - 1908). Through its domestic and foreign policies, it seeks revenge against Greece for the result of the Balkan Wars (1912-3), the exchange of population with Bulgaria (1924), and the Greek civil war that deprived Skopje from the opportunity to form a Slavophone communist government in Thessaloniki.

Since the FYROM is no match for Greece, Skopje has already proven that it is willing and capable to launch its national power. It intends to pursue its goal through patrons, as did the Bulgarians in 1885 and the Albanians in 1999. The FYROM regresses to the propaganda strategy of the komitadjis that made them known to Western Europe and Russia.

The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin wrote,

All of us must now embark on stormy revolutionary seas, and from this very moment we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda... Let us say less about principles whenever circumstances and revolutionary policy demand it – i.e., during our momentary weakness in relation to the enemy – but let us

¹⁵ Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za Biografiju* (Beograd: Kultura, 1955), 518.

¹⁶ «εἶπατε τῷ βασιλεῖ, χαμαὶ πέσε δαίδαλος αὐλά. οὐκέτι Φοῖβος ἔχει καλύβαν, οὐ μάντιδα δάφνην, οὐ παγὰν λαλέουσαν. ἀπέσβετο καὶ λάλον ὕδωρ». One must bear in mind that the Oracle of Delphi was dedicated to the god Apollo, the god of Sun and light.

at all times and under all circumstances be adamantly consistent in our action. For in this lies the salvation of the revolution.”¹⁷

As Paul Bousse,¹⁸ another anarchist, stated: “When one resorts to that line of reasoning one is on the trail that leads, besides theoretical propaganda, to propaganda by the deed. Propaganda by the deed is a mighty means of rousing the popular consciousness.”¹⁹ Briefly put, both Bakunin and Bousse argue for the same thing: do whatever to show the flag; do whatever to make a point. Words do not work; actions do. It is exactly what Skopje has done and keeps doing. Skopje funds its resident representatives (Ouranio Toxo and UMD) in Greece who promote cultural events imported from Skopje or open cultural centers in western Macedonia. One might remember the interview that Kostas Simitis, the former Prime Minister of Greece, gave to Charlie Rose during the bombing of Belgrade by NATO. To the comment of Mr. Rose that the Russians were very vocal, showing his contempt toward the Russians, Simitis said something to the effect, let them be vocal; that’s all they can do.

In the last few years, we have encountered during the Feast of St. Elijah’s Configuration, the celebration of the Ilinden Revolt in Meliti. The infamous event of Ilinden is celebrated in Meliti of Florina Prefecture. Skopje’s surrogates bring music bands from the FYROM offering entertainment to a local population that seeks a chance to have fun. The issue is not as much that the music is Slavic, but the lyrics of the songs, which the local population dances to, although they do not understand them. Words such as “Greek murderers” or the lyrics of the song “Pearl of the Balkans” or “Get out, Young Man” Greeks dance to without understanding their meaning. Transmitted through Skopje TV to the FYROM, citizens see that “Macedonians,” according to the Skopjan reporters, dance to songs of vengeance designed against Greece and Greeks. They even show those reports to foreign dignitaries and diplomatic employees including employees of the Greek Liaison Office in Skopje as “proof” that the people in the “Aegean Macedonia” are “Macedonians,” not Greeks.

How important the FYROM diaspora considers the recognition of them as “Macedonians” is obvious from the fact that it does everything it its power to advertise their “plight” against Greece. Skopje violates the UN Charter and the Interim Agreement by getting into the Internal Affairs of Greece. Just before the last EU elections in Greece, Bulgarian Customs officers intercepted mail sacs directed to Greece with pre-addressed envelopes that included stuffed ballots for the Ouranio Toxo and a €100 bill in each.

Recently, Skopje’s Foreign Ministry disseminated false information on the number of Slavs with FYROM national conscience living in Greece, which according to the same source has

¹⁷ Sam Dolgoff, *Bakunin on Anarchy*, “Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis,” September 1870, 2nd ed., Black Rose Books, June 1, 1980.

¹⁸ The term was popularized by Paul Bousse who wrote an article under the name “Propagande par le fait” published in the *Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne* on August 5, 1877. His companion article, “Hoedel, Nobiling, et la propagande par le fait,” was published about a year later at the *L’Avant-garde*, June 15, 1878.

¹⁹ Robert Graham, ed. “Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas” in *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*, (Tonawanda, NY: Black Rose Books, 2005), 150.

reached 700,000 people. According to the same source, the number of 700,000 “Macedonians” living in Greece is based on an alleged census that took place in 1925.

To begin with, the Minister has lied when he mentioned that the 162,506 people counted in the 1925 census were “Macedonians.” Greece has never recognized “Macedonians” as an ethnic group. Besides, Comintern had not yet recognized the so-called “Macedonian” nation. The census was taken in order to determine the number of ethnic Bulgarians living in Macedonia in view of the voluntary population exchange under the agreement of Politis – Kalfov and the subsequent *Abecedar* book for Slavophone Greeks.

Since the census was counting Bulgarians in the Macedonian region of Greece, one cannot understand why Skopje is concerned about their whereabouts, unless it admits that its “Macedonians” are actually Bulgarians. In that case, the world would like to know how many Bulgarians live in the FYROM as a matter of fact, not as a result of FYROM’s hallucinations. But the Slavs have done and do all possible to promote their “ethnicity.”

Ninety two thousand Bulgarians left Macedonia for Bulgaria. The rest declared themselves Greeks. The dissemination of the *Abecedar* by the Greek government was cancelled for two reasons. The first reason was the pressure from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which had viewed the Slavophones of Greece as Serbs, not Bulgarians. The second reason was that the Slavophone Greeks felt offended because they considered themselves as Greeks. The surprise census that Skopje advertizes does not consider the population exchange. Then, at the end of the Civil War of Greece, almost all of the remaining Slavophones left for Yugoslavia either to avoid being thrown into prison for criminal activities during the Civil War, or because they believed the communist lies that the Greek Army was after them. Some of them had left during the WWII such as Dimitris Tupurkas, or Tupurkovski from Trigonon of Florina Prefecture, who had left during the WWII for Yugoslavia in order to train with Tito’s Partisans and then return home in order to kill Greeks. He joined the JNA and retired with the rank of Major. His son, Vasil Tupurkovski, is a politician of the FYROM. The present FYROM Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s origin is from Macedonia, and although his grandfather fought against the Italians, his parents chose Tito’s communist paradise.

But let us see the number 700,000 from a simple statistical point. Assuming that the 1925 census is correct, the 162,506 Bulgarians who used to live in the region of Macedonia of Greece would have reached 700,000 by 2013 only if the annual growth were at the impossible constant minimum of 1.7% (or 0.017). The true statistics belying the claim of the FYROM MFA are closely related to the fact that in the last EU elections that took place in Greece, only about 3,000 out of approximately 8.5 million voters had indicated that they have Slavic ethnic conscience. The elections monitored by the EU are very genuine, unless Skopje doubts the credibility of the EU. In that case, Skopje should stop its efforts to join a body that it considers untrustworthy. Yet, the fact is quite the opposite.²⁰

²⁰ “Lithuanian Ambassador Jushka: ‘Macedonia’ is not a priority of Lithuanian Presidency of the European Union” *Press 24*. <http://press24.mk/litvanskiot-ambasador-jushka-makedonija-ne-e-prioritet-na->

5.0 Greece's Self-Inflicted Wounds

The foreign policy of Greece is the result of series of dogmatic actions that have gradually developed into a complex, convoluted, and politically polarized undiscerning course of action. Since its independence, Greece's Ministry of Foreign Affairs fights inherited traits of the Greek bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire while old prominent families have been determined to defend their privileges and the status quo of business as usual in the new administration, this time Greek. In other words, many of the ills of modern Greece have their roots in 1830, when the newly formed first modern Greek political parties had such names as the Russian Party, the French Party, or the English Party. To this day, nothing has changed but the names of the political parties; the managing families, their interests or attitudes are the same as before. Politics is a constantly recycling process. As a result of such recycling, the country faced a great dilemma when its northern neighbor, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was dissolved.

On January 3, 1992, a few months after FYROM's declaration of independence (September 8, 1991), an informal meeting of experts from Greece and Skopje took place in Athens. The goal of the meeting was to expedite bilateral issues resulted by Skopje's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. Since all diplomatic instruments are based on the name of the country in question, the issue of the name was at the center of all discussions. The Skopje delegation refused to discuss the name issue and, consequently, the talks failed. Then on February 18, 1992, in an attempt to promote consensus of all political parties on the Macedonia name issue, the then President, Konstantine Karamanlis, convened the first meeting of Greek political party leaders. A few months later, on April 12 and 13, 1992, the second meeting of Greek political party leaders took place. During the first day of the meeting, Greek Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras (present Prime Minister) revealed a seven-point proposal regarding the Macedonian name issue.

On the second day (April 13, 1992), the leaders agreed that Greece would recognize the new state if Skopje was willing to exclude the term "Macedonia" from its official appellation. The only party leader that was concerned about Greece's legal safeguarding its borders with a treaty over the name of Skopje was Aleka Pappariga of the Communist Party. However, on the same day, Prime Minister Konstantine Mitsotakis and Foreign Minister Samaras disagreed on a future policy and strategy of Greece regarding Greece's reaction to a possible recognition of the new state, i.e. Skopje by the international community as "Macedonia." Mitsotakis dismissed Samaras from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and took over the Foreign Ministry himself.

While the European Union and the U.S. government accepted the Greek position, on January 26, 1993, six days after Bill Clinton was sworn in as the new President of the United States, Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis changed position on the matter. Despite the existing agreement (April 13, 1992) of the leaders and without the knowledge of Greece's

litvanskoto-pretседatelstvo-so-evropskata accessed July 29, 2013 and "Message of Lithuanian Ambassador Shocks FYROM," *Macedonia Hellenic Land*, URL: <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/4188/77/lang.el/> accessed July 29, 2013.

President Constantine Karamanlis, Mitsotakis hired the Greek American Public Relations firm “Manatos and Manatos,” to form the “Ad Hoc American Hellenic Leadership Committee.” That Committee, unbeknown to the Greek American Community which it allegedly represented, faxed a letter to the newly elected President Clinton, stating that Greece was willing to compromise on the name issue. Here is the clause:

Greece has reacted favorably to proposals submitted to the UN for the peaceful settlement of a dispute which leave open the avenue of international arbitration. We urge your support for these proposals. It is necessary, however, to block the Skopje application to the UN, **if these proposals are going to lead to meaningful negotiations.** The protection of democratic stability in Greece and the containment of the conflict in the Balkans, will serve the cause of peace as well as the interests of the United States. [Emphasis is mine]²¹

On November 6, 1995, the Greek political leaders, with the exception of Samaras (*Political Spring* established in June 1993, decided in favor of an “honorable compromise” of their country’s national security with the FYROM. However, such a compromise was not necessary at that time. One looks toward an “honorable compromise” only when one already faces defeat.

During the period between the Interim Agreement and present time, Greece’s *laissez faire* attitude toward Skopje has not changed. Actions of the leaders of the Greek political parties have brought a series of intended mishaps and unintended ominous consequences, which proved that politicians of Greece do not qualify to hold the offices to which they are elected.

According to the former MFA of Greece, Dora Bakoyanni (daughter of Con. Mitsotakis), Greece has awarded Skopje 80% of what it sought by constantly giving in. Thus, Skopje has no incentive to allow Greece to receive the remaining 20%. Holding to the already possessed 80%, it negotiates the remaining 20% adhering to the dictum “what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.” It has been the traditional Skopje’s approach to the name issue since 1991.

The policy-makers of Greece had expected the opposite. They are still in denial and indeed perplexed. They have given everything they could to Skopje expecting reciprocity and yet Skopje not only has not reciprocated, but instead, it has launched an all-out social network undertaking, an aggressive diplomatic campaign, and well-planned and executed global operations of disinformation building up concrete support of the world public opinion claiming anything Macedonian as its “inherent” right. It is, in practice, an offensive war of cyberspace to “reclaim” its rights on Macedonia, which rights have been the conclusion of a myth that Macedonia was once theirs and they want it back! It is a war intended to regain the “lost” territory of Macedonia promised to Skopje by Tito and the Greek communists had the latter won the civil war in Greece!

²¹ Chris Spyrou [or Spirou], Speech to the *Association of Greek Alumni of American Universities*, Athens, December 15, 2004.

In an interview with the FYROM newspaper *Utrinski Vesnik*, Mrs. Bakoyanni said,

Greece wishes a solution that respects the sensitivities of both peoples. We proposed a name with a geographical qualifier, which would distinguish your country from the Greek Macedonia. In addition, this name must affect all uses [erga omnes]. If you ask the Greeks, they will respond by 85-90% that the term Macedonia should not be included in the name of your country. This is popular belief in Greece. Politicians in Greece have ignored the political cost in order to find a solution. We expect from Skopje to show the same courage but they are already very late.²²

As Dora Bakoyanni has admitted, not only politicians disregard the feelings and will of the Greek people, but also they are incapable to even negotiate their own political stance on the matter. One would think that the Greek political establishment has learned and as a result would implement a clear and cohesive foreign policy. Instead, they rely on personality driven policies as understood and employed by each Minister of Foreign Affairs and their, oftentimes, subject matter irrelevant staff. Former Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party Mr. Spyrou furthermore claims,

At the time, Lee Herbert Hamilton, a former member of the United States House of Representatives, member of the Democratic Party was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress. According to the journalist Michael Ignatiou in an interview given by Mr. Hamilton, published in the daily newspaper *Πρωινή* of New York a few days after the official recognition of Skopje by the United Nations, Mr. Hamilton stated, “you compromised with a lightning speed so that we did not have a chance to help you. You left us dumbfounded. The correspondence of the same journalist from the United Nations was, “The Greek government lost a unique opportunity to gain significant advantages in the battle against Skopje when due lack of communication with Washington and amateur handling, it accepted an “honorable compromise” without waiting the announcement regarding the position of the new American government on the matter.”²³

But let us see what exactly Mrs. Bakoyanni’s negotiating skills and political “shrewdness” has offered on the table. On December 7, 2009, under the title “The Unknown Dialogue,” the newspaper *Ethnos* of Athens reported that Mrs. Bakoyanni had already agreed to ditch the “erga omnes” red line of Greece while she had no problem recognizing the ethnic and language designation of Skopje.²⁴ According to the report, on September 20, 2008, Mrs. Bakoyanni had accepted the above points as basis for negotiation. Here are the points that

²² Dora Bakoyanni, «η πΓΔΜ δεν θέλει ουσιαστικές διαπραγματεύσεις», *To Vima* 12/07/2011.

<http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=410609&h1=true#commentForm> accessed on July 9, 2013.

²³ Chris Spyrou, Speech to the *Association of Greek Alumni of American Universities*, Athens, December 15, 2004

²⁴ “Ο άγνωστος διάλογος,” *Έθνος*, 7 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, “Απόρρητο έγγραφο της πρεσβείας μας στο Παρίσι αποκαλύπτει ότι στο τετ α τετ Μπακογιάννη - Μίλοσόσκι, η πρώην υπουργός απεμπόλησε «erga omnes», ταυτότητα και γλώσσα.” <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=8742863> accessed July 28, 2013.

she worked so hard for. Mrs. Bakoyanni's exploits before and after Bucharest²⁵ are the following:

- Six months after Bucharest, she does not even mention in discussions of the «erga omnes», i.e. Skopje's name would be for all uses.
- Use of name. She assures Skopje that "the Greek side does not deal with the Skopje Constitution" (author's note: while it is imperative to guarantee implementation of the solution as «erga omnes» requires constitutional revision).
- Identity and language: She proposes the term "Makedonski in Cyrillic as a determinant of language and ethnicity of the people of Skopje." Basically, she had not only accepted the existence of a "Macedonian identity, ethnicity and language," but she practically proposed the recognition of this entity by Greece itself.
- History: Problematic is the reference of Mrs. Bakoyanni in reply to Mr. Miloski that "the history of Macedonia is a matter that belongs to the past."!?!? ²⁶

I want to add a few more instances of failure of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs as the clinching of the European country cyber-acronym MK by the FYROM, because the Greek representative suddenly had problems with his airplane ticket. Thus, although the Conference had taken place in Crete, Greece was not represented. Mrs. Bakoyanni's actions indicate the degree of impertinence on issues of national security. That applies to her MFA and political advisers as well.

When Skopje wanted to send troops to Afghanistan, the MFA of Greece was Dora Bakoyanni and the Minister of Defense was Evangelos Meimarakis. The question of the Skopjans was whether the Greeks, as full members of NATO, would let them participate as "Macedonia" or as "FYROM." Although the Skopjans were willing to show the flag even under the country designation FYROM, Mrs. Bakoyanni told Mr. Meimarakis to be silent on the subject and so he did not object at all. Thus, the Skopjans went to Afghanistan bearing the name "Macedonia" on their country's nametag, instead of FYROM, compliments of Mrs. Bakoyanni and Mr. Meimarakis.

President Bush's ambition to expand NATO resulted in the Adriatic Charter signed in Tirana under the aegis of the United States on May 2, 2003. The Greek Parliament ratified the indirect membership of Skopje to NATO as Republic of "Macedonia", not the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Thus Skopje knocked on the door of NATO as Republic of "Macedonia".

²⁵ Δώρα Αντωνίου "Το παρασκήνιο πριν από το βέτο στο Βουκουρέστι - Τα Wikileaks για το Σκοπιανό" Η Καθημερινή, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_23/03/2011_436712 accessed on July 29, 2013.

²⁶ "Ο άγνωστος διάλογος," Έθνος, 7 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=8742863> accessed July 28, 2013.

The recognition of the FYROM as Republic of “Macedonia” on November 7, 2004 was the result of the detrimental for Greece events that could be avoided had the subsequent governments of Greece since 1991 done their job methodically, responsibly using a well thought strategic plan. All Greek governments without exception handled the issue of the FYROM with the perfect dexterity of an amateur.

The excuse offered by the current Greek government was that the Adriatic Charter had arrived to Athens as a package. Nothing can be further from the truth. NATO decisions are taken by consensus, which means that Greece had agreed to the Adriatic Charter and its contents before it was disseminated by Brussels to the governments of the member states for ratification. The MFA of Greece chose docility over the importance of their country’s national security. Hence, the door opened to the recognition of the FYROM as Macedonia [sic] by the United States 18 months later with, perilous for Greece, ramifications. Another foreign policy failure came about when the FYROM contingent deployed to Afghanistan branding the name “Macedonia” on the uniforms of its soldiers, instead of the FYROM, because Greece did not object.

But the issue is not problematic only on the government side. Every Greek owned company that does business in the FYROM signs a contract with the “Republic of Macedonia [sic],” not the FYROM. Characteristic is the case of Alpha Bank which was explaining its business in Macedonia [sic].²⁷ Nevertheless, this is only one occasion. The question is, how many other companies have done and do the same.

Despite the constant provocations, which through its media, all levels and dimensions of education - formal, informal, non-formal²⁸ - and even diplomatic missions where Skopje incites ethnic hatred against Greeks at home and abroad, Greek politicians put the country’s national security and territorial integrity in the name of good neighborly relations. While they are fully aware of the consequences, the political elite of Greece are still willing to compromise. Greece’s complacent attitude would be facing Skopje’s persistent disregard for the final name agreement, a behavior fully exhibited soon after the Interim Agreement was signed. It is doubtful if any of them has thought that such a compromise could prove to be not only utopian, but also pernicious.

²⁷ Macedonia Hellenic Land. <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2108/77/lang,el/>;
<http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2111/77/lang,el/> ;
<http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/21350/> All above were accessed August 23, 2013.

²⁸ In an overly simplified manner the differences between the three types of education are: **Formal education** – Organized, guided by a formal curriculum, leads to a formally recognized credential such as a high school completion diploma or a degree, and is often guided and recognized by government at some level. **Non-formal learning** – Organized (even if it is only loosely organized), may or may not be guided by a formal curriculum, i.e. (business, government) seminars or conferences. In **informal learning**, the teacher is simply someone with more experience, such as a parent, grandparent or a friend. **Press/TV and Social media (Social media: Blogs, Social networking, Microblogging, Virtual Worlds, Photo and Video sharing services)** could fall in any of the above categories depending on how they are used.

6. Skopje's Venomous Heritage

Skopje has consistently argued that its constitutional name was chosen by its people. This simply is not true. The name "Macedonia" was imposed on its inhabitants by the one party dictatorial system in 1943 in Jajce, Bosnia by the Decision #3 of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia or AVNOJ on November 29, 1943.²⁹ After 50 years of constant education and training, it was expected that the citizens of the area would unquestionably accept the name Macedonia. Even so, the question of the referendum concerning the independence of the country on September 8, 1991, did not include a question regarding the name of the country. The communist government, under new management and name, again gave the name of the new independent republic to the voters as if it was a done deal. One could perceive the question on Skopje's independence as deceptive, since it was promising an eventual union with Yugoslavia. At that time, Yugoslavia existed.

The "constitutional name" that Skopje has chosen is not the real issue; it never was. The real issue is Skopje's aspirations that hide behind the chosen "constitutional name" and the appropriation of Greece's history. Skopje actually has appropriated Bulgarian and Serbian history for the same reasons and based on similar excuses, it claims territories of Bulgaria (*Blagoevgrad*) and Serbia (*Prohor Pčinjski*). The real reason behind all this is the appropriation of the lands that the history of those countries represents.

Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), by international law and norms, all six republics became heirs of the country's all positive and negative issues. The property of the SFRY and its legacy applies to all former republics within the federal entity. Some negative issues are the maltreatment and forced deportation of the Swabian Germans from mainly the region of Banat, Vojvodina, and the facilitation of the kidnapping of Greek children from all over Greece for the sole purpose of the indoctrination to Marxism-Leninism, and forced "Macedonization".

Skopje's version that the Greek national forces had expelled "Macedonian" children, Milan Ristović explains that Greek children from all over Greece were offered to the Yugoslav forces in order for them to transport the children to Romania and Hungary.³⁰ Milan Ristović further states that, "...in January of 1950 there were 2000 children in Bulgaria, 3,500 in Czechoslovakia, 3,000 in Hungary, 500 in Poland, 6,500 in Romania, and 11,000 in Yugoslavia, a total of 26,500 children."³¹ Eudes also mentions that according to the Red Cross reports, there were 23,693 of them: 10,000 in Yugoslavia, 3,801 in Rumania, 3,800 in Hungary, 2,660 in Bulgaria, 2,235 in Czechoslovakia and 2000 in Albania.³² According to official

²⁹ The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia is more commonly known by its Yugoslav abbreviation AVNOJ, which in Serbian is Antifašističko veće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije and in Croatian: Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije.

³⁰ Milan Ristović, *A Long Way Home. Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia 1948-1960* (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 2000), 20.

³¹ Milan Ristović, *Long Return Home, Children Refugees from Greece in Yugoslavia 1948-1960*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2000), 95.

³² Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanos. Partisans and Civil War in Greece...1943-1949* (London: Monthly Review, 1972) 317.

accounts, the total number of child victims kidnapped during the civil war of Greece were 29,877.³³ Specifically, in 1948, 24,871 children; in 1949, 5,006 children; no kidnapping was reported in 1950. These are the same children that the communist world before, and now Skopje, euphemistically and in bad taste calls “children refugees”. For this crime the UN condemned Yugoslavia and asked it to expedite the repatriation of the children (UNGAR 517, dated February 2, 1952, UNGAR 381, dated November 17, 1950, UNGAR 382, dated December 1, 1950). Skopje, as heir and facilitator of the communist Yugoslavia, is responsible for each account.

One more legacy of Skopje is its voluntary espousal of the deeds of the Bulgarians of Macedonia, who in the first quarter of the 20th century savagely roamed and terrorized the Macedonian countryside. They acted against Greece and Greek interests either within the Ottoman Empire or from the Bulgarian Principality using intimidation, murder, armed insurrection, war crimes (Treaty of Neuilly articles 118)³⁴, and other felonies. One must consider that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, requested the extradition from Bulgaria of 1,662 persons “accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war,” 216 of whom were leaders of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, aka IMRO.³⁵

According to the FYROM’s Preamble to its Constitution, “particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic” are part of the heritage of the country. The Ilinden Revolt started at about 6:30 pm of Sunday, July 20 [Old Style], in the town of Krushevo. The Turkish forces of “liberation” came into the town, which was already in flames, early in the morning of Thursday, July 31, 1903. Revolutionary socialist, i.e. communist Karev’s brigands, started their work by killing, pillaging, and burning the non-Bulgarian areas of the town for ten days.³⁶ The Ottoman troops finished the town off. It was a revolt led by criminals, who after they re-invented themselves as freedom fighters, continued their trade of hatred and the skill of killing, raping, burning, pillaging at the expense of Greeks and Greek speaking Vlachs and Albanians as if one tried to excel over the other in doing so. Although it is advertized as an “uprising,” a word that gives the connotation of a widespread revolt, the truth is that the event took place in a relatively small area

³³ Colonel T. Papathanasiades, “The Bandits’ Last Stand in Greece.” Edited by Colonel H. R. Emery. *U.S. Military Review*, Vol. XXX, Number 11, February 1951: 22 – 31.

³⁴ ARTICLE 118

The Bulgarian Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies.

The Bulgarian Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office, or employment which they held under the Bulgarian authorities.

³⁵ Joseph S. Roucek, *Balkan Politics: International Relations in No Man’s Land*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 152 fn 8.

³⁶ Keith Brown, *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 190, 209. Compare to George W. Gawrych, “The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-14,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 22, 3 (Jul., 1986), 307-330; 308.

of the northern part of the Manastir (Monastirion / Bitola) vilayet or province.³⁷ Since it was local, it was a “revolt.”

Misirkov explained to what extent “Macedonian” was the Ilinden revolt as follows: “We can call [the revolt] whatever we like, but in fact it was only a partial movement. It was, and still is, an affair of the Exarchists: that is, a Bulgarian ploy to settle the Macedonian question to its own advantage by creating a *Bulgarian Macedonia*.”³⁸

The “Boatmen” of Thessaloniki (Οἱ Βαρκάρηδες τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης), who by all accounts were a gang of thugs, anarchists and terrorists, who transformed themselves into “revolutionaries,” indiscriminately bombed buildings of Thessaloniki, ships in its port, and killed unsuspecting citizens.

Others preferred acts were more profitable. Under Yane Sandanski, a Bulgarian socialist revolutionary, i.e. communist and follower of Plekhanov, whose gang was responsible for the area of Serres, present day Greece, staged a number of terrorist acts that affected the infamy of the IMRO.³⁹ The most famous act of these felons was the kidnapping of Ms. Ellen Stone for whom the U.S. government, at that time, paid US\$66,000 in ransom (present

³⁷ The Monument of the Ilinden Revolt aka “Makedonium”!

<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Makedonija140.jpg> accessed July 29, 2013.

³⁸ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 45; also see К. П. Мисирковъ, *За Македонските Работи* (София: Либерални Клуб, 1903), 9. The original text is: Ние можеме да го велиме како сакаме, но до действителност оно беше само частично. Оно беше и ет работа на екзархистите, кои се величаат „бугари“, а следователно, тоа ет бугарски маневр, да се решит македонското прашаи’е само во бугарцка полза, то ет да се создайт една „Бугарцка Македонниа“.

³⁹ Aka in English as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Over the first thirty years the organization changed names numerous times. In May 1866 in Bucharest, Romania, Lyuben Karavelov and Vasil Levski started the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee (BTCK) having its purpose the preparation of the people for a national uprising. It dispatched young Bulgarians to spread the message among the Bulgarian people. A few years later, on August 1, 1870 (for some in 1869) Bulgarian émigrés in Romania founded the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCK), which Lyuben Karavelov was an influential factor. Vasil Levski, Dimitar Tsenovich, Panayot Hitov, were involved as well. On July 10, 1876 (for some in 1868) the Bulgarian Charitable Society (BCBO) was established with the sole purpose the coordination of the ‘Bulgarian cause’ in Macedonia and Thrace. In 1872 the Macedonian Society was established to counter Greek Ethniki Etairia. In reality the “Macedonian Society” fully established the Bulgarian propaganda territories west and south of Bulgaria. In April 1885 the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee (BTCRK) was established and on October 23, 1893 the Bulgarian Macedono- Odrinski (Thracian) Revolutionary Committee (BMORK) and according to some historians the organization changed its name sometime between 1896 and 1897 to Bulgarian Macedonian-Odrinski Revolutionary Committee (BMORK). However, in 1902 it was renamed to Secret Macedonian - Odrinski revolutionary organization (TMORO) and in 1905 to Internal Macedonian - Odrinski revolutionary organization (VMORO). The organization as independent unit ceased to exist in 1910, although its members under Protogerov continued their association with the Bulgarian government. During the Balkan Wars and WWI, the organization fought against Bulgaria’s adversaries and in 1920 split into two organizations. One of them became known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (aka IMRO) and the other as the Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization. The last one disappeared after the treaties of Severs and Lausanne. The right wing of the IMRO that was responsible for the assassination of Serbia’s King Alexander in 1924. Although allegedly both wings of the IMRO signed the famous May Manifesto, the fact is that only the leadership of the left had actually done so. The left wing of the IMRO was responsible for Comintern’s recognition of the “Macedonian” ethnicity, as the third Slavic ethnicity in the Balkans besides the Serbian and Bulgarian on January 11, 1934. The new political parties in Bulgaria and the FYROM are namesakes of the old IMRO with no connection to either wing of the old organization in any way.

equivalent of about US\$15 million),⁴⁰ has become Skopje's heritage by its own admission. They had originally demanded 25,000 gold Turkish liras, or approximately US\$110,000, which for that time, the sum was colossal. The reason for such terrorist act was the need for money that would finance their weapons supplies.

This kidnapping was the first terrorist act ever against a U.S. citizen. And to top this, Skopje has erected statues in testimony to the exaltation of these criminals.⁴¹ Even by standards of those times, these people were considered terrorists.

7. Skopje's Beliefs and Norms

The Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, as modified by the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), did not set the present state borders in the Balkans. It established ONLY the borders of Bulgaria in relation to its neighbors, which excludes the borders between the FYROM and Greece. Bilateral treaties, conventions, and protocols had already established the remaining borders of the south Balkan countries. Besides, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Article 62.2.a) is clear: Treaties establishing borders may not change or be nullified.

Preying on people's ignorance, Skopje claims that article 15 of the UN Charter gives them the right to have the "Macedonian" nationality. Nationality, in international legal terms and norms, is a loose term for citizenship, not ethnicity. The UN Charter states that every person must have a country that he or she calls home and everyone is entitled to a passport. According to provisions of article 2 of the UN Charter, ethnicity and language constitute an internal issue for each nation-state. It is the reason why countries do not recognize ethnicities and languages of another country.

For instance, the nationality of a U.S. national is *United States of America* regardless of one's country of origin or ethnicity. Not every U.S. national is a U.S. citizen, i.e. the American Samoans, but they carry U.S. passports. Passports of all countries of the world that have the designation of nationality on their passports bear the name of the country as nationality, i.e. citizenship. The U.S. Constitution not only does not recognize ethnicities, but it does not even include a provision for an official language.

Ethnicity is a personal matter and falls under one's individual right, which differs from group rights. The belief that nationality is equivalent to ethnicity existed only within communist Yugoslavia and other multiethnic nation-states such as the USSR. It derived from Lenin's definition of a nation, as it appears in Joseph Stalin's book *Marxism and the Nation-*

⁴⁰ Teresa Carpenter, *The Miss Stone Affair: America's First Modern Hostage Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 57, 73, 157.

⁴¹ Statue of the Boatmen in Skopje.

<http://www.macedonians.com.au/forum/showthread.php/12628-Skopje-2014-The-Boatmen-of-Thessaloniki-1903-Sculpture-Gemid%C5%BEii-%CE%93%CE%B5%CE%BC%CE%B9%CF%84%CE%B6%CE%AE%CE%B4%CE%B5%CF%82> accessed July 29, 2013. The title Gemidji 1903 in Cyrillic is obvious (Гемиџии 1903).

al Question published in *Works*, English Edition (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946).⁴²

Greece is not a federal or confederate state with constitutionally set borders, but a unitary country with administrative areas. The borders of these administrative areas approximate the borders of the ancient tribal or geographic areas, modified to serve present needs and norms of Greece. The existence of the Ministry of Northern Greece, which includes Macedonia and Thrace, is testament that Greece considers these regions vital for its national security. Also, Skopje contends that Greece changed the name of its northern province from Northern Greece to Macedonia just before the fall of the Wall. The facts belie such a notion.

According to Greek Historical Archives (file 79), the General Administration of Macedonia was established in 1914. That means that Greece had established not only its presence in Macedonia, but she also officially restored the name after more than 480 years under Ottoman rule.

On March 6, 1987, Greece re-arranged its Ministry of "Northern Greece" to the administrations of "Central and Western Macedonia" on one hand and "Eastern Macedonia and Thrace" on the other, returning to the provincial arrangement of the era of the Colonels (1967 – 1974). At present, the Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace is located in Thessaloniki.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)⁴³ exchanges information with intelligence agencies of other allied countries as country-members of NATO, but also with other friendly countries under the National Disclosures Policy.⁴⁴ As changes in the communist world were unfolding and communist countries were democratizing, intelligence agencies directly affected by the changes, such as the Finnish Intelligence Agencies,⁴⁵ were constantly exchanging information with the U.S. Intelligence Community. While that was happening, both U.S. national security advisors to President George Herbert Walker Bush, Condoleezza Rice, an expert on the USSR, and Brent Scowcroft, U.S. leading expert on international policy, insisted that they could foresee that 1991 would not be "a period for great initiatives."⁴⁶ In addi-

⁴² Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin*, tr. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 157.

⁴³ Per the website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) "The U.S. Intelligence Community is a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations, including the ODNI, within the Executive Branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather and analyze the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities." The IC member agencies in alphabetical order are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

⁴⁴ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 6.

⁴⁵ The Finnish Intelligence Agency (*Suojelupoliisi*) and the Finnish Military Intelligence Service (*Pääesikunnan tiedusteluosasto*),

⁴⁶ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 347).

tion, the CIA could not even predict the USSR communist coup of August 18 - 21, 1991.⁴⁷ When the fall of the USSR took place, the U.S. Intelligence Community was caught by great surprise. They were admittedly embarrassed. They could not believe what was going on; nobody had predicted it.

Coming to the specific issue of Yugoslavia, Marten van Heusen, a career foreign service officer, was appointed to replace Condoleezza Rice at the National Security Council (NSC). Heusen visited Yugoslavia in the summer 1990. In his report to the NSC published in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), he stated that the Yugoslav politicians would agree to a solution keeping the country together so that Yugoslavia would stay intact. He wrote that the Yugoslav politicians “will muddle through, because the collapse of the nation is so dark a future that the Yugoslav, especially the JNA⁴⁸ officer corps won’t allow it to happen.”⁴⁹

On September 27, 1990, about two weeks before the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 15 - 90, Ambassador Zimmerman felt that “the [Yugoslav] nation’s unity had substantially decayed, over the last six months, mainly as the forces of nationalism had grown to the point where political decentralization was almost inevitable.”⁵⁰ Under the title *Yugoslavia Transformed*, dated October 18, 1990, the NIE states “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic Reform will not stave off the breakup.”⁵¹

The U.S. Administration and the U.S. Intelligence Community (at that time, 16 intelligence agencies), the best intelligence apparatus in the world, could not predict the end of the USSR a few months before it happened and the same could not foresee the disintegration of Yugoslavia before October 1990. Yet, Skopje wants the world to believe that Greece knew about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1988!

Skopje also disseminates that “nobody objected,” to the name Macedonia held by Skopje since its inception. They obviously missed that in 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius disputed the name not only of the “republic,” but also of the “Macedonian” ethnicity. In Greece, while the civil war was being fought, the UN had charged Yugoslavia with both inspiring the civil war and giving material aid to the insurgents.

In 1962, the then Prime Minister of Greece Konstantinos Karamanlis, himself a Macedonian, started talks with Josip Broz Tito about changing the name of the republic of “Macedonia.” Tito was very receptive to the idea, but the nationalist cabinet of Skopje opposed it. As the discussions between Karamanlis and Tito continued, Greece held elections on November 3, 1963, which Karamanlis lost to George Papandreou, a Socialist, and the talks dis-

⁴⁷ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 424).

⁴⁸ JNA is the Serbo-Croatian acronym for Jugoslavenska narodna armija or Yugoslavian People’s Army

⁴⁹ NIE (Aug. 2006), 709.

⁵⁰ The Intelligence Community Case Method Program, “Appendix B. A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslavia: From the National Communism to National Collapse*, U.S. Intelligence Community Estimate Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990. National Defense University. Approved for Release Date: Aug 2006 (NIC 2006-0004 December 2006) 711.

⁵¹ NIE 15 - 90 (May 2006) 654.

continued. The fact that the Greek government was talking to Tito's government about the name of Skopje means that Greece had objected to Skopje's name.

Sometime after April 21, 1967, the dictatorial regime (1967 – 1974), divided the Ministry of "Northern Greece" into the administrations of "Central and Western Macedonia" and "Eastern Macedonia and Thrace." After the fall of the regime, the new government brought back the Ministry of "Northern Greece."

The problem is not what Greece has done or has not done. The problem is what Skopje has done and keeps doing. In 1978, while in Novi Sad during dinner, I responded to a pertinent question from one of the guests stating that I was a Macedonian. The host, an officer of the Yugoslavian Navy, who knew my background "corrected" me by saying that I was a Greek, not a Macedonian. Even after I explained to them what I meant, they were incredulous to the fact that I considered myself a Macedonian within the Hellenic domain. To them, a Macedonian simultaneously could not be Greek.

In another trip to Yugoslavia, a Serbian female colleague of mine said, "you [the Greeks] have Macedonia, as well." My response was, "You are wrong; Macedonia is part of Greece. With the exception of the area of Bitola/Ohrid, no other location in Yugoslavia qualifies as Macedonia." She could not understand it. Her one-party dictatorship "education" did not permit her to perceive the fact that she was historically wrong.

In October 2010, I had an experience in the amphitheater of the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle, Western Australia when one of the Skopjans present, provocatively wearing a red T-shirt with the golden Sun of Vergina, while his friends were laughing, he yelled, "Philip [II] was a Slav!" Of course, these people could not infer that if Philip II of Macedonia was a Slav, it would make Skopje's prevailing view that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct nation not related to any other Balkan nations, moot. Since they believe that they descent from the ancient Macedonians, the same argument makes them Slavs, as well. It seems that the whole country agrees that all of them are *Macedonians*, but they still have to persuade themselves and everyone else on their ethnicity.

The fact is that the regional identity of the Macedonians of Greece, as it is of Greeks of all regions, is very strong and it is exhibited both in Greece and the Greek diaspora. Characteristic of such identity is the expression of the former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, who in January 2007 at a meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, stated, "*I myself am a Macedonian, and another two and a half million Greeks are Macedonians.*"

The present educational system in the FYROM is based on the former one-party communist dictatorship that allows the previous political doctrine and national interest to guide history as long as it revolves around *Macedonianism*. It is the same system that "improved" the Bulgarian political concept under which the present FYROM used to be Macedonia!!! Somehow, Paionia and Dardania, the ancient lands that form the bulk of the FYROM territory, have disappeared from the ancient world as if they never existed. This understanding of the ancient world has continued to thrive after the independence of the FYROM, thus increasingly becoming stronger and stronger. Some of the Skopjans have even re-baptized

Paionians and Dardanians to “independent” Macedonian tribes, in their effort to justify the name of the FYROM as “Macedonia.”

According to the Greek MFA website [<http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/>], the Greek government is cognizant of the FYROM’s violations of the Interim Agreement. All violations hit the heart of Greece’s national security. It is understandable that the last thing Greece wants is to be blamed as being “non-constructive,” but Greece has not done anything against the constant provocations from Skopje. But here is the issue. I disagree with the characterization by the Greek MFA that “the name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the promotion of an assumed irredentism that hides territorial ambitions on the part of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*.” Since neither the FYROM nor its inhabitants ever controlled Macedonia, their actions are not the result of a lost fatherland to be “irredentist”, but it is simply expansionistic. I also find the depiction of the Macedonia name issue being a matter of “sovereignty and territorial integrity” very interesting, but also confusing. Since the name issue is so important to the territorial integrity of Greece, why is the Greek government willing to compromise on the name of Macedonia, i.e. the country’s national security? One only wonders exactly how the same politicians will answer future generations of Greeks who ask them, “Why did you allow a discredited and irrelevant adversary to take away from Greece what our forefathers suffered pain for and shed a lot of blood and tears for to keep it Greek?”

In the book *Mein Kampf*, Hitler made it clear that Germany’s aim was “the acquisition and penetration of the territory east of the Elbe” adding, “We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east.”⁵² That was his goal and when he came into power, he implemented it.

The same is true regarding the goal of Skopje, the acquisition and penetration of the territory south of Mount Vorras or Kajmakchalan. Not one of Skopje’s diaspora, which by the way votes in the FYROM’s national elections, hides the fact that their dream is the “unification” of all Macedonian lands. Not one of the politicians in Skopje hides the same goal since they are all behind the funding of festivities, statues, and naming of streets and buildings and their insistence of their “constitutional name” and ethnicity.

Whether the framers of Yugoslavia considered the Skopjans Slavs or descendants of the ancient Macedonians was reflected in the legal system of the federal state.⁵³ It is important for one to keep in mind that it is the same system that nurtured and molded the *Macedonism* of the Skopje Slavs. The explanation below is a simplified version of the system devoid of political explanations; however, it is based on Tito’s interpretation of Marxism.

⁵² Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Volume I - A Reckoning, Chapter XIV: Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy <http://www.angelfire.com/folk/bigbaldbob88/MeinKampf.pdf> accessed on June 18, 2014.

⁵³ Yugoslavia was a term that unified the six South Slavic nations. The idea of Yugoslavism grew out of the *Illyrian Movement* in the mid-1800s, in its development included Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, and to some degree even Bulgarians. South Slavic languages and dialects are similar enough to the point that their speakers understand each other without special training.

The architects of post-WWII Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito, charted the foundations of the new state of Yugoslavia after considering all the ethnic groups within communist Yugoslavia. Among the delegates to the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, aka, AVNOJ from Skopje representing the Slav population of Greek Macedonia was Dimitar Vlahov, and representing the Bulgarian Macedonia was Vlado Popotomov (or Pop-Tomov).⁵⁴ Both of them were Bulgarians. Dimitar Vlahov was a former Deputy of the Bulgarian Parliament representing the Communist Party of Bulgaria,⁵⁵ and Vlado Poptomov became the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria in 1949.⁵⁶ On December 26, 1943, in an encoded telegram to the pseudonym Walter, one of Tito's *nom de guerre*, Georgi Dimitrov, the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party, protested the inclusion to the AVNOJ of both Vlahov and Poptomov as being Bulgarians.⁵⁷

The original name of the communist Yugoslavia was People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with each constituent republic bearing the title, People's Republic.⁵⁸ In order to bring the People's Republic of "Macedonia" in line with its communist roots, Skopje made the communist partisan song the anthem of the republic, which today is the FYROM's national anthem with some modifications, e.g. Vlahov's name has been wiped out of the anthem. The framers wanted to ensure that the ethnic Slavic groups formed the backbone of the country. Simultaneously, they realized that the Serbs, who were more numerous than the other Slavs, were a factor they could not ignore. Tito wanted a politically "balanced" country, a Slavic Yugoslavia with Marxist flavor.

According to the system of *Nations and Ethnicities (Narodi i Narodnosti)*, the Slavic peoples of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia – the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Muslims and "Macedonians" - each ethnic group was considered a *narod* or nation, because their origin was inside Yugoslavia. If the mother country of an ethnic group lay outside Yugoslavia, it was defined as a *narodnost* or ethnicity, but not a minority in the legal sense. This was how the Albanians, Germans, Russians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Hungarians, etc. were classified. Officially, Yugoslavia did not recognize minorities because in a country that all peoples are equal before the law, the issue of minorities was non-existent. Recognition of a minority oftentimes is accompanied by privileges that make the minority having more rights than the majority. After all, such recognition would be against Marxism's "national question." The differences however are more obvious in the matter of official languages. Languages of *nations*, i.e. Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and "Macedonian," were official throughout Yugoslavia; however, the languages of the *ethnicities* were official only within their own republics or provinces.

The system of *Nations* (ethnic Slavs originated from within Yugoslavia) and *Ethnicities* (ethnic others) had little to do with the size of an ethnic group and only with whether the

⁵⁴ Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za Biografiju* (Beograd: Kultura, 1955), 380. Also compare John Bell, *Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 66.

⁵⁵ John Bell, *Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 66.

⁵⁶ Ivo Banač (Editor), *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 111.

⁵⁷ Ivo Banač (Editor), *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 291.

⁵⁸ In this form, the People's Republic of "Macedonia" was established in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on August 2, 1944.

origins and mother-country of a specific group was inside or outside Yugoslavia. For example, since only the Slav peoples were allowed to form a Republic, the Montenegrins, the Slovenes, and the Slavs of Skopje, although fewer in number than the Albanians, formed a Republic, while the Albanians, despite their greater numbers, were only an ethnic group or other living in an autonomous Province within a Republic, i.e. Serbia.

Based upon the system of *Nations* and *Ethnicities* as laid down by Tito and the architects of a socialist Yugoslavia, including delegates from Skopje, only Slavic nations whose mother country was within the AVNOJ Yugoslavia could form a constituent republic of the country. Other Slavic ethnic groups such as Slovaks, Ruthenians (aka Pannonian Rusyn) were considered *Ethnicities* because their mother country was outside the national borders of Yugoslavia. The leadership of Yugoslavia had determined that the prevalent people of Skopje had met the two determinants to classify them as Slavs as required for the formation of their republic, i.e. their mother country was within Yugoslavia and they were Slavs.

The “Macedonia name dispute” is not a simple political issue as some Greeks suggest, nor it is a matter of a simple usurpation of the Greek history, as others believe. It is in the heart of the FYROM’s national interests. Ancient history is being used as a covert act of aggression and expansionism. Claiming ancient Macedonian heritage, Skopje sets the foundations for a legitimate claim of entitlement over the land of Macedonia. It challenges Greece’s territorial integrity and because of it, it hits the heart of Greece’s national security. The meaning of *Macedonia* and its derivatives, as has evolved in the FYROM and its diaspora, is not veneer, but rather it is as essential to them as the air they breathe.

8. Skopje’s Values

Although the FYROM is not a communist country anymore, the whole system of *Macedonianism* was built on communist ideology and political agenda in the Balkans. Its mentality is still authoritarian with an understanding of the early 1900’s. A communist organization, Comintern, under Joseph Stalin based on Lenin’s definition of a nation, baptized the Bulgarians in Macedonia, as “Macedonians.” The communist regime, under Joseph Broz Tito, molded and nurtured the new nation of “Macedonians” and every single institution of Tito’s Yugoslavia, focusing on this constituent republic, was established in order to reinforce Skopje’s “Macedonian” ethnicity, language, history, and general heritage.

What the people of the FYROM value most is the incorporation of “Aegean Macedonia” to their country. The title “Aegean Macedonia,” which circulates in official and unofficial circles means that Skopje and its citizens do not recognize Macedonia proper as an integral part of Greece, but as an occupied region integral to the FYROM. In addition, judging from the gigantic flag that depicts Skopje’s understanding of Macedonia, which should “unite,” a flag that additionally brands the golden Sun of Vergina on a red background, one cannot but conclude that the dream and therefore the goal of the Skopje Slavs is a united Macedonia under their government. The flag of a “United” Macedonia made its official debut during the government sponsored 20th anniversary of the FYROM’s independence.

From statements of common people and photographs of Skopje's officials, we reach the same conclusion. On the international front, Skopje has not been idle, but has actively worked on everyone including the U.S. government.



**Skopje, September 8, 2011,
20th Anniversary of Independence Celebrations.
The flag of a "United Macedonia"**

In a Country Handbook published by the U.S. Department of Defense, the map of geographic Macedonia prepared by a professor of Skopjan descent depicted the Greek and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia as "Occupied Macedonian Territories."⁵⁹ Although the matter was made known to the governments of the United States and Greece, it took a few years and a lot of yelling from the Greek American organizations to both Greece and the United States for the U.S. Department of Defense to withdraw the booklet.

In another case, an unclassified map published by the CIA and sold by the U.S. Government Published Office (GPO) bore gross historical inaccuracies. The timeline branded on the side of the FYROM map started at the ancient Macedonian Kingdom of Philip II, but somehow in the modern era switched to the FYROM with Mr. Gligorov being the President of the modern state moving the ancient Macedonian territory and the heritage north. In both cases, the Greek government was as loud as a dead sardine.

In April 2010, the U.S. Department of State published an article in its official magazine entitled: "Skopje – Ancient Macedonia Builds Modern Democracy." The author, Ms. Stephanie Rowlands, claimed that Skopje is the legitimate heir of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia. The force behind it was the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) and United "Macedonian" Diaspora (UMD). Nevertheless, the issue of ancient Macedonia, per se, is not

⁵⁹ Marcus A. Templar, "Twenty Years after Independence: Activities of the Government, the Citizens, and the Diaspora of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the FYROM) for the Appropriation & Possession of the Name "Macedonia." <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2875/76/lang,el/> accessed on July 10, 2013.

as important as it is that the article had connected the “the Pearl of the Balkans,” i.e. Lake Ohrid to a song with the same title, which clearly states that the “three Macedonias” should unite. Of course, this union would materialize at the expense of Greece and Bulgaria. Thus in the eyes of the FYROM Slav nationals, the U.S. State Department had espoused the FYROM’s nationalist dream for a “united” Macedonia as the Comintern had agreed to, an encouraging act. The government of Greece remained idly and oddly disengaged.

The slogan “Macedonia is One” which must unite under a “Macedonian,” i.e. Skopjan government, is what the people of the FYROM value most. That makes the incorporation of the Bulgarian and Greek part of Macedonia the FYROM’s national goal. The adoption of the history of ancient Macedonia by Skopje is not a misguided or perceived heritage, but it is an organized scheme that the *Macedonists* and *Pan-Slavists* needed in order to a). Galvanize the FYROM masses and thusly offer a reason for them to fight for their “heritage,” and b). Trick the international community into going along with the “will of the people” as it did for the Bulgarians in Eastern Rumelia (1885) and the Albanians in Kosovo (1999). For those who believe such a thing is impossible I suggest that they study the history of the IMRO and draw their own conclusions. Territorial expansion of Skopje to the south and southeast, even if it seems impossible at this point, might be possible in the future. The desire of the FYROM’s Slavic population for the Slavic control of all Macedonian territories as their inherent right makes it the people’s national goal. The official FYROM, in order to reflect the goal of the nation, has manifested that goal in the form of its national interest, as is apparent in its domestic and foreign policies. Such a manifestation is consistent with the psycho-synthesis of insecure polities that see “enemies” all around them, such as Turkey, North Korea, Iran, etc.

The Skopje diaspora is very organized and actively assists anti-Greek elements located within Greece in the form of a political party such as Ουράνιο Τόξο or media Nova Zora (Νέα Αυγή). The anti-Hellenic website MakNews is registered to Lubi Uzunovski of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Additionally, Skopje has people working either directly or indirectly as consultants for Wikipedia (and other Wiki’s such as Wikimedia, Wikianswers, Wikispace, Wikisource, etc.) who are very instrumental in anything that has to do with issues of Macedonia. Wikis employ FYROM staff under the directorship of the President of the Association, Dimce Grozdanoski who feed the Wiki websites with information created in Skopje and thus they disseminate their unopposed view on issues that should concern Greece. Grozdanoski is currently employed as an IT advisor in the Government Administration of the Ministry of Education and Science of the FYROM.⁶⁰ If, to the academic, political, and journalistic world, Wikimedia is insignificant and below their standards, they must realize that it is easily accessible to everyone, especially to children who educate themselves by doing their homework using this new source as reference. One of the first websites that comes up first on any subject is Wikimedia and its similar appellations.

⁶⁰ <http://www.linkedin.com/in/dimcegrozdanoski> (accessed October 29, 2011).

Diplomatic employees such as Ambassadors, Consuls, and high-ranking employees of the FYROM MFA are photographed before “United Macedonia” maps. They portray in their personal social network pages a “United Macedonia” being in their heart and slogans like “Macedonia’s Name will not perish” appear under the map of a “United Macedonia.” These kinds of maps are reminiscent of the Argentinean maps proclaiming the Falkland Islands as Argentine territory under occupation. Such maps had precipitated the April 1982, 10-week Argentina’s war with the UK that cost 650 Argentinean and 255 British lives ending with Argentina’s surrender.

In the domestic arena, *Macedonianism* is fully protected through various laws, which disallow educational institutions to discuss the issue of the ancient Macedonians. Free speech is only on paper. Various government sponsored institutions and the Church exalt *Macedonianism* and encourage it. When the racist and offensive *Macedonian Prayer* made its debut in government sponsored TV stations, neither the official Church nor the government of the FYROM condemned it. With the blessings of the Skopjan Church, churches within the FYROM and abroad depict pagan symbols and personalities. In the village Musomishta (only 800 meters south of Goce Delchev – Nevrokopi) in southwestern Bulgaria, the Sun of Vergina is branded on the floor of the church of Saint Nicholas. In addition, according to History Professor Bozhidar Dimitrov, Director of the Bulgarian Museum of National History, a church in the FYROM depicts on its walls icons of the “saints” Philip II and Alexander the Great, both pagans, which according to the Canons of the Eastern Orthodox Faith constitutes a sacrilege.⁶¹ The Church of Skopje by harboring the depiction of pagan symbols and personalities embraces heresy.

In their foreign policy, all diplomatic moves resonate from and aim at the implementation and expansion of *Macedonianism* abroad. Foreign dignitaries attended a vigorous and elaborate presentation on why the FYROM Slavs are Macedonians drawing legitimacy from various sources including Greek, purposely misinterpreted in order to justify the desired result.

In those presentations the bottom line is that the meaning of words patriots and nationalists are reversed. Skopjans are demonstrated as patriots although they want to grab Greece’s territories and Greeks are nationalists despite the fact that they only want to keep what is theirs. Why does Skopje go to such extent? Michael Roskin argues,

At least one element of the medieval churchmen survives in national interest thinking. Humans have souls, and these are judged in an afterlife, they argued. Accordingly, humans can be held to exacting standards of behavior with curbs on beastly impulses. States, being artificial creations, have no souls; they have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their survival. States are amoral and can do things individual

⁶¹ “Bozhidar Dimitrov: Placing pagan symbol - star of Vergina in Christian church is sacrilege” (Бождидар Димитров: Поставянето на езически символ – Звездата на Вергина на християнска църква е кощунство) (Sofia: *Agency Fokus*, July 23, 2013), <http://www.focus-news.net/?id=n1809055>

humans cannot do. It is in this context that churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas proposed theories of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Clausewitz also contributes to the national-interest approach. All state behavior is motivated by its need to survive and prosper.⁶²

But in the discussion of territories and claims over Macedonia, the human element or human terrain is completely missing. Besides, the question is how Skopje is going to achieve the occupation of Macedonia. Even if one assumes that Skopje succeeds in taking over effective control of the area, how is Skopje going to deal with the 2.5 million Macedonian Greeks? Although this is a very good question that makes the Skopjan claim laughable, the fact is that those who understand the Skopje's thinking would not even smirk. From personal knowledge, their plan under Tito was the expulsion of the Greeks from Macedonia.

Skopje is very cognizant of reality and so are those of its own diaspora. Nonetheless, they refuse to connect their desire to see Greeks out of Macedonia with the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, such expectations are not groundless. The behavior of the Greek politicians in the last century feeds such thoughts. The pogroms of the 1950s by Turkey went unanswered, the invasion of Cyprus still lingers with the Greek leadership of the island ready to compromise the existence of their own country. The political "leadership" in Athens found the junta to be its easy scapegoat hoping to free themselves from the responsibility for the political instability and constitutional crisis they had imposed on Greece that gave the junta the excuse to intervene on April 21, 1967.

In Western Thrace, the Turk Consul General is actually in charge because the MFA of Greece, which is responsible for the area, is absolutely inactive. In addition, the Greek state has tolerated Skopje's propaganda on the name issue. These and some other similar sheepish responses of the Greek state reinforce Skopje's belief that everything is possible if one insists, persists, provokes, and harasses the Greeks. Everything has its limits and so does the patience of the Greek people.

9. Conclusion

The development of the national security policy and consequently strategy entails the full and undivided attention of every government, including countries who are members of the EU and NATO. No matter how strong the union and no matter how trustworthy the alliance, neither of them can replace the necessity of a sound national security and foreign policy based on collected intelligence.

The EU is a union of customs, commerce, and finance, not a political union. Even if one day the countries of the EU unite politically, it is doubtful if the union will last long. Since the peoples of the EU have different national heritages and goals, a future union would be as temporary as it was for the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. We saw what happened

⁶² Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," *Parameters*, XXIV, 4, Winter 1994-95, 4-18 in Selected Readings in Strategy and Force Planning, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, Vol I, SFP-3 Through SFP-18, p. 5.

with the countries that sprang up from them. Some of them resorted to war among themselves and others still have border disputes only because their federation took place under "brotherly" conditions. Only those states with clear-cut recognized borders before the federation came out of it without problems. In addition, in the last few years it became evident that the most economically powerful attempted to impose, and in some cases did impose, their will over the less fortunate countries.

NATO is an association of defense interests, an alliance that when common interests exist the organization comes into play a role. Experience has taught us that within NATO, the most powerful regard their interests as vital, while the same powers consider the interests of the less powerful as insignificant even when they are related to the member's national security.

Although these organizations give the feeling of security to some of its members, the fact is that no country, no matter how friendly or closely connected, can offer to another a guarantee of full support in time of need. Various circumstances might impede such assistance. Over the years of Tito's rule, *Macedonianism* was nurtured, aided, grew, and elusively changed its form, but because of a constant anti-Hellenic education, its goal has remained the same. For as long as Skopje continues to offer education of all sorts to its citizens based on anti-Hellenic absurdity, an agreement with Greece might materialize, but a solution on the issue will only exist in the imagination of naïve politicians. The crisis will linger, gradually becoming Greece's living nightmare. Slavs of the FYROM and its diaspora expect that the EU membership would allow them under the free movement chapters of the *acquis* to modify the demography of the Macedonian region of Greece in order to tilt the human terrain to their advantage.

Admittedly, not all problems have solutions, even bad ones, but given the fact that the political establishment of Greece has brought the country's national security through their insular mentality into question, the politically privileged of Greece must now manage any upcoming agreement with appropriate care preventing Skopje from establishing a threshold for future territorial claims.

Since the public opinion associates the name Macedonia to an existing homonymous country, it is natural that the public opinion also associates the historical, i.e. ancient Macedonia to the same country. Consequently, in the future, the country with the exclusive designation "Macedonia" would be at ease in claiming the territories of ancient Macedonia as its own integral part. In this manner, the name issue of Skopje becomes an issue of territorial integrity and consequently the national security of Greece.

Skopje's argument that any change of the country's name would affect the identity and language of the country, and by that very act would insult the "dignity" of its Slavic population, is inconsequential and of less importance to Greece. To Greece, its own territorial integrity is much more significant than Skopje's psychological problems. After all, Skopje has created its own problems.

Since 1944, the same people who keep selling nonsense about their “ethnic” Macedonian ancestry have insulted the dignity and the intelligence not only of their own people, but indeed the world. Skopje should have thought about the dignity of its people long before it started spreading *Macedonianism* as a historical fact and not as a political ploy that aspired annexation of Greek territories.

Conversely, Skopje bears full responsibility for its people’s identity, language, and psychological heritage problems given that Skopje’s successive governments since 1944 have been behind such deceptive designation such as ethnic “Macedonian,” “Macedonian language,” and “Macedonian heritage.” After all, the fact is that the term “Macedonian” was always used as a geographic designation followed by the ethnic designation, i.e. Macedonian Slavs, even according to Misirkov, “The designation Macedonian was first used by the Macedonian Slavs as a geographical term to indicate their birth. This designation is well known to the Macedonian Slavs and all of them use it to describe themselves,”⁶³ while Dimitar Vlahov agreed,

When I talk about Macedonian people, in first place, I have in mind the Macedonian Slavs. By the name Macedonian people, the Macedonian activists at that time have in mind the entire population of Macedonia, i.e. the word Macedonians had a geographical connotation... When the revolutionary organization was founded and began operating, I started working amidst those Macedonians who called themselves Bulgarians...⁶⁴

The fact is that all the inhabitants of Macedonia used and still use the same designation for reasons of birth, not just the Slavs. The difference is that the Bulgarians in Macedonia struggled for their recognition as separate from the Bulgarians legal entity, because not only they wanted independence from the Ottomans, but simultaneously they wanted to declare a “Peoples Republic” long before the establishment of the USSR. Had the brigands declared themselves Bulgarians fighting for a People’s Republic, they would have met with resistance by their own Bulgarian kin of the Principality along with the rest of Europe and especially the Russians.

But let us reflect on the transpired events since 1991. The FYROM is a country that a quarter of a century ago did not exist as an independent state and in terms of dealing with Greece, it has dominated the political scene in Europe and North America only by selling bogus arguments based on political hot air. In addition, although it has violated the Interim Agreement in any way it could, it has managed to persuade the ICJ that it has been the victim all along. That indicates the degree of political resolve, ability, and willingness of the FYROM to use its national power, something that Greece has neglected to do.

The reason for such neglect is that the political establishment, the academia, and the press of Greece are not convinced that the FYROM has constituted a national security threat to the country. They constantly underestimate the danger from the north. Consequently, they have passed their simple-minded sentiments to the people of Greece, which, although in its majority, is unwilling to let its heritage pass along to a Slav people, in its majority the Greek

⁶³ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 159.

⁶⁴ Димитар Влахов, *Мемоари*, Скопје, 1970, 21 (translation from the original is mine).

people (ὁ λαός) is unaware that the stakes are much higher than the various pseudo-cultured members of “intelligentsia” proclaim.

The name dispute between Greece and Skopje is not simply a “national issue,” but it is a “national security issue” for Greece. Greece had better treat it as such. In the last 22 years, considering their own convenience due to their natural ineffectiveness or chosen incompetence, the political establishment of Greece has downgraded “national security issues” to “national issues.” It is a political ploy that helped politicians to conveniently sweep under the rug a matter that no Greek would have ever accepted otherwise, the compromise of their country’s territorial integrity, if not its survival.

The elected officials and influential politicians of Greece bear the sole responsibility to handle the issue of Greece’s national security and territorial integrity in a dependable and responsible manner. Naïve, indifferent, whining, and “poor me” behavior would not absolve their guilt and condemnation by future generations for their intended actions or inactions. Although communists tend to blame the Westerners for the mess of the Macedonian Question, they should know that Russia is at fault. The source of the problem of the Macedonian Question is not the Americans, not even the Westerners; the Russians are. At least, it is what the former President of the Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” has explained,

Neither Marx nor Lenin, any more than Soviet academics or the leaders of the Bulgarian socialist movement, have ever overlooked or indeed concealed the fact that tsarist Russia - although objectively aiding the Balkan peoples to gain emancipation from Turkish rule, did make this problem more difficult, turning it into a question of the Balkan interests of the European imperialists precisely because it was pursuing its own conquest rather than the actual liberation of the Balkan peoples. History has also shown that in view of the balance of forces at the time, San Stefano Bulgaria was a fiction; that the European powers could accept the liberation of Bulgaria but not also the creation of a “greater Bulgaria” as an instrument of Russian policy in the Balkans. The Peace of San Stefano was concluded (on 3 March 1878), but San Stefano Bulgaria - never materialized because the Berlin Congress (on 13 July 1878) opposed it. An outburst of megalomania was paid for by the tearing apart of the Bulgarian nation.⁶⁵

And although the communists did not start the issue, they are the ones who, instead of helping with a solution, have become part of the problem. One cannot help, but seriously consider the last sentence “an outburst of megalomania was paid for by the tearing apart of

⁶⁵ Lazar Koliševski, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1980), 152. Lazar Koliševski aka Lazar Panev Kolišev was born on February 14, 1914, in Sveti Nikole, Kingdom of Serbia (present day The FYROM) and died on July 6, 2000 in Skopje, the FYROM. He was Second President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (May 4, 1980 - May 15, 1980), First President of the Executive Council of People’s Republic of “Macedonia” (April 16, 1945 - December 19, 1953), Sixth President of the People’s Assembly of PR Macedonia (December 19, 1953 - June 26, 1962), and First Chairman of the League of Communists of Macedonia (1945 - July 1963). Lazar Koliševski served the Yugoslavian People’s Army from its inception in 1941 until 1980 achieving the Rank of Major General.

the Bulgarian nation.” That means that the author lamented that the Bulgarian nation was split into Bulgarians of the Principality and those living in Macedonia.

However, Mr. Koliševski, who wrote the above, had declared himself Bulgarian in the past. In November 1941, the Bulgarian forces of occupation arrested Lazar Koliševski (then Kolišev) along with other communist leaders and a military tribunal in the Bitola District sentenced him to death, case number 133/941. During his incarceration awaiting execution Kolišev, in a letter dated December 7, 1941, petitioned the King of Bulgaria to grant him clemency declaring, “I am the son of Bulgarian parents, I felt and feel Bulgarian and despite the dreadful [Serbian] bondage I have remained in customs, language and values Bulgarian.”⁶⁶

As for the Greek simple-minded ideologists of opportunism, they had better understand that nobody has the right to endanger the national security of Greece by aiding and abetting the adversary, which in this case is the FYROM, a nation that unquestionably wants Greece’s dismemberment.

When on February 11, 1934, the Third Communist International Association, aka Comintern, decided to recognize a Third Slavic ethnic group in the Balkans besides the Serbian and Bulgarian, the “Macedonian” Slavs, it took into consideration Stalin’s understanding of what constituted a “nation.” Ivo Banač has hit the nail on its head when he observed,

“The growing successes of Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia created new conditions in the Balkan region, favorable to Yugoslav solutions for such thorny issues as that of Macedonia. Precisely because under the Stalinist dispensation nationhood was the decisive element in territorial claims, it was very important to decide whether the Macedonians were a separate nationality or simply a Bulgarian regional group.”⁶⁷

According to Stalin, “a nation is the product of capitalism with given characteristics. And ‘people’ – these are the working men of a given nation, that is, workingmen of the same language, culture, customs.”⁶⁸ When Djilas questioned him about the above definition of a “nation” referred to in his book *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin uttered “That was Ilyich’s – Lenin’s view. Ilyich also edited the book.”⁶⁹ Thus according to Lenin, as Stalin had mentioned, a “Nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.⁷⁰ As one notices, the word “ethnicity” is missing from both Stalin’s and Lenin’s basis of the nation.

⁶⁶ Petar Hristov Petrov, “Macedonia: history and political destiny” (Петър Христов Петров “Македонија: историја и политическа судба”), *Знание*, Софија 1998, 64; Утрински Весник, Број 1475 Понеделник, 16 октомври 2006; Снимка архиве, <http://media.snimka.bg/images/003068212-big.jpg> (accessed September 16, 2013).

⁶⁷ Ivo Banač, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933 – 1949* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2003), xxxix.

⁶⁸ Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962), 156-7.

⁶⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962), 157

⁷⁰ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (Moscow: Publishing House, 1946), 11.

The new country, *Balkan Soviet Socialist Federation*, would include the territory of the newly formed Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” or present day the FYROM, the Bulgarian territory of Blagoevgrad, and of course Greece’s region of Macedonia, i.e. Macedonia Proper. Therefore, since the south Balkans would be dominated by Slavs, the new “nation” and its language would be the prevailing “nation” and its “dominant” language in the new country, despite the fact that population of the Greek region of Macedonia was by far Greek. In his *On Macedonian Matters*, Misirkov argued exactly the same, “if one asks which will be the official language, the answer is – the language of the majority. Which majority? That remains to be seen. The question goes no further. Nobody asks how this majority will be discovered.”⁷¹

Tito’s disagreement with Stalin was whether the new state of a Socialist Macedonian Federation should exist. It was not as much about the political system of a Macedonian state, nor was it about the influence of Belgrade versus that of Moscow over the new country; Stalin had already cemented the power in his USSR. Stalin’s comment to Milovan Djilas, a high ranking Yugoslav official, was that Tito was an amateur and the fact that in Moscow he treated Tito in the first months of 1948 with indignation having the opportunity to eliminate him altogether, indicates Stalin’s political security.

The resolution of the Comintern, regarding the existence of the “Macedonian” nation, reminiscent of the “May Manifesto” of 1924, was drafted in the known communist parlance. The Comintern’s resolution stated, “The bourgeoisie of the dominant nations of the three imperialist powers, which have split Macedonia among them, are trying to conceal the national oppression and deny the national characteristics of the Macedonian people and the Macedonian nation” establishing the basis for the nation and the new state under full Slav communist control.⁷² Given that the issue of *Macedonianism* is the result of a communist decision to which the Greek Communist Party had consented, the members of the same ideology also bear full responsibility for this mess.⁷³

Even Comintern’s resolution did not solve the question of the “Macedonian nation.” The opinion of delegates and the differing drafts preceding the final decision oscillated between “Macedonian people,” which included all people of Macedonia regardless of ethnicity and the “Macedonian nation,” which referred solely to the Slavic population in Macedonia other than Serbs and Bulgarians. They even debated the definition of Macedonia. Without offering specific characteristics of the new nation, it became impossible for one to understand in what way the new nation would differ from the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nations.⁷⁴ As a result, the Serbian delegation walked out of the proceedings.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 46. also see К. П. Мисирковъ, *За Македонските Работи* (София: Либерални Клуб, 1903), 9.

⁷² Lazar Koliševski, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1980), 232.

⁷³ Eleutherios Stavridis (Ελευθέριος Σταυρίδης), *Τα παρασκήνια του ΚΚΕ*, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, σελ.174-180.

⁷⁴ Spyridon Sfetas, “The Birth of ‘Macedonianism’ in the Interwar Period” in *The History of Macedonia*, ed. Ioannis Koliopoulos, Musesum of the Macedonian Struggle (Thessaloniki, 2007) 289-292.

⁷⁵ Eleutherios Stavridis (Ελευθέριος Σταυρίδης), *Τα παρασκήνια του ΚΚΕ*, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, σελ.183.

Now, Greek simple-minded ideologists of opportunism are expected to contribute to a real and concrete solution of the name issue bearing in mind the protection of the heritage and the national security of Greece, not the expansionist vision of Skopje. "The ancient Greek theory of war was that if the growing crops were threatened, the inhabitants of the walled cities would be obliged either to come to terms or to fight in order to protect them."⁷⁶ At present, the threat to the crops is very real. The stance of Greece must change and demonstrate a direct and firm position. Greece must demand a clear and viable solution, not subject to future political or legal interpretations.

Skopje is already feeling the beginning of instability due to the Slavic ultra-nationalist narrative which bypasses the reality of the 40% ethnic Albanians along with the minimum 10% of all other ethnic groups, all FYROM nationals. All minorities proclaimed their own numeric superiority over the official numbers thus making Skopje's official demographic statistics questionable. It is safer to say that its Slavic population might be a majority against individual ethnic groups, but a minority before the total; it is a minority-majority. Unless the Slavic led government of Skopje succeeds in taking the first steps in claiming the Greek region of Macedonia, i.e. history, ethnicity, language, heritage, etc., the country could implode. From Skopje's rhetoric and their actions, it is obvious that Skopje has positioned itself at the verge of an eventual, but certain claim on the land that Pavlos Melas had depicted, "Macedonia is the lung of Greece; without it the rest of Greece would be condemned to death."

⁷⁶ Sir Reginald Neville Custance, *A study of War* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), 71.

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