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Περιοδική Έκδοση Μακεδονικών Σπουδών

Έκδοση του Αυστραλιανού Ινστιτούτου Μακεδονικών Σπουδών
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Editorial

The apostolate of 'objectivity'



Aristotle made a crucial discovery: there's a part of the mind that can go wrong, and that's the part that we're in control of, where our free will reigns, and that there's a part of the mind that is safe, where we don't need control. As a result, we can decide to check the part that can go wrong using the other, error-free part. That's what we have to know before we can search for a method of guiding our thinking.

broadly speaking are free of bias. Objectivity called for researchers and scholars, including journalists, to develop a consistent method of monitoring, assessing, testing and documenting information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.

A few years ago researchers talked about something called “realism” rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if they simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally. Realism emerged at a time when the creation of knowledge and researchers were asked to separate from political party affiliations, ethno-specific legacies and propagating scenarios becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents. At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity.

In 1919, Charles Merz, an associate editor for the *New York World*, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the *New York Times* coverage of the Russian Revolution. “In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not

Certain Macedoslav scholars¹ - primarily involved with humanities and social sciences - in an attempt to propagate their ideas and gratify desires natural in the breast of those who have been brought up as part of a process of ethnogenesis, interpret the concept of objectivity in a radical, fundamental and pseudo-liberal way. Their approach is not based on primary sources but on preceded interpretations of other same-flag raising “researchers”. The said Macedoslav researchers, who select their sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral style of writing to make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the craft by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased. They, like the postmodernists reject the very *notion of objective* truth, and hold that there are separate realities-as well as truths-for separate groups. Hence, it is only natural that their writings often generate confusion and illusion and rendered to be unreliable and capricious in their content.

Needless to say that when the concept of objectivity originally evolved it was not meant to imply that scholars

¹Reference is made here to numerous articles appearing on the Journal *On the Documents* of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, FYROM.

Editorial

what was, but what men wished to see,” he wrote. Researchers must be trained adequately to grasp the scientific spirit, to study the evidence and verify their sources, to be disciplined by the method, to be able to distinguish between conceptions and perceptions. Although scholars in general may have developed various techniques and conventions for determining facts, they have done less to develop a system for testing the reliability of “impartial” interpretation.

Great Macedonian Hellene **Aristotle** had established a number of steps to induce his principle of objectivity. Its essentially five steps were:

1. Grasp the distinction of percepts and concepts.
2. Understand that concepts are capable of error, whereas percepts are not.
3. Learn that the functioning of concepts is under our control, whereas percepts are not.
4. Discover that we can somehow use percepts as a means to measure concepts.
5. We’ll then know that a method is necessary, and that it is possible because we know what it would consist of, by reducing the fallible part to the infallible part.

The first step is to reach the distinction between percepts and concepts, what the Greeks called “sense” and “idea.” The distinction was originated by **Socrates** and **Plato**, depending on how one interprets his dialogues. What Plato had to do, and what Aristotle and all of us had to do, was to mentally observe similar instances of ideas in contrast to sensory experience, to our percepts. With the contrast, Plato was able to draw out a list of attributes that belonged to ideas as opposed to sense experience:

1. Ideas were general or universal (Beauty, Justice, Virtue, etc.); sense experience was particular or concrete (the beauty of a maiden, the piety of a man, etc.).
2. The One and the Many—we’re aware of countless things which nevertheless seem to have the *same* properties; for instance, John is the same person, no matter what age he is or any differences in his appearances. Plato realized that this physical distinction actually applied to these mental phenomena, ideas.
3. Ideas are abstract, non-material, whereas the senses interact with our bodies and material objects.
4. Ideas are immutable, changeless, whereas sensory objects are always changing, coming into being and going out of existence.

We hope that our Macedoslav colleagues of the University of Cyril and Methodius will be objective enough to distinguish between concepts and percepts and to acknowledge in scientific objectivity that the two **Thessalonikean** brothers to whom they attribute their nomenclature, namely **Cyril** and **Methodius** and for whom they have erected magnificent monument at their university campus, where not just “Macedonians”, as they ingenuously depict with much naivety in their university charter, but **Macedonian Hellenes** and **missionaries of the Greek language and culture**, who resurrected them from the obscurity and taught them how to write the Slavic concepts and be proud of their Slavic origin.

FROM THE DESK OF THE EDITOR
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“Aetolos, Akarnanas, Makedonas ejusdem linguae homines”
(T. Livius)

Table of Contents

<i>The Borders of Ancient Makedonia I: To Perdikkas III</i>	1
John Melville-Jones, Emeritus Professor of Classics and Ancient History, University of Western Australia	
<i>MACEDONIAN HELLENES: FROM DARIUS TO POLIBIUS AND THE GRAECO-INDIAN KINGDOMS</i>	13
Professor A. M. Tamis is a socio-linguist and historian of the Hellenic Diaspora with the University of Notre Dame Australia; president, Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies.	
<i>Alexander – the Great Tactician?</i>	37
Christopher A. Matthew, Lecturer in Ancient History, Australian Catholic University, Sydney	
<i>Women and costumes of Naoussa, the end of an era</i>	61
Eugenia Zaliou-Basiakouli, Writer - Researcher	
<i>Skopje's Political Efficiency: Converting a National Goal to National Policy</i>	93
Marcus A. Templar, is a former code breaker and Principal Subject Matter Expert in Intelligence Analysis	
<i>The Greek-Americans and Balkan Wars 1912-13: Helping the old homeland</i>	133
Terry Stavridis, researcher, writer and scholar of Asia Minor historiography; member of the executive committee of the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies	



The Lion of Amphipolis

The Borders of Ancient Makedonia I: To Perdikkas III¹

John Melville-Jones, Emeritus Professor of Classics and Ancient History,
University of Western Australia

Summary:

At a time that cannot be closely determined, about 1,000 B.C., the Makedones began to establish themselves in a small area north of Mount Olympos. At a later date their kings were buried at Aigai (close to Vergina), which must have been the centre of the territory that they began to control. By the beginning of the 4th century B.C. they had expanded (with a few short periods of contraction) in a remarkable manner, 'absorbing' or expelling the neighbouring groups of people until their territory extended further to the north and west and to the sea (although not at first to Chalkidike, where there were many colonies established by southern Hellenic cities) and to the Axios river. However, it is clear that many of the groups that they had 'absorbed' still retained their identity and independence, even if they were in some way under the control of the rulers of Makedonia. For this reason, the 'borders' of Makedonia are difficult to define, at least before the time of Philippos II.

By 500 B.C. they were the leading power in the area. About 400 B.C. they moved their capital further north to Pella, which was near a river which was at that time navigable to the Thermaic Gulf. In the fourth century B.C. Philippos II (360/59-336 B.C.) again expanded the area under their control, annexing Chalkidike and land to the east. 'Makedonia' now became approximately the same as the modern Greek province of Makedonia. As neighbours the Makedonians now had the Illyrians to the west, the Paiones to the north, and the Dardanoi beyond them, the Thessalians to the south and the Thrakes to the east. These were independent groups, although the Paionians may have had a 'client kingdom' relationship with the Makedonians (their kings issued coins independently, but they supplied cavalry to assist Alexander the Great in his eastward campaign).

This geographical area stayed the same until the Roman conquest of 168 B.C. After this the Romans tried to destroy the identity of the Makedonians by establishing a new province that was split into four different areas, with restrictions on some activities that might be

¹This study will present a selection of the more important passages of the surviving ancient literary evidence regarding this topic, and comment on them. Those who wish to study the evidence further will need to have access to the monumental work by N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* (three volumes, Oxford 1972-1988, vol. 2 written in conjunction with G.T. Griffith, vol. 3 in conjunction with F.W. Walbank). This will remain of permanent value. For more recent studies the collection, *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, edited by Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington (Oxford 2010) should be consulted, since it not only contains material of considerable relevance, but will also direct the reader to publications produced in the intervening period.

conducted between one area and another. After two decades this proved to be unsuccessful, and after a revolt (which was quickly quelled), another approach was adopted. A new Roman province was created which was still called 'Makedonia', but now contained land which stretched as far as the Adriatic, and much further south than the original Makedonia. As a result, 'Makedonia' became a geographical rather than an ethnic name. In the following centuries, the borders of this province were modified again, but it still covered a much larger area than the Makedonia that had existed in the time of Philip II and his son Alexander the Great.

Humans (or at least, tool-using primates) lived in Makedonia for a long time before the *Makedones* arrived. They were certainly there at least fifty thousand years ago in the Palaeolithic period, and perhaps much earlier (if the scientific controversies about the age of a female skull discovered at Petralona in Chalkidike could be resolved, we might be able to reach a more definite conclusion).

But to say this is to imply that the modern 'Makedonia' is the same as the ancient one. This is a more complicated story. In the first place, the concept of fixed 'borders' is something that does not necessarily apply to early human groups,² and even today, when they can be measured from the sky, borders are sometimes permanent, sometimes variable. In this context we might quote the statement attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, which is preserved by later writers in various forms, that everything is 'in a state of flux', and that 'you cannot step into the same river twice', because the water is different.

The sea, or a wide river, provides the best border, mountain ranges may often be almost as good at separating one group from another, and a narrow defile like Tempe, as we shall see later, can serve the same purpose. But borders on land can often be changed, and although in modern times this rarely happens, there are still times when they become uncertain, or are formally changed for one reason or another. So it is not surprising that this should have happened with Makedonia, which in ancient times expanded in various directions, sometimes with slight contractions.

Its nature also changed: its greatest expansion, which took place after it was conquered by the Romans, led to its becoming a geographical and administrative area, rather than a territory which was connected with any single racial group. This expansion will be described in a later part of this study, since in this first section we are concerned only with the period before the accession of Philip II, the father of Alexandros the Great.

So when did the *Makedones* first settle in Makedonia? No archaeological evidence of the introduction of this new group into the area has been found – in this respect they have something in common with the *Dorieis* who are reported as having begun to enter the

²'Border studies' in relation to ancient Greek history are a field in which little work has been done. This is not surprising; evidence which might lead to defining borders exactly often does not exist. For Makedonia in particular there is little written evidence, so although the researches of Hammond and others have established approximate borders, uncertainty remains, although there are some exceptions (for example, see *Recherches sur les marches orientales des Temenides (Anthemonte-Kalinda) 1ère partie (Meletemata 11)* by M.B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulou, Athens 1992).

Greek peninsula from the north at some time after 1200 B.C., after which they are said to have settled in parts of it, and on Crete and some other islands. Historians have in the past referred to the 'Dorian Invasion' (and I am guilty of this), but there is no archaeological evidence for an invasion, unless you believe that the fortification of some sites in southern Greece at this period was caused by fear of these invaders, and the ancient literary sources do not tell us anything precise about it; all that we can be sure of is that the dialect of some Hellenic groups in later times was called 'Dorian' (with an *alpha* instead of an *eta* being its most obvious distinctive feature, a feature that also occurs in words that we are told are 'Makedonian', although other features appear to have more in common with the dialect of the area in northern Boiotia and Thessalia that is known as Aiolis), and this suggests that the Dorians, whoever they were, may have arrived in Hellas from a different direction from some others, and so were in some way separate from other groups with which they later coalesced into being Hellenes.

There was also a 'Doric' style of architecture. Its name suggests that although it was used for buildings constructed by non-Dorians, its origin was attributed to them, but it cannot be associated with the early *Makedones*, so the idea of a Dorian-Makedonian connection cannot be supported in this way.

An attractive theory is, however, that the *Makedones* were the last wave of the *Dorieis*, and that they stayed in the north rather than moving southward. This is at any rate what Herodotos seems to be saying in one passage:³

*... the former (the Dorieis) have moved very frequently; their home in Deukalion's reign was Phthiotis and in the reign of Doros son of Hellen the country known as Histiaiotis in the neighbourhood of Ossa and Olympos; when driven from there by the Kadmeioi they settled in Pindos and were known as Makednoi; from there they emigrated to Dryopis, and finally to the Peloponnesos, where they got their present name of Dorieis.*⁴

This can be supported by the surviving fragments of their language, which, as already mentioned, sometimes use the long Dorian *alpha* instead of the long *epsilon* or *eta*. But this is only one among several possibilities, and the evidence is so limited that nothing about the origin of the *Makedones* can be stated with confidence, and the question is of little relevance to the present study, which is concerned with the territory that they occupied.

In this context, however, it is important to note that in the so-called 'Catalogue of Ships', a long passage of uncertain date that appears in the second book of the Homeric epic the *Iliad*, and seems to reproduce a list that gives the names of a number of different groups which are said to be attacking or defending Troy, the *Makedones* are not mentioned (alt-

³1.56.

⁴ This passage, which might have been intended to link the *Makedones* with the *Dorieis*, tells us nothing useful about their final location, except for providing an alternative form of their name, and suggesting that they had at one time settled in Pindos (which might mean the Pindos range of mountains, or Pindos itself). In that case, they would at a later time have moved to the northern side of Mount Olympos.

though their later neighbours the *Paiones* are said to be on the Trojan side, which suggests that they may once have had a home in Asia Minor, although in the Homeric text they are associated with the Axios/Vardarios river).⁵

The traditional date of 'the Trojan War' (whatever that actually was) is about 1200 B.C. If the *Makedones* were in fact relatively late arrivals in what later came to be called *Makedonia*, a very approximate date of around 1000 B.C. for their first settlement may therefore be suggested, although they certainly did not have a significant presence there for several centuries after that. At first they seem to have occupied only a small area NNE of Mount Olympos, perhaps arriving from the Pindos range.⁶ Their centre seems to have been at Aigai near the modern Vergina from a very early stage, and this possibility is supported by the fact that even after their capital was removed to Pella,⁷ some royal burials still took place at Aigai.⁸

To the south, there was at that time no such country or nation as Greece. 'Hellas', the proper name of this country,⁹ was at first the name of a small area in Thessaly, which gradually came to be used to describe an expanded area in the Hellenic peninsula, then the Peloponnese as well, and finally the whole Hellenic world.

Makedonia as a geographical area is also not mentioned in ancient literature until relatively late. The first passage of relevance, which gives us only the name of its legendary founder Makedon, occurs in a fragment of a lost work by the poet Hesiod, composed around 700 B.C. The fragment is preserved as a quotation in an article on Makedonia in the *Ethnika* of Stephanos of Byzantion, a work compiled from earlier sources in the middle of the sixth century of the Christian era. This, however, mentions Makedonia only in its introduction to the quotation, but by that time the name had been established for a millennium. The passage reads as follows (the text of Stephanos presented here has been improved with the help of a recycling of it in the later work 'On Themes' composed by the emperor Konstantinos Porphyrogenetos):

'Makedonia: the country, from Makedon son of Zeus and Thyia daughter of Deukalion, as the poet Hesiodos says: "And she, becoming pregnant to Zeus, gave birth

⁵*Iliad* 2.848-50: 'Pyraichmes led the Paionians who come from the area of the Axios River.' It does indeed seem, as will be shown below, that the Paionians may have dwelt along the Axios/Vardarios river before they were pushed out by the *Makedones*.

⁶See Herodotos 1.56 (quoted previously). Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford 1967), pp. 525-40, discusses this movement, and proposes that the Molossians who came to occupy land on the west of the Pindos range were in fact a western group of the *Makedones*; this might be one reason for Philip II's second marriage to the Molossian princess Olympias, who became the mother of Alexandros III ('the Great').

⁷There is no precise literary or other evidence for the date of this, but most scholars think that it took place during the reign of Archelaos (413-399 B.C.), although some prefer to attribute it to Amyntas III (393-370 B.C.). Of course it is always possible that it was a process that did not happen in any particular year.

⁸The tombs that were discovered there by the Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos in 1977 are so lavishly appointed that they must be royal burials, and are certainly to be dated to the fourth century B.C., after the capital had been moved to Pella.

⁹'Greece' and 'Greek' are names used by the Romans, based on the nearest Greek group to them. The name 'Hellas' is rarely used officially by non-Greeks (exceptions are found in Chinese, Vietnamese and Norwegian).

for the one who rejoiced in the thunderbolt two sons, Magnes and Makedon who battled from horses, and they had their dwellings around Pieria and Olympos.”¹⁰

The use of the name ‘Makedon’ is probably a typical example of an attempt to explain the name of a place by inventing an original founder, but the rest of this passage provides good evidence for the original settling place of the *Makedones*, and the association with horses (used for cavalry or to draw chariots) seems correct, since Lower Makedonia (*i.e.* the part nearer the sea), which includes the area called Pieria, has some flat areas very suitable for breeding and training war horses. However, this does not mean that Makedonia was always recognised as a separate and defined political area with defined boundaries before the fourth century B.C.¹¹ When a ‘League of Delos’ was established after the Persian invasions, and the Athenians pushed most of its members into contributing money instead of men and ships (which led to the building of a large fleet controlled by the Athenians), the lists of the 1/60 part of their contributions that was given to Athena as a reward for protecting this money at Athens (a group of inscriptions which scholars call ‘The Athenian Tribute Lists’), locate places such as Methone (on the west of the Thermaic Gulf) in ‘Thrake’. This was not because it was assumed that its inhabitants were *Thrakes*; it was probably because although by that time it had been recognised for a long time that there were *Makedones*, there was not yet a general recognition of the geographical area that they were beginning to control as Makedonia. This is in spite of the fact that Herodotos, who was composing his *Histories* at about the same time, could refer to ‘Makedonia’,¹² to ‘Upper (*ano*) Makedonia’¹³ and to ‘Lower (*kato*) Makedonia’¹⁴. Putting together the inscriptions and the literary passages, it seems that although a general consciousness of the existence of a country that could be named after the leading group that existed there had come into existence, and this could be recognised by Thoukydides (as in the passage quoted below), the name had not yet become part of formal administrative language.

On the other hand, even as early as the beginning of the seventh century B.C., the *Makedones* had become a recognised group, and their kings, beginning with Perdikkas I,¹⁵ are accepted as having a genuine existence. Hereditary kingship became an outmoded form of government elsewhere in the area that would gradually be known as Hellas¹⁶, but like the

¹⁰ A similarly invented founder Makedon was reported by Ailianos, *On Animals* 10.48: ‘A son was born to Lykaon king of Emathia, and called Makedon, after whom the country was named after it had ceased to keep its ancient name. Then he (Makedon) had a manly son of exceptional beauty, named Pindos.’

¹¹ It may be relevant that in a few places Herodotos uses the more abstract forms *Makedonis* (*sc. ge*) and *Paionis*, which may imply that he was thinking in terms of approximate geographical areas rather than countries.

¹² 5.17 and 20-21.

¹³ 7.128.

¹⁴ 7.173.

¹⁵ Alternative versions of the establishment of the dynasty, such as an earlier Archelaos who preceded the known king of that name, or a king named Karanos who preceded Perdikkas in some accounts, may be inventions, and certainly cannot be verified. The ancient sources for these statements (recycled in Justin’s epitome of the lost work of Pompeius Trogus, composed in the time of Augustus), which refer to these earlier kings, have been omitted from this study.

¹⁶ The history of this word is interesting. When we first meet it in the Homeric *Iliad* it seems to refer to a small area near the southern border of Thessalia, but it then begins to be used occasionally to describe central Greece (but not the Peloponnesos). However, by the end of the sixth century B.C. it occurs in contexts where it means the whole of mainland Greece. The *Graikes* or *Graikoi* from whom the word ‘Greek’ is derived occupied an area on the east side

Spartans and some of their closer neighbours, the *Makedones* retained it for a long time after most other states in the Hellenic peninsula had moved to other ways of being ruled.

The territory that they controlled gradually became larger, and here we must consider further the multitude of other groups that they came to influence, or rule. The most important period of expansion in the earlier stages was the reign of Alexandros I (c. 498-454 B.C.) At this point it is appropriate to quote a passage from the *History* of Thoukydides, referring to an invasion of Makedonia in 429/8 B.C. by the Odrysians:¹⁷

So they (the army of Sitalkes, king of the Odrysians) assembled at Doberos and were preparing to invade Lower Makedonia, which Perdikkas was ruling, from the heights above. In the upper country there are some Makedonians also – the Lynkestai, the Elimiotai and other tribes¹⁸ – who are allies of the Makedonian king and his subjects, but have separate kingdoms of their own. It was Alexandros the father of Perdikkas (II), and his forebears, who originally gained the part of the country on the coast that is now Makedonia. They were previously Temenids from Argos who became kings after defeating in battle and expelling the Pierians from Pieria, who later dwelt in Phagres and other places under Mount Pangaion beyond the Strymon (the country between the sea and the lower slopes of Pangaion is still called the Pierian Gulf), and the Bottiaioi¹⁹ (who now dwell as neighbours of the Chalkideis) from Bottia. They also gained a narrow strip of Paionia along the River Axios, extending from the mountains to Pella and the sea.²⁰ Then, after driving out the Edones, they now have control of the country called Mygdonia, which lies between the Axios and the Strymon. They also drove out the Eordoi from the country now called Eordaia – most were killed, though a few still live around Physka – and the Almopians from Almopia. These Makedonians also conquered and still hold places that belonged to other tribes – Anthemios,²¹ Krestonia,²² Bisaltia²³ and much that belonged to the Makedonians them-

of the Adriatic Sea near Dodona, and it was from them that the Romans derived the words *Graecus* and *Graecia* which led later nations in Europe, followed by other non-European nations, to call the country 'Greece' in various slightly different linguistic forms.

¹⁷2.99, referring in the first place to an invasion that took place in 429/8 B.C.

¹⁸ The Lynkestai can be located north of Lake Kastoria, and the Elymiotai along the Pindos range (Hammond, *History of Macedonia*, 1, 102ff.).

¹⁹This group provides an excellent example of a population which was expelled by the *Makedones* (their original territory was around Pella, although the locating of the Makedonian capital there could of course not have been foreseen as early as this). In the fourth century some coins were issued bearing their name, and some numismatists have wondered whether they might have retained a presence in their original home. There is, however, no other evidence to support this theory.

²⁰This reinforces the statement of Iliad 2.848-50 which suggests that the Paionians once controlled land along the Axios/Vardarios as far as the sea.

²¹On the east side of the Thermaic Gulf, to the north of Chalkidike.

²²To the north-east of Pella, between the Amphaxitis and Strymon rivers. Thoukydides does not tell us when any of these areas came under Makedonian control, but it is clear that by the time that he was writing, they had expanded well beyond the east bank of the Axios/Vardarios river.

²³Bisaltai: near Amphipolis, a Thracian tribe, annexed by Alexandros I (498-54) to his kingdom (which then gained a talent of silver a day from their mines). Even after the Romans had conquered Makedonia in the 2nd century B.C., the Bisaltai seem still to have been recognised as a separate group (they are mentioned in three places in Livy's history *Ab Urbe Condita*, 44, 45, 8; 45, 29, 7 and 30, 3), and this is one of the best of examples of the way in which

selves. The whole country is now called Makedonia, and Perdikkas the son of Alexandros was the king of it when Sitalkes invaded it.

This important passage, as has been noticed by scholars, shows an unusual interest in listing groups that were not of any special relevance to the events that were being described. It is possible that it takes this form because when Thoukydides visited that area in the first part of the Peloponnesian War (he was the Athenian commander who failed to protect Amphipolis from the Spartan commander Brasidas), he found its history interesting. Whatever the reason for its inclusion in his work, it is by far the most important evidence for the state of Makedonia at the time that he was writing. To understand it properly, it is necessary to realise that the subject of these sentences is not the *Makedones*, but the Temenids from Argos (also therefore called the Argeadai) who had made themselves the ruling house in Makedonia.²⁴ The *Makedones* whom they ruled seem to have enlarged their territory, either by expelling other tribes, or 'absorbing' them (whatever that means), or by entering into a relationship that allowed the other tribes to keep their identities and their chieftains, but made them in some way subservient to the kings of Makedonia. This makes it difficult or impossible to define the 'borders' of Makedonia at this time, because we cannot say whether the territory of the Lynkestians or other groups that were in some way subservient to the *Makedones* should be considered as being part of Makedonia, although if we follow Thoukydides, it would seem that this would be the case with the groups that he mentions later as dwelling between the Axios and the Strymon. It was only with the greater dominance that was achieved in the middle of the fourth century by Philip II, that we can begin to think of this larger Makedonia as being a more clearly defined country with more or less permanent borders, although the existence of 'client states/kingdoms' still makes it very difficult to decide exactly where the borders might have been.

Going back to the sixth or earlier fifth century, we know of many other tribes in this area, either from literary evidence (for example, the Ainianeis, Bistoneis, Dobreis, Odomanteis, Orestai, Pelagones and Tymphaioi, some of whom should probably be classed as Thracian) or, in a few cases, only from coins that they issued which bore their names (the Derrones, Orreskioi and Zaeleis, who must have been located in areas where they could mine silver for export, and therefore placed on their coinage information which would allow its source to be identified). This again reinforces the situation described by Thoukydides, which suggests that by his time the *Makedones* had become by far the leading group, but that the existence of other groups was also still recognised.

After this general introduction, let us look at some more specific moments in the early history of Makedonia. By the late 6th century B.C. the history of the country was beginning to be influenced by its relationship with the enormously powerful kingdom of Persia. During the reigns of Amyntas I (c.540-498 B.C.) and Alexandros I (498-454 B.C.) we find that the

'Makedonia' in one sense had become the name of a country, although some of the elements of its population, like the Scots and Welsh and Irish in Britain, had retained their identities and perhaps some degree of independence.

²⁴They claimed to have arrived from Argos in the Peloponnese, and this was the basis of the claim by Alexandros I that he should be allowed to compete in the Olympic Games (see Herodotos, *Histories* 5.22). However, there are other places named Argos, one of them actually in an area close to the first small area of what later became Makedonia. No certainty is possible.

Persians first, after a failed invasion of Skythia, moved into Thrake and Makedonia and set up a sort of Persian 'satrapy' there,²⁵ and later forced Alexandros to join them when they invaded Greece. No ancient source tells us how the non-Makedonian groups in Makedonia were treated by the Persians at this time, but it is probable that individually they would have been regarded as insignificant, and that the only official dealings would have been with the Makedonian kings or their direct representatives. This was perhaps a mistake on their part, because, as Herodotos tells us, Alexandros was able to give information and advice to his contacts in the south that enabled them to avoid an early defeat by giving up the idea of making what would have been a vain attempt to defend Thessalia.²⁶ Although the story of his slipping into the Greek camp from the Persian one in the following year, just before the battle of Plataia, to bring a message²⁷ is open to doubt, it reinforces the general picture of a king who had to pretend to be supporting an enemy who could not be defeated by his own forces. And at the battle of Salamis, Herodotos tells us that some of the non-Athenian ships were crewed by men of 'Dorian and Makedonian blood', who had emigrated southwards, an interesting idea, although not relevant to the present study.²⁸

In addition, the slightly later historian Thoukydides provides further information, which makes it clear that for him (as he wrote of the events of 432 B.C.), Makedonia was a defined area which included Therme (where Thessalonike was later founded) and Pydna.²⁹

First they arrived in Makedonia, where they found that the original force of one thousand had just captured Therme and were besieging Pydna ... Leaving Makedonia then, they came to Beroia, and from there went on to Strepsa.³⁰ After making an unsuccessful attempt at capturing that place, they marched on by land to Potidaia.

In a later passage (referring to 424 B.C.), Thoukydides also locates Dion in Makedonia:³¹

²⁵Herodotos 5.12-17; the statement that the Paionians were deported to Persia can be only partially true, since they certainly existed in their territory north of Makedonia later, issued coins both before and after the time of Alexandros III, and were only incorporated in Makedonia after the Romans established a province there in 148 B.C.

²⁶Herodotos 7.173.

²⁷Herodotos 9. 44-5.

²⁸A passage in a much later work (Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus 7.4.1) states that after being defeated in 480 B.C. at the battle of Salamis, the Persian King Xerxes gave Alexandros I the right to rule over an area 'from Olympos to the Haimos mountain.' Pompeius Trogus was writing during the reign of Augustus, so must have been dependent on some earlier source which has been lost. The most likely interpretation of these words is that Xerxes, who would have hoped for Alexandros's further support, was promising him that Makedonia would in future be independent rather than being a satrapy of Persia, as it had been for some years.

²⁹1.56-7 and 61. In the first of these passages, which says that the Chalkidians and Bottiaians (who had moved to Chalkidike) 'border on Makedonia', it seems that Potidaia in Chalkidike at the head of the Pallene peninsula might have been thought of as being in Thrake, which is not surprising since the expansion that took place under Philip II had not yet happened. But in the second, Perdikkas II is recognized as 'King of Makedonia', not 'of the Makedones', and this reinforces the idea that by this time the existence of this country as a geographical area, not simply an area in which a tribe resided, had been recognized. In the second, it seems that Therme (later Thessaloniki) and Pydna (on the west coast of the Thermaic Gulf) are both thought of as being within Makedonia by this time.

³⁰This is a modern editor's emendation of the manuscript reading *epistrepsantes*, 'after turning back', which makes no sense in this context, to *epistrepsan*. In the Athenian Tribute Lists, as previously noted, all the places in this area are listed under 'Thrake', but this is probably because for administrative convenience Makedonia was not yet recognized as a separate geographical entity.

³¹4.78 (424 B.C.).

... Dion, a Makedonian polis at the foot of Mount Olympos on the frontier with Thessalia, in the kingdom of Perdikkas ...

On the other hand, another passage in the *History* of Thukydides³² makes it clear that the north-west boundary of Makedonia at this time stopped short of the Erigon River, because the Lynkestians were independent at this time:

... Perdikkas, with the army of Brasidas added to his own force, marched at once against Arrhibaios, son of Bromeros, king (basileus) of the Lynkestian Makedones, whose country bordered on his own, whom he wished to bring under his control.

This is an interesting sentence, which shows how flexible the concept of 'boundaries' is in relation to this area: Bromeros, like other chieftains (*basileus* does not necessarily always mean the ruler of a whole country), seems to have been partly independent, but also partly involved in a relationship in which obedience to Perdikkas might be expected.

At the beginning of the fourth century, therefore, the last date with which this introductory study of the borders of Makedonia is concerned, it seems as if at least some of its boundaries can be fairly closely defined. Starting with the coastal area, the southern border can be said to begin at the pass of Tempe, because Herodotos writes of "Tempe, the pass that leads from Lower Makedonia into Thessalia along the river Peneus, between Olympos and Ossa",³³ and the *Makedones* will have controlled the coast at least as far as Therme, after expelling the Paionians (although the Athenian Peisistratos also controlled some territory there)³⁴. The eastern border, however, presents some difficulties. Amyntas I is said to have offered the former ruler of Athens, Hippias, Anthemous in Chalkidike south of Therme about 500 B.C., an offer that he did not accept.³⁵ This suggests that the *Makedones* were by that time in control of that area. Alexandros I seems to have expanded his area of control when the Persians fled homeward in 479 B.C. after the failure of their second invasion, and reached the west bank of the River Strymon. However, later in the same century the Athenians were competing with him for control of the territory stretching inland from Chalkidike, and established a colony inland at Amphipolis (originally a Thracian settlement aptly named *Ennea Hodoi*, 'Nine Ways', because it sat on several trade routes on land and along the Strymon river) in 437/6 B.C. So it was not until the time of Philippos II that the Makedonians had complete control of this area.

To the north, the border of Makedonia might have been approximately the same as the northern border of modern Greece if we assume that the Paionians had now been pushed back from their original territory, but to the west the situation was more fluid, because the Illyrians continually made incursions, although these were not necessarily intended to

³²4.83.

³³7.173.

³⁴Aristoteles, *Athenaion Politeia* 15.

³⁵*Histories* 5.94.

seize territory that they could hold permanently, but rather as raids to carry off livestock, any portable property and humans to become slaves.

In conclusion, we may review the history of Makedonia in terms of the dimensions of the country in the time of its kings from the time of Amyntas I, the earliest to be much more than a name, until the reign of Perdikkas III (365-360 B.C.), where this preliminary study will end. By the end of the reign of Amyntas, Makedonia consisted of a border with Thessalia on the south, with the Molossians and Illyrians to the west and the Paionians to the north, after the Persian king Dareios had broken their power in 511 B.C. and deported many of them to Persia.³⁶ The eastern border probably by that time lay along the western bank of the Axios/Vardar River. Dareios did not have complete control of this area, because, for example, along the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf there was a colony, Methone, that had been settled from Eretria, but we have no record of any tensions arising from this situation, any more than there were tensions between the colonies established from the south along the coast of Chalkidike and the pre-existing groups living there. Also, we have to distinguish between the genuine original Makedonian territory in Pieria, and the outlying areas to the north and north-west that were occupied by tribes that seem to have been to some extent under the control of the *Makedones*, but would not yet have been thought of as being located in their territory.

Amyntas's successor Alexandros I (c.498-454 B.C.) is well known because of his apparently successful bid to compete in the Olympic Games. However, a few years before he succeeded his father, Makedonia passed under the control of the Persian king, becoming the equivalent of a Persian 'satrapy'. This led to a balancing act, particularly at the time of the second Persian invasion of 480/79 B.C., when the *Makedones* were forced to give support to the invaders, while at the same time Alexandros was sending useful messages to the southern cities which were defending their country. Not surprisingly, it is not possible to point to any significant increase in the territory that he ruled until after the defeated Persians had departed in 479 B.C., but during the last two decades of his reign, he seems to have expanded Makedonian control as far as the west bank of the Strymon.³⁷

Alexandros's son Perdikkas II (c.454-c.413 B.C.) was faced with a new problem. The Athenians were taking a great interest in the area that he ruled (probably because much of it was richly timbered, and the naval power that Athens increasingly controlled (paid for to a great extent by the other members of the League of Delos), and several Athenian colonies were established in Makedonian territory, one of them at Amphipolis, a long way inland in the northern part of Chalkidike. Another city, Berge, on the Strymon, had already come under Athenian control, and Perdikkas's silver coinage is extremely limited and consists only of very small denominations. This suggests that he had lost control of the silver mines in this area, which was the home of a group called the Bisaltai.

³⁶Herodotos 5.14-17.

³⁷See the extract from the *History* of Thoukydides (2.99) quoted above, which specifically attributes some expansion to Alexandros I.

Archelaos (c.413-c.399 B.C.), Perdikkas' son, was evidently a most active ruler. In addition, by this time the situation had changed: Athens was losing the power that it had once had, after the disastrous expedition to Sicily, and it seems that Archelaos was recognised as being of great help to them in supplying timber for ships and oars. He was honoured at Athens for this as an *euergetes* at Athens, as a surviving inscription tells us.³⁸ There are records of his struggles with the tribes on his western frontier, but no precise indication of whether territory was lost or gained. However, we can assume that he regained the land on the western side of the Strymon occupied by the Bisaltai that Perdikkas II had lost, since his coinage is relatively plentiful and not confined to small denominations. In addition, he gave a daughter in marriage to the ruler of the Elimiotai, who formed his south-western border along the Haliakmon River. This suggests that he was protecting this border, even if Elimiotis could not be considered a client kingdom. He also seems to have been involved in Thessalia towards the end of his reign, and may have received the area immediately to the south of Mount Olympus as a result, although this occupation, whatever its terms were, did not last long.

For six years after the death of Archelaos there was instability in Makedonia, with no fewer than four kings ruling (Orestes, Aëropos, Amyntas II and Pausanias). They were succeeded by Amyntas III (389-369 B.C.). By the time that he became king, some territory in the eastern part of his kingdom seems to have been lost to the cities in Chalkidike that had formed a Chalkidian League, and expanded the area under control in a northward direction, with Olynthos taking the lead. At one time they had actually reduced the area under the control of the Makedonians by gaining Anthemous and Pella. Also, in 393 B.C. he lost much of his territory to the Illyrians, and actually had to leave his kingdom, with Argaios II being installed in his place, but regained it in the following year with the help of the Thessalians. The gradual increase in power of the Chalkidian League, centred on Olynthos, led to the loss of territory even as far as Pella in the decade that followed, because Amyntas ceded land to the League in the hope of support against the Illyrians.

Some years later, he negotiated a treaty with the Spartans which led to their capturing Olynthos in 379 B.C. and (at least for a few years) disbanding the Chalkidian league.

He was succeeded by his eldest son Alexander II (c.371-368 B.C.), who during his short reign fended off an attack from the west by the Illyrians and from the east by a would-be king called Pausanias, gaining help from the Athenians. He also briefly gained control of part of Thessalia, including Larissa, but this did not last long, after he was expelled from Thessalia by a force from Thebes.

Finally, in this introductory essay, we come to Perdikkas III (368-359 B.C.), the predecessor of Philippos II. At the time of his accession he tried to regain Amphipolis in the north of Makedonia after it had been controlled by the Athenians for a long time, but without success. Also at this time much of Upper Makedonia was still held by the Illyrians, and when he made an attempt some years after his accession to reconquer this area, he was disastrously defeated and lost his life.

³⁸*Inscriptiones Graecae* I (3rd edition), no. 117.

In conclusion, it may be said that in this first period of the history of Makedonia and the *Makedones* there were periods of expansion and some small contractions, and in 359 B.C. the country and the nation were in a vulnerable position. The arrival of the young Philippos II, however, changed the situation considerably, as will be explained in the second tranche of this essay (see the next edition of the *Macedonian Studies Journal*).

MACEDONIAN HELLENES: FROM DARIUS TO POLIBIUS AND THE GRAECO-INDIAN KINGDOMS

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Abstract

*Τα όρια της αρχαίας Μακεδονίας και οι φυλές και εθνότητες που κατακτήθηκαν και αφομοιώθηκαν πολιτιστικά από τους Αρχαίους Μακεδόνες παραμένουν αντικείμενο επιστημονικής έρευνας και συζήτησης. Οι Μακεδόνες, ωστόσο, καταγράφηκαν στις αρχαίες πηγές από την εποχή του Δαρείου στην Περσία, και του Αισχύλου στην Ελλάδα, μέσα από έργα ποίησης, ιστοριογραφίας, θεάτρου, γεωγραφίας, πολιτικής και θρησκευσιολογίας ως φυλή ελληνική, με ελληνική λαλιά, με παραδόσεις και δοξασίες ελληνικές, με βιώματα που δεν διέφεραν ουσιαστικά από τους συμπατριώτες τους στον υπόλοιπο ελληνικό χώρο του νότου ούτε και της Ανατολής μέχρι την Ιωνία και την Καππαδοκία, ούτε και της Δύσης μέχρι τη Σικελία και την Ιταλία του Νότου. Είχαν τις δικές τους περιφερειακές ιδιαιτερότητες, το δικό τους πολιτικό σύστημα, τη δική του ντοπιολαλιά, αλλά τα ονόματα και τα έθιμά τους ήσαν κοινά, όπως και η τεράστια δεξαμενή της ελληνικής πολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς από την οποία αντλούσαν την καθημερινότητά τους. Ο Πέρσης βασιλιάς Δαρείος ο Μέγας αποκαλούσε τους Έλληνες **Yaunâ** δηλαδή «**Ιωνες**» και τους Μακεδόνες ως **Yaunâ takabarâ** δηλαδή «**Ιωνες που φέρουν τα καπέλα του ήλιου**». Τα βασίλεια που εμφανίσθηκαν το 311 π.Χ. στα βάθη της Ανατολής, γέννημα των Μακεδόνων συναγωνιστών του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου, αναγνωρίσθηκαν ως «Ελληνο-Ινδικά βασίλεια» από τους ντόπιους Ινδούς, Πέρσες, ακόμη και Κινέζους της Άπω Ανατολής και ως τέτοια μαρτυρούνται στην παγκόσμια ιστορία, διότι για τους λαούς αυτούς της αρχαιότητας ο Μακεδόνας και ο Έλληνας λειτουργούσαν ως ταυτόσημες έννοιες, όπως ο Σπαρτιάτης και ο Αθηναίος. Οι λαοί της Ανατολής δεν ξεχώριζαν εθνικά τους Μακεδόνες από τους υπόλοιπους Έλληνες. Έπρεπε να προκληθεί μία εθνογέννηση με τρόπο εφεύρεσης και κατασκευής στα Βαλκάνια για να αμφισβητηθεί η ταυτότητα του μακεδονικού Ελληνισμού από τους ιδίους, κάτι που αναγνώριζαν Μήδοι, Πέρσες, Ινδοί και Κινέζοι 2.500 χρόνια πριν...*

1.0 Introduction

Historians and anthropologists are very much concerned these days with the name issue, the boundaries and the legitimacy of claims on the term “Macedonia”, entangling the nations of Greece, former Yugoslavia, FYROM and Bulgaria in long and cumbersome dialogue and unproductive negotiations. The European Union, the European Council, NATO, the United States Department of State, the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and a host of governmental and non-governmental entities and institutions monitor crucial policy matters and developments and prepare their annual reports. They assess constitutional issues such as human rights, respect for minorities, the rights to cultural and multicultural identity and other sensitive civil matters. The governments which are directly affected eagerly follow these reports, codifying deviations and inaccuracies or preparing defence papers on law and practice as well as on historical and cultural rights and their domestic or external policies. The governments involved and their agencies also attempt to influence these institutions to obtain favourable treatment, or sometimes vehemently oppose them.

This is often an on-going political rally, a derisive show which is implemented with much political hypocrisy by certain institutional entities, serving their own particular interests, hence ignoring violations when this suits their interests or even rewarding violations when this is necessary to confirm their national comfort. The traumatic decade of the 1990s following the demise of Yugoslavia, the vicious bombardment of Serbia by NATO forces, the spectacular trials of former Serbian leaders in the Hague and the fiasco of a Greater Albania via Kosovo as proposed by the USA were no doubt significant manifestations of duplicity, arguably designed to satisfy the American electorate rather than to respond impartially to the issues. Then there is the electronic warfare over the Internet, with its abused global electronic networks, where daily numerous sites on “Macedonia” are being created, manipulating the free access and mocking freedom of expression. Free-lance gladiators from all sides and perspectives of “Macedonianism” make impure statements offering a continuous spectacle of flagrant and occasionally vitriolic electronic aphorisms against one another.

Certain geographical as well as historical aspects of Ancient and pre-Slavic Macedonia have been discussed and analysed by ancient Greek authors, philosophers, poets (Aeschylus, Euripides), historians (Hellanicus, Arrian, Herodotus and Thucydides), geographers (Pausanias and Strabo), travellers and political genius, such as Arcadian Hellene Polibius and Pontian Hellene Strabo and others (*see below*). In this study an attempt will be made to define and demonstrate the perceptions held by ancient Greek writers and their Greek city states about their Macedonian compatriots and their Kingdom in the north.

2.0 The region and its practices

Although the physical barriers, water courses and mountain ranges were taken into consideration, none of the boundaries of Macedonia followed the natural line or environment. They simply reflected the balance of power between the ethnicities and tribes at any given

time of history involving the region north of Thessaly all the way to Illyria and Dardania; the primary city of the latter was Scupi [<Episkopi], contemporary capital city of FYROM, Skopje. In antiquity, Paeonia (Παιονία) the kingdom of the Paeonians (Ancient Greek Πάιονες) was also incorporated in Macedonia when its ruler was Philip II, the most ardent tactician of the Greek antiquity together with Themistocles. Philip undoubtedly had been the most significant exponent of political conceptions and practices in the Greek world.¹



During his ruling period Paionia might have also included the whole Axios River valley and the surrounding areas. It was located immediately north of ancient Macedonia (which roughly corresponds to the modern Greek region of Macedonia) and to the south-east of Dardania (roughly corresponding to modern-day Kosovo); in the east was the Thracian mountains, and in the west, the Illyrians. The Macedonian Kings before Philip II maintained their ruling authority in central Macedonia, around Aegae and Pella and progressively expanded to augment their sovereignty lands. However, it was Philip who was driven by his far-sighted genius to expand his territory in search of resources which will secure him adequate wealth and taxes to materialize his ambitions.

¹ The phrase “*διαίρει και βασιλεύει*» which was later employed by the Romans *divide et impera* (divide and conquer) and was adopted by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) is attributed to Philip II.

Macedonian tradition, customs, heritage, language and rulers were all treated by erudite ancient sources, Greek, Persian and Roman as Hellenic. Ancient kingdoms and Empires, prominent for their institutional life and respect for their history made statements carrying crushing answers about the Hellenic ethnicity and identity of those *Makednoi* and their tribes residing initially around Aegai and Pella and later on under Philip were extended in search of resources all the way to modern Kavala unifying those tribes who claimed similar identity or Hellenizing those who wished to be acculturated. It was a culturally diverse kingdom, where the native populace was exposed to continuous warfare in an attempt to augment and then secure its boundaries. It was also a chivalric culture which was bound to produce lofty ideals. It was an age of social and political insecurity, when violence was rife and life crude and uncouth; hence it was natural that the rulers of the Makednoi ought to set great store by high precepts. History can also point to individual rulers, generals, poets and philosophers emerging from the land of Makednoi, who won renown as exemplars of their Hellenic spirit.² Before the days of the military and cultural achievements brought forth by the Eastern immense expedition of Alexander the Great and the establishment of its ephemeral empire, all the way to the lands of Jewish, Medoi and the Persians, the Asian mighty rulers from the time of Darius the Great and beyond, knew well that both **Greeks** (*Yaunâ* [Persian]; *Iones* [Greek]; *Yavan* [Hebrew], *Yunan* [Uralo-Altaic]) as well as **Macedonians** (*Yaunâtakabarâ* [Persian]) were both Hellenes (*see below*).

2.1 The Ancient Greek sources

To suppose that the rulers and the tribes in Macedonia did not speak Greek or a Greek dialect of its own, which could be comprehended by the central and south Hellenes, or to argue that the Macedonian dialect as a norm of communication was not part of the dialect continuum of the Hellenic world from the “pure waters of Strymon” to the south Peloponnese has been shown to be fallacious and politically naïve.³ After all, man is a rationale being who guides his acts by his free will and imposes his culture upon his material environment as he deems proper. Aeschylus the greatest worshipper of ancient Greek legends in his *Suppliants* (234ff), makes Pelasgus, the king of Argos, boast that his kin ruled beyond the Pindus and Dodona, as far the pure waters of Strymon, thus including Macedonia. Euripides, in his play *Iphigenia in Aulis*, 1400 ff. refers to his long sojourn in the Macedonian kingdom. Euripides migrated and settled in Macedonia where he also wrote and performed his plays; his dramas being the gospel of the national traditions of Hellenism, were presented in the capital of Macedonia. This would have been impossible, particularly in the case of a drama which poured contempt on barbarians, if the Macedonians were regarded as non-Greek. In Macedonia there was the general conviction that the Macedonians were

² It is significant to note that Slavic “Macedonian” bibliography presents Macedonia as a place without a history before Alexander the Great and almost without any or substantial reference to the region prior to the arrival of the Slavs. They also manage to remain silent about the Macedonian history during the Byzantine period to the end of the nineteenth century, and thenceforth with a meagre history at best. This is the result of total silence about the activities of the Hellenes of Macedonia.

³ See among others, G. Babiniotis (2014), the Language of Ancient Macedonians, *Macedonian Studies Journal*, AIMS, Melbourne; also

Greeks, thus it was there that he staged *Iphigenia in Aulis*, a play which contains the famous dogma concerning Greek superiority to the barbarians.

In light of the above, it should be also ascertained that the “barbarians” living along and around the confines of the kingdom of Makednoi were also destined to become the ultimate heirs of the Hellenic culture and language known and used in Macedonia. Paionians, Dardanians and Illyrians had also ultimately acquired from their contact with the Macedonian Hellenes certain socio-cultural and political concepts and other more or less incidental aspects of civilization including music, dancing and religious activities, arguably retaining their tribal freedom. Conformity to custom related practices does not require special mental training. Euripides, in his *Archelaos* extols the descent of the royal house of Macedonia and its Hellenic virtues from the national heroes of Greek legend, precisely to edify the Macedonians nationally.

Similarly, there was much intellectual activity in the Ancient world of Hellas producing a vast bulk of Greek literature and historiography; naturally socio-cultural aspects and political features characterizing the Makednoi in the north would be freely depicted and imbedded in these works, during a time when freedom and democratic practice in the south were part of the daily life. Contrary to the biased Athenian patriot and orator Demosthenes, who for reasons of political expediency refused to accept his compatriots from the North as isobar and equal Greeks, a whole cluster of noted experienced and extraordinary intellectual writers confessed with remarkable examples the unity of the Hellenic culture from Peloponnese to Macedonia. Historian Hellanicus of Lesbos⁴ (Hellanicus, frag. 75), who was a contemporary with Herodotus, travelled around Greek regions of Hellas, lived at the Macedonian court and collected old traditions and concluded: “*Macedon was the son of Aeolus*”.

Herodotus, in his (*Historia*, 8,43), argued that “*the Macedonians, the Lacedaemonians and the Corinthians were the ones who kept the Greek tradition and customs in the most conservative fashion and close to them the Sicyonians, the Epidaurians, the Troizinians, for the Macedonian and the Dorian nations extends from Erineus to Pindus and the Dryopian region*”. Herodotus, once again in his (*Historia*, 5, 22, 1) will voice: “*now that these descendants of Perdiccas are Greeks, as they themselves say, and I myself chance to know*”. This foremost historian in his *Historia*, 8,137 argued that the two names of the Macedonian capital **Edessa** and **Aegae**, the first with a Phrygian root and the second with a Greek one, both mean etymologically “abundant waters”, obviously derived from the Edessa water-falls still running today. The root of the word *Aegae* is found in Greek words either indicating water or related to it, as *Aegean*, *Aegialos*, *Aegion*. This meaning is already found in Homer (*Iliad* N, 21; and *Od.* E, 381), whilst according to Hesychius, the Dorians called the waves by this name.

⁴Hellanicus of Lesbos (Ancient Greek: Ἑλλάνικος) was an ancient Greeklogographer who flourished during the latter half of the 5th century BC. He was born in Mytilene on the isle of Lesbos in 490 BC and is reputed to have lived to the age of 85. According to the *Suda*, he lived for some time at the court of one of the kings of Macedon, and died at Perperene, a city in Aeolis on the plateau of Kozak near Pergamon, opposite Lesbos.

Hesiod,⁵ arguably a contemporary of Homer, a poetic luminary of great magnitude, a most noteworthy didactic poet of the antiquity, claimed in his *Theogony*, frag. 5, that **Macednos** and **Magnes**, who lived in the land around Olympus and Pieria, were the sons of Zeus and Thyia, daughter of Deukalion. Especially remarkable are Hesiod's conceptions in his poetic narrative in *List of Women*, HOIAI A2: "...and Pandora the daughter of Deukalion conceived to Zeus and gave birth to two sons of his, **Magnita** (the ancestor of the Thessalian people) and **Makidona** (the ancestor of the Macedonian people) and both of them settled in Pieria and Olympus".

Arrian of Nicomedia⁶ perhaps the best known historical source to illustrate the traits of Alexander's imperial campaign, combining with great vigour and extraordinary ability the striking success of the Macedon King as a multicultural inspirator and military genius, had left no dilemma about his ethnic identity. In his *Anabasis*, I, 2: "...He sent to Athens three hundred Persian Panoplies to be sent to Goddess Athena in the Acropolis; he ordered this inscription to be attached on the Parthenon: **Alexander son of Philip and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, set up these spoils from the barbarians dwelling in Asia.**" Especially remarkable is Arrian's treatment of the Great Macedonian Hellene who boasts for his descent and acts as the avenger of the nation of the Hellenes. According to his *Anabasis*, II, 14, 4, Alexander sent the following message to the Persian Great King: "...**Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece and did us great harm, though we had done them no prior injury....I have been appointed leader of the Greeks**". Of the historian scholars and philosophers who thus busied themselves with the metaphysical principles of Alexander and his theological beliefs, one of the most influential was again Arrian, who portrayed Alexander as a descendant of the Greek pantheon. According to his *Anabasis*, III, 3.1: Alexander believed that he was a descendant of Heracles, and therefore he derived his origin from Zeus and made determined efforts to identify supreme Egyptian and Asiatic deities with the Olympian father of gods and men. Thus, when Alexander visited the Temple of Ammon in Egypt, evidently as a Heracleid he was proclaimed by the priests a son of Zeus, with whom the god Ammon was often identified even in Greece itself. According to Arrianos, Alexander had the desire to visit the shrine of Ammon and consult the oracle, since according to legend both Perseus and Heracles had done so. They were sons of Zeus and he was their descendant and thus somewhat indirectly of Ammon too. Ancient Athenian rhetorician Isocrates (436–338 BC), one of the ten most influential Greek rhetoricians of his time, who made many contributions to rhetoric and education through his teaching and written works, in his monumental work *Panegiricus* 70 speaking of the first barbarians who attacked the Greeks to enslave them he calls the Thracians "*neighbours living near us*", consequently he includes the **Macedonians as part of Hellas**.

⁵Hesiod lived in the 8th century BCE, probably about the same time or shortly after Homer. He refers to himself as a farmer in Boeotia, a region of central Greece, but other than that we know little. His poetry codified the chronology and genealogy of the Greek myths. *Works and Days* and the *Theogony* are the only two complete works we have of Hesiod, other than the first few lines of a poem called the *Shield of Heracles*.

⁶Arrian of Nicomedia (*Lucius Flavius Arrianus "Xenophon"*; Greek: Ἀρριανός c. AD c. 86 – c. 160) was a Greek historian, public servant, military commander and philosopher of the 2nd-century Roman period. As with other authors of the Second Sophistic, Arrian wrote primarily in Attic (*Indica* is in Herodotus' Ionic dialect, his philosophical works in Koine Greek). The *Anabasis of Alexander* is perhaps his best-known work, and is generally considered one of the best sources on the campaigns of Alexander the Great.

The great geographer of the ancient world, Pausanias⁷ whose illustrious and exhaustive observatory work on Greece had been the indispensable manual of modern and contemporary archaeology, ascertained that the Macedonians of his time easily integrated in the political and social affairs of the Phokian Greeks. In his work *Phokis*, VIII 2-4 he clearly stated: “*They say that these were the clans collected by Amphiktryon himself in the Greek assembly...The Macedonians managed to join the entire Phocian race...In my day there were thirty members: six each from Nikopolis, Macedonia and Thessaly*”. In another reference of the spiritual needs of Macedonians residing in Phokis, Pausanias clarifies their common religious aspirations with other Greeks. In his *Phokis*, 13.5, he depicts: “*Of the Macedonians there are dedications from the inhabitants of Dion, a city under the Pierian Mountains, statutes depicting Apollo holding a stag*”.

Polibius (c.200-c.118 BC),⁸ was born in Megalopolis, Arcadia and built fruitful relations with Macedonia and its society. He was the greatest historian of the Hellenistic period and a political genius who influenced with his writings the western world. His father Lycortas, a renown politician was appointed cavalry commander of the Achaean League and strongly opposed the Roman control of Macedonia. This able and unscrupulous leader was punished with imprisonment by the Romans for his vigorous role, whilst his son Polibius was deported to Rome immediately after the Roman victory at Pydna, Macedonia in 168 BC. In 152 BC Polibius returned for a short period to Macedonia in an effort to settle; however, he soon returned to Rome entering a long and constructive association with the leaders of the Empire. This great historian in his erudite work *the Histories*, IX, 35, 2, elaborates on the important role of Macedonians in protecting the safety of Greece and the Greeks from the barbarians: “*How highly should we honour the Macedonians, who for the greater part of their lives never cease from fighting with the barbarians for the sake of the security of Greece? For who is not aware that Greece would have constantly stood in the greater danger, had we not been fenced by the Macedonians and the honourable ambition of their kings?*”

Athenian great historian and political philosopher Thucydides,⁹ the father of the school of political realism, which views the relations between nations as based on might rather than

⁷Pausanias (c. AD 110 – AD 180) was a Greek traveller and geographer of the 2nd century AD, who lived in the times of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. He is famous for his *Description of Greece* (Ἑλλάδος περιήγησις *Hellados Periegesis*) a lengthy work that describes ancient Greece from first hand observations, and is a crucial link between classical literature and modern archaeology.

⁸Polybius was a Greek historian of the Hellenistic Period noted for his work, *The Histories*, which covered the period of 264–146 BC in detail. The work describes the rise of the Roman Republic to 'world power'. Polybius is also renowned for his ideas concerning the separation of powers in government, later used in Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* and in the drafting of the United States Constitution. Following his father's imprisonment, Polybius was deported to Rome, where Lucius Aemilius Paulus employed him to tutor his two sons. Polybius had the opportunity to return to Macedonia in 152 BC; he elected to stay, however, in Rome, as by that time he had placed his allegiance in the Roman Republic. He became a close friend of the Roman military commander Scipio Aemilianus, accompanying the general to Hispania and Africa. He was also among the members of the Scipionic Circle.

⁹Thucydides (c. 460– c. 395 BC) was an Athenian historian, political philosopher and general. His *History of the Peloponnesian War* recounts the 5th century BC war between Sparta and Athens to the year 411 BC. Thucydides has been dubbed the father of "scientific history" because of his strict standards of evidence-gathering and analysis in terms of cause and effect without reference to intervention by the gods, as outlined in his introduction to his work.

right, the man who pioneered scientific historiography relates the Macedonians as descendants of the Argian Greeks of the south. In his Book II, 99.3 we learn: “...*The country by the sea which is now called Macedonia...Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were originally Temenidae from Argos...*”

Pontian Hellene and great geographer Strabo ¹⁰ provided us the foundations on which the geographic and other organizational characteristics of the vast Roman Empire rested. His reference on Macedonia, a region that he crossed on his way to Rome and socially experienced via his extensive travels, had been explicit. In his book *VII*, Frag. 9, he clearly states: “*Macedonia, of course, is part of Greece*”.

3.0 The Ancient Persian sources

The *Behistun Inscription* meaning “the place of god” is a multi-lingual inscription located on Mount Behistun in the Kermanshah Province of Iran, near the city of Kermanshah in western Iran.



The Behistun Inscription meaning “the place of god” located on Mount Behistun in the Kermanshah Province of Iran, near the city of Kermanshah in western Iran

It was crucial to the decipherment of cuneiform script. Authored by Darius the Great sometime between his coronation as king of the Persian Empire in the summer of 522 BC and his death in autumn of 486 BC, the inscription begins with a brief autobiography of Darius, including his ancestry and lineage. Later in the inscription, Darius provides a lengthy sequence of events following the deaths of Cyrus the Great and Cambyses II in which he fought nineteen battles in a period of one year (ending in December 521 BC) to put down multiple rebellions throughout the Persian Empire. The inscription

His text is still studied at advanced military colleges worldwide and the Melian dialogue remains a seminal work of international relations theory

¹⁰ Strabo was born to an affluent family from Amaseia in Pontus. Pontus had recently fallen to the Roman Republic, and although politically he was a proponent of Roman imperialism, Strabo belonged on his mother's side to a prominent family whose members had held important positions under the resisting regime of King Mithridates VI of Pontus. Strabo's life was characterized by extensive travels. He journeyed to Egypt and Kush, as far west as coastal Tuscany and as far south as Ethiopia in addition to his travels in Asia Minor and time spent in Rome. Travel throughout the Mediterranean and Near East, especially for scholarly purposes, was popular during this era and was facilitated by the relative peace enjoyed throughout the reign of Augustus (27 BC – AD 14). He moved to Rome in 44 BC, and stayed there, studying and writing, until at least 31 BC. In 29 BC, on his way to Corinth (where Augustus was at the time), he visited the island of Gyaros in the Aegean Sea. Around 25 BC, he sailed up the Nile until reaching Philae, after which point there is little record of his proceedings until AD 17.

states in detail that the rebellions, which had resulted from the deaths of Cyrus the Great and his son Cambyses II, were orchestrated by several impostors and their co-conspirators in various cities throughout the empire, each of whom falsely proclaimed kingship during the upheaval following Cyrus's death.

Darius the Great proclaimed himself victorious in all battles during the period of upheaval, attributing his success to the "grace of Ahura Mazda". The inscription includes three versions of the same text, written in three different cuneiform script languages: Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian (a later form of Akkadian). In effect, then, the inscription is to cuneiform what the Rosetta Stone is to Egyptian hieroglyphs: the document most crucial in the decipherment of a previously lost script.



The image of Darius the Great of Persia.

The inscription is approximately 15 metres high by 25 metres wide and 100 metres up a limestone cliff from an ancient road connecting the capitals of Babylonia and Media (Babylon and Ecbatana, respectively). The Old Persian text contains 414 lines in five columns; the Elamite text includes 593 lines in eight columns, and the Babylonian text is in 112 lines. The inscription was illustrated by a life-sized bas-relief of Darius I, the Great, holding a bow as a sign of kingship, with his left foot on the chest of a figure lying on his back before him. The supine figure is reputed to be the pretender Gaumata. Darius is attended to the left by two servants, and nine one-metre figures stand to the right, with hands tied and rope around their necks, representing conquered peoples. Faravahar floats above, giving his blessing to the king. One figure appears to have been added after the others were completed, as was Darius's beard, which is a separate block of stone attached with iron pins and lead.

The inscription is mentioned by Ctesias of Cnidus, who noted its existence sometime around 400 BC and mentioned a well and a garden beneath the inscription. He incorrectly concluded that the inscription had been dedicated "by Queen Semiramis of Babylon to Zeus". Tacitus also mentions it and includes a description of some of the long-lost ancillary monuments at the base of the cliff, including an altar to "Herakles". What has been recov-

ered of them, including a statue dedicated in 148 BC, is consistent with Tacitus's description. Diodorus also writes of "Bagistanon" and claims it was inscribed by Semiramis.



Column 1 (DB I 1-15), sketch by Friedrich von Spiegel (1881)

In 1598, the Englishman Robert Sherley saw the inscription during a diplomatic mission to Persia on behalf of Austria, and brought it to the attention of Western European scholars. In 1835, Sir Henry Rawlinson, an officer of the British East India Company army assigned to the forces of the Shah of Iran, began studying the inscription in earnest. As the town of Bisutun's name was anglicized as "Behistun" at this time, the monument became known as the "Behistun Inscription". Despite its relative inaccessibility, Rawlinson was able to scale the cliff and copy the Old Persian inscription. The Elamite was across a chasm, and the Babylonian four meters above; both were beyond easy reach and were left for later.

With the Persian text, and with about a third of the syllabary made available to him by the work of Georg Friedrich Grotefend, Rawlinson set to work on deciphering the text. Fortunately, the first section of this text contained a list of the same Persian kings found in Herodotus in their original Persian forms as opposed to Herodotus's Greek transliterations; for example Darius is given as the original *Dāryavuš* instead of the Hellenized *Δαρείος*. By matching the names and the characters, Rawlinson was able to decipher the type of cuneiform used for Old Persian by 1838 and presented his results to the Royal Asiatic Society in London and the Société Asiatique in Paris. In the interim, Rawlinson spent a brief tour of duty in Afghanistan, returning to the site in 1843. He first crossed a chasm between the Persian and Elamite scripts by bridging the gap with planks, subsequently copying the Elamite inscription. He was then able to find an enterprising local boy to climb up a crack in the cliff and suspend ropes across the Babylonian writing, so that papier-mâché casts of the inscriptions could be taken. Rawlinson, along with several other scholars, most notably Edward Hincks, Julius Oppert, William Henry Fox Talbot, and Edwin Norris, either working separately or in collaboration, eventually deciphered these inscriptions, leading eventually to the ability to read them completely.

The site was visited by A. V. Williams Jackson in 1903. Later expeditions, in 1904 sponsored by the British Museum and led by Leonard William King and Reginald Campbell Thompson and in 1948 by George G. Cameron of the University of Michigan, obtained photographs, casts and more accurate transcriptions of the texts, including passages that were not copied by Rawlinson. It also became apparent that rainwater had dissolved some areas of the limestone in which the text was inscribed, while leaving new deposits of limestone over other areas, covering the text. In 1938, the inscription became of interest to the Nazi

German think tank Ahnenerbe, although research plans were cancelled due to the onset of World War II.



Close-up of the inscription showing damage

The monument later suffered some damage from Allied soldiers using it for target practice in World War II, during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. In 1999, Iranian archeologists began the documentation and assessment of damages to the site incurred during the 20th century. Malieh Mehdiabadi, who was project manager for the effort, described a photogrammetric process by which two-dimensional photos were taken of the inscriptions using two cameras and later transmuted into 3-D images. In recent years, Iranian archaeologists have been undertaking conservation works. The site became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2006.

3.1 The cast of nations during the Darius era

The *Yaunâ* (Ἴωνες, *Ionian* and in Turkish *Yunan (or Old Testament, Yanan (Hebrew) Isaiah (Hebre/Aramaic) 66:19, Ezekiel 27:13)*) was the old Persian name for the Greeks and is being mentioned for the first time in the catalogue of subject people in the *Inscription of the Behistun Monument*, which was erected in c.520 BC by the Persian King Darius I the Great (see above). This confirms what we know from the *Histories* by the Greek researcher and Historian Herodotus of Halicarnassus (fifth century): the Ionians had been subjugated by the Persian king Cyrus the Great in the mid-sixth century. According to Herodotus, the Ionian Greeks were grouped together in one tax district with the Pamphylians, Lycians, Magnesians, Aeolians, Milyans and Carians.

The *Yaunâ* appear to have gained from the Persian occupation. After all, the eastern Mediterranean was ruled by one king, which made trade easier. Impoverishment, therefore, is not the explanation for the revolt of the *Yaunâ* in Asia Minor in 499. It took the Persian armies about six years to restore order. Now, it was clear that the possessions in Asia Minor could be safe only after a *cordon sanitaire* had been created that separated the *Yaunâ* in the Persian Empire from those to the west of the Aegean Sea.

As a preliminary operation, general Mardonius was sent out to conquer Macedonia (492). His navy may have counted 300 ships, the army 20,000 men. Their first victim was Thasos, a *Yaunâ island* that possessed important mines. It became tributary to the Achaemenid em-


pire. The navy and the army continued to Macedonia, which was added to Darius' kingdom as well. (Herodotus presents this expedition as directed against the entire Greece, but he is mistaken.) This campaign was important, because Macedonia was a fine base for further conquests in Europe and possessed gold mines. Darius proudly wrote in the inscription on his tomb at Naqš-iRustam that he had conquered the *Yaunâtakabarâ*, the '*Greeks with sun hats*', a reference to the *Macedonian headwear*. So the Ancient Persians clearly recognized Ancient Macedonians as *Yaunâtakabarâ*, the '*Greeks with sun hats*' whereas the rest of Greeks were simply *Yuana*.

In the two lists below, which depict as well as enumerate the various subject nations, the reader will attest that according to the *Behistun Inscription*, the Greeks i.e, *Yauna* (Ionians) are number 23 from left to right. *Yauna Takabara* (the 'Greeks with the sun hats') – a clear reference to the ancient Macedonians and their *Kafsia* are at number 26. This is a very significant piece of information that reinforces the Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians according to old and genuine sources from the East. This piece of information in conjunction with Herodotus' reference to Alexander the I, the Persians' 'Greek viceroy' in Macedonia and his relationship with the Persians in Book 9: 45, leaves little doubt that the Persians with their inscription were essentially corroborating the story by Herodotus and clearly regarded both Alexander the I and the Macedonians as *Yauna Takabara* (the Greeks who wear the sun hats). This may also allude the reader to the sun of the Macedonian Kings, the emblem of the *Yauna Takabara*.

Indications of people and its Translation in English below:

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. iyam \ Pârsâ | 16. iyam \ Bâbiruš |
| 2. iyam \ Mâda | 17. iyam \ Athuriya |
| 3. iyam \ Uvja | 18. iyam \ Arabâya |
| 4. iyam \ Parthava | 19. iyam \ Mudrâya |
| 5. iyam \ Haraiva | 20. iyam \ Arminiya |
| 6. iyam \ Baxtriya | 21. iyam \ Katpatuka |
| 7. iyam \ Suguda | 22. imay \ Spardiya |
| 8. iyam \ Uvârazmiya | 23. iyam \ Yaunâ |
| 9. iyam \ Zrakâ | 24. iyam \ Sakâ \ paradraiya |
| 10. iyam \ Harauvatiya | 25. iyam \ Skudra |
| 11. iyam \ Thataguiya | 26. iyam \ Yauna \ takabarâ |
| 12. iyam \ Gadâraya | 27. iyam \ Putâya |
| 13. iyam \ Hiduya | 28. iyam \ Kušâya |
| 14. iyam \ Sakâ \ haumavargâ | 29. iyam \ Maciya |
| 15. iyam \ Sakâ \ tigraxaudâ | 30. iyam \ Karka |
| 1. This is the Persian. | 16. This is the Babylonian. |
| 2. This is the Mede. | 17. This is the Syrian. |
| 3. This is the Elamite. | 18. This is the Arab. |
| 4. This is the Parthian. | 19. This is the Egyptian. |
| 5. This is the Arian. | 20. This is the Armenian. |
| 6. This is the Bactrian. | 21. This is the Cappadocian. |
| 7. This is the Sogdian. | 22. This is the Lydian. |

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>8. This is the Chorasmian.
 9. This is the Drangian.
 10. This is the Arachosian.
 11. This is the Sattagydian.
 12. This is the Gandaran.
 13. This is the man of Sind.
 14. This is the haoma-drinking Saca.
 15. This is the Saca with the pointed hat</p> | <p>23. This is the Greek.
 24. This is the Scythian from across the sea
 25. This is the Thracian.
 26. This is the Macedonian Greek.
 27. This is the Libyan.
 28. This is the Kushite.
 29. This is the man of Maka.
 30. This is the Carian</p> |
|--|--|



It is also reasonable to conclude that curiously enough what the ancient Persians had recognized 2600 years ago, **namely that the Macedonians were simply Greeks that wore sun hats**, could fraudulently be placed in doubt today by the strategists of the ethnogenesis of the Macedoslavs and their ignorant agencies.

4.0 The Graeco-Indian Kingdoms¹¹

Available sources¹² refer to the first Sino-Hellenic encounter during the reign of the great Chinese Emperor Wu (141-87 BC) who belonged to the Han Dynasty (206 BC- 220 AD). In

¹¹ For a detailed account on the Greeks in Easter Asia, the reader is referred to A. M. Tamis (2012), *Greeks in the Far Orient*, Vaniias, Thessaloniki.

¹² Reference is made here to the research conducted by the 2nd post-WWII Greek Ambassador to China D.K. Velisariopoulos on the Sino-Byzantine relations from the Hellenistic period to a more recent past. See file 1217/9/AS 637, 25 June 1977, Peking, pp. 1-11, *Dardalis Archives*.

c. 130 BC, the empire was suffering constant invasions on its western provinces by barbarian tribes provoking enormous unrest and catastrophes. Emperor Wu, in an effort to appease the situation, appointed a gallant warrior, Zhang Qian [Chang Ch'ien], with an objective to find allies across the western borders of the Empire and to organize a strong defence line against the invading nomads Scythians and Mongols, the Huns. Zhang Qian arrived with the Chinese army south of the river Oxus, in the province of Bactria, where he was met by the leaders of a tribe called Chang or Kushan. These people were also fugitives of the invading Mongol nomad forces and having been driven from their own lands, deposed the Greeks and their leaders from the Greek kingdom of Bactria to the southern regions.

The Greek kingdoms of Bactria in the north and the Indo-Greek dynasties in the south were formed in 311 BC following Alexander the Great's overthrow of the Persian Empire. These two Greek kingdoms¹³ were overwhelmed by the invading nomads from central Asia in c. 130 BC. Consequently, Chang Ch'ien missed by a few only years the Bactrian Greek (Macedonian) leaders; however, it is reasonable to assume that he and his soldiers made their first contact with the Greeks of Bactria, and naturally the most abiding achievement of Greek rule in Asia, the Buddhist monumental Greco-Bactrian art. It is also reasonable to believe that Chang Ch'ien also sighted some of the most splendid of Greek coins bearing King Demetrios and King Menander [Menandros] (175-135?), displaying them with their Macedonian head-band as Saviours. It is also feasible to propose that during the 200 years of Hellenistic domination in the region with the reign of forty Greek kings, the Greek presence was apparent in the wider western borders of China.¹⁴ Greek Bactria was overthrown by the invading central Asian nomads, yet the Greek presence south of the Hindu Kush maintained its vigour, with the reinforcement by refugees from Bactria until the closing years of 130 BC.¹⁵

The father of the Chinese historiography, Sima Qian (c. 145-86 BC) in his work entitled *Records of the Grand Historian*, covering more than 2000 years of Chinese history records the trade between China and the Indo-Greek kingdoms. He refers to Zhang Qian's visit in the Greco-Indian kingdoms and suggests that intense trade with Southern China was going through northern India. Zhang Qian explains that he found Chinese products in the Bactrian Hellenic markets, and that they were transiting through north-western India, which he incidentally describes as a civilization similar to that of Bactria: "*When I was in Bactria,*" Zhang Qian reported, "*I saw bamboo canes from Qiong and cloth (silk?) made in the province of Shu. When I asked the people how they had gotten such articles, they replied: "Our merchants go buy them in the markets of Shendu (north-western India). Shendu, they told*

¹³ These Greek kingdoms were spread within the region which incorporated the four Alexandrias of the East, namely, Alexandria Escharta in Sogdia, Alexandria of Bactria, Alexandria Areion and Alexandria of Arachosia.

¹⁴ Velissaropoulos correctly points out that during the reigns of Demetrios and Menandros, the Greek presence remained strong during the arrival there of Chang Ch'ien, since the Greeks and their culture were spread in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the North Western part of India reaching up to Benares and the Ganges Basin. See Velissaropoulos (1977: 2ff), *Dardalis Archives*.

¹⁵ See in particular P. Halsall (2006), *East Asian History Sourcebook: Chinese Accounts of Rome, Byzantium and the Middle East, c. 91 B.C.-1643 CE*, Fordham University.

me, lies several thousand li southeast of Bactria. The people cultivate land, and live much like the people of Bactria".¹⁶

According to well-documented sources¹⁷ King Menandros about 138 BC marched far down the Ganges. According to well-known British historian, A. R. Burn, Menandros figures in a Buddhist classic, *The Questions of King Milinda*; Milinda, king of the 'fierce Ionians', in his town planned and well-watered capital in the Punjab, held dialogues with the sage Nagasena, ending in his conversion to Buddhism. "*This is the context of the rise of the first Buddhist monumental sculpture, in the province of Gandhara. Hitherto Buddhists, like the earliest Christians, had not portrayed their master. The motifs are Indian, both free-standing statues and reliefs with, for instance, the birth stories of the Buddha; the technique is Greek. From it descended all Buddhist monumental art, though it swiftly assumes its own character both in southern Asia and in China...*" Nonetheless, broadly speaking Greek influence on Buddhist sculpture remained apparent in the two main schools of arts in India, namely the Gandhara school, where the art is clearly Hellenistic and that of Mathura, close to Delhi, where the Hellenistic impact and stimulus are perceptible. Subsequently, when Buddhism reached China from India during the T'Ang Dynasty (618-906 AD), together with it came also the Hellenistic influences in the Chinese sculpture. These artistic influences were clearer in the religious manifestations of the art, rather than its secular aspects. The Chinese adopted many aspects of the Hellenistic artistic style via the Indian Buddhist monumental art but a few only aspects of the Hellenistic spiritualism. After all, the Greek sculptures always promoted in their statutes the individuality and thus their gods were always anthropomorphic. In China, the dimension of the divine remained always geometric and thus never anthropomorphic.

Finally, it is also logical to assume that Bactrian Greeks used to have some sort of commercial communication with the Chinese as many silk garments imported from the Chinese province of Sichuan were found in the four cities in the region bearing the name of Alexandria. Hence, it was only reasonable for Zhang Qian to report to Emperor Wu, that he found "also a kind of tribe there different from the other indigenous population". Almost eighty years later under the reign of the Chinese Emperor Han YuaTi (43-33 BC), Chinese embassies were sent to the South Western borders of the Empire and met there the last Greek King, Ermaios. The latter had unsuccessfully requested a few years earlier the military support of the Chinese Empire against the invading tribes of the Kushans, who having conquered the Greek Bactrian region in the north, were now attacking the last Greek remnants in the south. By this time Indian Hellenism was already "much diluted", before the invading nomads penetrated the region establishing their Kushan Empire. These events were indecisively described by certain sources utilizing rather tentative evidence:¹⁸

"..The Chinese embassies met Ermaios, the last Greek king in the region. However, this finding remains rather uncertain. In the Chinese chronicles is witnessed that their en-

¹⁶Watson Burton (1956:236) translation of *Sima Qian's Records of the Great Historian*, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.

¹⁷ A. R. Burn (1965), *The History of Greece*, pp. 362-369.

¹⁸Velissaropoulos (1977:3-4).

voys met a king in the region, Yu Mo Fu. The leading historian of the region, Tarn, ¹⁹believes that Yu Mo Fu is the transliteration of the word 'Ermaios'. His opinion is fully justifiable, if we consider that the Chinese script could not adequately transfer the foreign sounds and from my own experience in China, I could also conclude that the word Yu Mo Fu could realistically be the word 'Ermaios'...

A few years earlier King Ermaios, enduring the invasion of the Kushans, a barbarian tribe, sought the military support of the Chinese by sending his envoys to Emperor Cheng Ti (32-7 BC). The latter decided not to interfere and a few years later the last remaining bastion of Hellenism in central Asia fell to the Kushans. It is interesting to note that historian Strabon also refers to the region and mentions the progressive descent of the barbarian nomads from the north, who finally reduced the Greek presence and eradicated the Greek authority from the region. A lot were also witnessed in the *Chronicles* maintained by the Chinese Emperors in which for more than 2,000 years professional historiographers were composing with accuracy the historical events of their nation.

British historian C.P. Fitzgerald, describing the last days of the Greek dominance in the Orient, comments "what a pity that these relations between the Chinese and the Greeks did not take place one century earlier?" If the Chinese contact with the robust Greek kingdoms of the East was to take place 100 years earlier, then the end result could be very profitable for both nations...."

Almost two-hundred years after the envoy mission of 128 BC to the western border of the Empire by warlord Chang Ch'ien, in AD 97, the then Emperor of China, Pan Chang, prepared an investigative expedition to the Sattagene region in the Caspian Sea with an army of 70,000, under the leadership of Kan Ying. The mission was to monitor and identify the state and the nature of the western world and more specifically of the Roman Empire, the Ta Tsin. However, although this expedition was never materialized, it was well perceived within the imperial circles that the Ta Tsin Empire was heavily influenced by the Greek language and civilization. According to Velissaropoulos (1977:4) and the *Chinese Chronicles*, the first Christians to arrive in China were the Nestorians during the 7th century AD, when almost "2000 Nestorian churches were established" and were compelled to close by the Emperor in 845 AD. Also consistent with the archives of the Chinese T' Ang Dynasty (618-906) is the fact that during the period 643-716 AD at least four envoy missions were organized by the Byzantines to China.²⁰ The Byzantine embassies were sent to China seeking unsuccessfully their military support against the invading Arab tribes.²¹ Even though it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese used the term Butzan and Fulin to denote the Eastern Roman Empire or Byzantium, according to the *Chinese Chronicles* of the T'Ang Dynasty, there was never any record of any Chinese embassy reaching Constantinople. Yet, the Chinese Ar-

¹⁹Velissaropoulos is making reference here to the brilliant and authoritative works of William Tarn and G.T. Griffith (1962), *Hellenistic Civilization*, Arnold.

²⁰ According to the *Chinese Chronicles*, in 643 AD a royal embassy arrived in China by the name Po To Li. The latter name is attributed to a Byzantine Emperor or his envoy and many researchers claim that the word Po To Li is the transliteration of the word 'Patrikios', "a title given to all the Emperors of New Rome", that is Constantinople. See Velissaropoulos (1977:5).

²¹Velissaropoulos correctly argues that despite the failure, the Byzantine embassies to China returned to Constantinople full of knowledge about advanced Chinese technology, as "Chinese technology was by far more advanced than the Western, at least until the Galileo's era".

chives incorporate the following description of the Byzantine Empire and its capital Constantinople. The description, as exotic and oriental as it may appear, is most significant:²²

“...Fulin or Butzan or Byzantium is the ancient Ta Tsin [Roman Empire] which is bordering with Persia and the Western Turks. The country has a large population and there are many cities. The Walls of the City are covered from dressed stone and the city is dwelled by more of 100,000 families. There is a gate with a height of 200 feet, which is fully covered by bronze. In the imperial palace there is a statue from gold of a man, which notices the passing hours with the sound of the bells. The building is decorated with glasses and porcelain, gold, ivory and very rare timber. The roofs are made of cement and are levelled. During the heat of the summer, there are machines that are being moved with water pressure and are used for air conditioning. The machines carry the water high and then it falls as a rain on the windows cooling the air.

The King is assisted by 12 ministers. When he leaves the palace, he is accompanied by a man, who carries a sack, where every citizen is free to throw in his request. Men have short hair and wear embroidered cloths. Their right hand remains naked. Women wear their hair in the shape of a crown. The people of Fulin appreciate wealth. They love the wine and the sweets. Every seventh day they have a brake.

The country produces corals, lime and many other strange things. They have very skilful magicians, who spit fire from their mouths; they extract water from their hands and toss pearls from their feet. They also have very talented medical practitioners, who could cure a number of illnesses taking warms out from the heads of their patients...”.

The aforementioned scanty contacts and transactions recorded mainly by Chinese and Indian historians, despite their excitement, remain largely rather vague. According to well documented sources²³ the Chinese discovered the Greeks as early as 1606, when a renowned science scholar and high-ranking imperial mandarin, Xu Guangqi (1562-1633), “a native of present day Shanghai, began to study Euclid’s *Elements* [Στοιχεία] in Latin with the Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci.” Xu was introduced to the Western science earlier via his contact with the Christian missionaries and was baptized in 1603. His fascination with the Greek mathematics, physics, logic in geometry and rational thinking overwhelmed him. Immediately he embarked on a campaign to enhance the study of Euclid’s writings in China, convincing Matteo Ricci to translate together the *Elements* into Chinese. By 1607, they managed to publish the first six books of the *Elements*, which became instrumental for the study of western mathematics in the subsequent centuries, and they still remain in use today. Almost four hundred years later (1903), Lu Xun, arguably the greatest 20th century Chinese writer published a story entitled *The Spartan Spirit*²⁴ making reference to the Battle of Thermopylae. Lu Xun and other Chinese were studying then in Japan (a few only months prior to the Russo-Japanese War), when the Russians threatened to annex the northeastern provinces of China.

²² See Velissaropoulos, (1977:5-6).

²³Reference is made here to Yang Huang’s paper entitled *Classical Studies in China*, Department of History, Fudan University, *Dardalis Archives*. In 2009, Professor Yang Huang was appointed Professor of History at the Department of History of the University of Peking.

²⁴The story was published on the journal *Zhejiang Tide*. See also Yang’s paper above, p.1.

5.0 Final remarks

The present borders of Macedonia are the subject of historic-political combinations and complexities. They were formed after the termination of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) by means of international agreements and treaties. They were disputed during both World Wars.²⁵ Although the physical barriers, water courses and mountain ranges were taken into consideration, none of the boundaries followed the natural line or environment. They simply reflected the balance of power between the countries involved. The national and more or less ethnic boundaries of the competing nations over the ancient Hellenic region of Macedonia were finally settled with the signing of the *Treaty of Bucharest* (1913), giving to Bulgaria²⁶ its linguistically and culturally claimed Bulgarian regions; Serbia gained most of northern Macedonia and the disputed districts around Monastiri (Bitola) and Lake Ochrid, whilst Greece won the clearly Greek speaking areas of South Macedonia and the disputed territory of the central zone including the districts of Florina, Kastoria and Almopia.

Most observers and scholars agree that clusters of Pomaks (Moslem Greeks and Bulgars), Roma and Vlachs were scattered throughout Macedonia. However, the Hellenes predominated in the south and the large towns of central Macedonia, and included the bulk of the literary population, the artisan and commercial families. Greek was considered to be the official language and culture of the Christian Orthodox population. Albanians predominated in the western part and even today constitute more than one-third of the overall population of the FYROM; Bulgars were numerically strong in the north and central parts of eastern Macedonia. The identity of the Slavic-speaking (*Slavophone*) population of the northern and central zones of Macedonia became then the centre of the dispute between the competing national ideologies. The Hellenes claimed that they were genuine Hellenes who had been assimilated linguistically by the Slavs. The Bulgars stated that they were true Bulgars, the Serbs declared them to be South Serbs, some claimed that they were an amalgam of Bulgarian and Serbian settlers, Macedoslavs, who must form a separate ethnicity.²⁷ During the first fifty years of the 20th century, the authorities of non-European English-speaking countries, including the US and Australia, used to enumerate race and ethnicity of their citizens according to the prevailing self-defined designations of the individuals themselves. Hence, Greece was portrayed with Greek and Macedonian Hellenes, Bulgaria with Bulgari-

²⁵ An attempt by Russia to incorporate Macedonia into an independent Great Bulgaria (1877-1878) failed because of the disagreement of the Great Powers who insisted that it should constitute part of the Ottoman Empire. This triggered a violent and bitter struggle amongst Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian guerrilla forces that entered the region staging rebellions of their own. The issue was finally settled among the competing nations following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).

²⁶ The Bulgarian government supported the *Macedonian Revolutionary Organization* as some of its members held positions in the Bulgarian armed forces. The *MRO* was dubbed 'a state within a state;' Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were greatly affected by the operation of the *MRO* as Belgrade suspected Bulgarian territorial aggrandizement of its territory. Sofia raised the issue of a Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia, despite the Balkan Pact of the 1930s with the Balkan states seeking to establish good neighbourly relations amongst themselves; Belgrade always remained suspicious of Bulgarian intentions.

²⁷ According to the U.S. Immigration Commissioner in 1911 the term Macedonian denoted simply the Bulgarian. In his Reports, entitled *Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission*, Volume I, p. 255 under the entry Macedonian was inserted in parenthesis (see Bulgarian), *AIMS Archives*.

ans and Bulgarian Macedonians, Turkey in Europe with Turks and Turkish Macedonians, like Kemal Pasha.²⁸

After December 1991, and the proclamation of independence of FYROM the 'name problem' escalated simply because it also claimed the cultural identity of the Macedoslavs as "Macedonians". While Greece and particularly the Hellenes in the Diaspora rejected FYROM's ethnogenetic perceptions outright, the Bulgarians, who recognized the new State, refused to recognize the transformation of its Bulgarian-speaking people from ethnic Bulgarians to "Macedonians". Hellenes around the globe discarded the appropriation of the nomenclatures "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" as national names with exclusive usage; the semantic value of these words and their concepts openly intersected their own cultural identity. During the next two decades up to 2014 the ethnogenesis of the Macedoslavs underwent a severe metamorphosis, violating historical borders; the leaders of the newly independent state were now in search in the distant past of any elements which could reinforce the ethnic awakening of their people. The conceptual values of the ethnogenesis were now based clearly on an ethnic arrogance that was well nourished primarily by the domestic irredentist claims of the robust Albanian minority, but also by the influence of a rather affluent and grossly fanatical Diaspora. In addition, several ultra-nationalist rulers, such as Nikola Gruevski²⁹ were seeking to divert the attention of their newly liberated population from the daily socio-economic challenges, by focusing particularly on issues of identity.³⁰ This included demands that Greece and Bulgaria recognize their "Macedonian minorities"; the resettlement of the Macedoslav guerillas who left Greece following the termination of the Civil War (1949); and most importantly a well-documented expansionist policy at the expense of the Greek region of Macedonia, including the historical and cultural identity of Greek Macedonians and Hellenism in general.

With the exclusive use of the name "Macedonia" the ultra-nationalist rulers of FYROM and the fanatical leaders of the Macedoslavs in Australia were demanding cultural, ethnic and territorial sovereignty over the broader geographical area of Macedonia as well as the historical events and achievements that took place there since time immemorial. This sense of a "Greater Macedonia" incorporating the Greek and Bulgarian regions also disseminates the perception of a mutilated "ethnos" desperately seeking its re-unification. Erudite Greek historian Evangelos Kofos, following a comprehensive study of the school-books of history and geography produced in contemporary FYROM, concludes:

"...They use two maps with the name 'Macedonia' hanging in the classrooms or covering their school books; both present their fatherland-'tatkovina'. However they differ in terms of the geographical area they present. The first map presents

²⁸Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission, Volume II, p. 685 under the title "Instructions Concerning country and race", AIMS Archives.

²⁹Nikola Gruevski was born in Skopje (31 August 1970) and has been Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia since 27 August 2006. He has led the ruling VMRO-DPMNE Party since May 2003. He was Minister of Finance in the VMRO-DPMNE government led by more liberal Ljubčo Georgievski until September 2002.

³⁰Most revealing are the circulation of maps of a 'Single Greater Macedonia', the advertisements by the Gruevski's nationalist party VMRO/DPMNE for a coming conference (1990) in (liberated) Thessaloniki and particularly the adoption of their national flag with its emblem the 'Sun of Macedonian Royal family'.

the 'Republika Makedonija' or FYROM, within today's national borders which are identical to the former SRM, containing parts of land acquired by the Serb Kingdom after the Balkan wars and the World War I. The second map covers the areas of the 'Greater' or 'Singular' Macedonia which- as is written underneath- presents Macedonia in its "geographic and national boundaries". Within these extended boundaries, outside the national boundaries of FYROM are also include all the Macedonian regional areas of Greece, Bulgaria as well as a strip of land from Albania. No doubt the presence of the two maps creates confusion; yet a purposeful confusion, especially valuable politically and culturally."

According to E. Kofos, the map of a singular Macedonia as a "fatherland" of today's *Makedontsi*, those who some refer to as *Skopjens*, fulfills many purposes and expresses, indirectly, unspoken objectives, for the following reasons:

- It creates the impression, particularly in the new generation, of an "unjustly" dismembered country, part of which is under *pod* (under sovereignty-yoke- occupation) by neighboring countries.
- It provides a canvas, unaltered by time, illustrating a "Macedonian fatherland" extending over the Aegean sea, where whatever has happened within its boundaries over the centuries, even prior to the descent of the Slavic "ancestors" of today's *Makedontsi*, comes under the ownership of the contemporary "Macedonian" people.
 - In addition it gives the right to monopolize the use of everything "Macedonian", from naming their country and their people, as well as the historic and cultural achievements of people who lived in this area throughout the ages.
 - Finally it maintains a vision, a "Great Idea" of its geographical as well as its cultural dimensions.

Hence, this two-fold concept of '*Tatkovina [fatherland]-nation*' and '*tatkovina [fatherland]*' - a dismembered political-geographical whole' - loads the generations of young and those of the Diaspora of FYROM, with nationalistic sentiments. In addition it gives a negative hue to their relationship with neighboring countries, mainly the Greeks who justly speak of irredentism.

Macedonia has been a distinct geographic and historical region since 1,400 B.C., well before the settlement of the Slavs in the Balkans almost 2,000 years later. The Greek ethnicity of Ancient Macedonians³¹ as well as that of the inhabitants of pre-Slavic and Byzantine Macedonia can not be placed in doubt³². During the Byzantine period Greek identity was further

³¹ For a detailed account of the ethnicity of Ancient Macedonians and their relation to Hellas see Jonathan Hall, "Contested ethnicities: perceptions of Macedonia within evolving definitions of Greek 'ethnicity'" in Irad Malkin, *Ancient perceptions of Greek ethnicity*, CUP, London, 2001; see also: F.W. Walbank, "Hellenes and Achaeans: 'Greek nationality' revisited" in *Further Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Historia Einzelschriften) 138, Stuttgart, 2000; also Christine Sourvinou-Inwood, *Greek perception of ethnicity and the ethnicity of the Macedonians*, Milan, 2002; also J. M. Hall, *Ethnicities*, Chicago, 2002.

³² H. H. Schmitt, *Die Verträge der griechisch-romischen Welt von 338-200 v. Chr. Die Staatsverträge des Altertums (StV) III*, München, 1969, pp. 520-528; See also Bloch, K. (1912), *Griechische. Geschichte*, vol. I, (Berlin) p. 92ff.: "The Macedonians were purer Greeks than those of Greece proper...."; also Casson, St. (1926), *Macedonia, Thrace*

reinforced in the Balkans as a result of the Greek Orthodox Church's hegemony.³³ The appearance of the Macedonian Question during the 1870s was the beginning of numerous claims and misgivings regarding the multiplicity of Macedonian identities in the region, depending on the ethnic and historical background of the claimants. This continuous warfare brought problems and menace to the peoples of the Balkans including the Macedoslavs. Ethnicity, according to J. M. Hall (2002), is a matter of "invention" and "construction". The ethnogenesis of the Macedoslavs is a recent phenomenon; it commenced with the self-contradictory and conflicting statements of Bulgarian Krste Misirkov (1874-1926) and his treatise "*On Macedonian Matters*" published in Sofia in 1905, about the ethnicity of the Slavs living in Macedonia, including his own ethnicity.³⁴

With the final merging of the larger section of Macedonia with Greece (26th October 1912) as a result of the Balkan Wars, the latter inherited a problem of national security, at least until 29 August 1949, when the Greek Communists and their allies, the Macedoslav forces, were finally defeated and left the country, thus resolving once and for all the problem of the Macedonian identities in Greece. During this period (1912-1949), Greek sovereignty was severely threatened, even militarily, and for a short period of time, during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), was even abolished by the joint forces of the Communists and the Macedoslavs. As a result of this warfare, the people in the region of Macedonia, Greece, suffered immensely, equally so the Macedoslavs and all those involved in provocative irredentist practices.

In conclusion, it could be argued that this study demonstrated that Macedonians were professed to be Hellenes, as indeed Spartans and Athenians were recognized as Hellenes. Macedonians were recognized by Ancient Greek philosophers, poets, historians, political minds and geographers as Hellenes. Ancient Persian emperors including Darius the Great, Indians and Chinese kings and emperors also recognized the Macedonians as Hellenes and their

and Illyria, Oxford, p.162: "If we are to define material belonging from the 10th to the 18th centuries found in many localities north and south of the Corinthian Gulf as such, we are bound to reckon Macedonia archaeologically as Greek. The people who lived in the Axios valley wore the same jewellery as that worn in Sparta, Olympia, Delphi, Aegina, Argos and many other districts..."; also Hoffman, O (1906), *Die Makedonen, Ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum*, Gottingen, p. 252: "The Macedonians came from a group of Greek tribes who lived in the Pindus and spread towards the Aliakmon. At an unknown period they advanced to the valley of Axios. In the valleys under Vermion, the Macedonians were of Hellenic origin; but the kingdom they founded before the time of Archelaos was a union of different peoples, ruled and governed by the Greek Macedonians and their aristocracy. They were Greeks by language and temperament that never lost their contact with Hellenic cultural manifestation..."; also Price, C. A. (1963), *Southern Europeans in Australia*, p. 311: The writer in his attempt to qualify his statement that the people of Macedonia have been the subject of prolonged and often furious argument states: "In classical days, though they spoke a variety of Greek, sent their kings to the Olympic Games, and founded the greatest of all Hellenic empires, they were thought of as remote and somewhat odd relatives of Greek proper, a cut above the "Barbarians" but not really true Hellenes."

³³ For a detailed and analytical bibliography on the Greek identity of Ancient Macedonians or a consciousness closely associated with Hellas and Hellenism, see U. Wilcken, "Philip II von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee", *SB Berlin*, 1929; also F.W. Walbank, *Polibius*, California, 1972, p. 72ff; also W.W. Tarn, "The Greek Leagues and Macedonia", *CAH VII*, CUP, Cambridge, 1954; also *Polibius*, book 7 to 9; see also W.W. Tarn, "Macedonia and Greece", *Cambridge Ancient History VII*, Cambridge, CUP, 1928, pp. 197 ff.

³⁴ Misirkov argues: "...Whether we call ourselves Bulgarians or Macedonians, we have always maintained a separate, unified and different from the Serbs ethnicity, with Bulgarian consciousness, which will entail the fight for the human rights of the Macedonian"... See also in Wikipedia.org/wiki/krste_Misirkov

kingdoms and realms as “Greek”. The persistence of the Macedoslavs of the Balkans to place in doubt the Hellenic identity of the Macedonians simply rests in their objective to find a place in the history of the Balkans, where they can exist as a separate nation and people, hence they portray themselves as the sole “Macedonians”. This fallacy leads them to the rejection and the betrayal of their own Slavic identity for which they ought to be proud of as indeed for their historic Bulgaro-Slavic language as this was emerged from their roots in Ochrid.

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Alexander – the Great Tactician?

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Abstract

There is little doubt that Alexander the Great was a very successful battlefield commander. Yet what was this success based upon? Many scholars attribute Alexander's success (at least in part) to tactical innovation. But how correct is such a conclusion? An examination of the four major set-piece battles that Alexander fought as part of his Eastern campaign provides the details of his implementation of tactics. By comparing these details to a set of criteria that many modern military theorists use to gauge tactical competency, the level of Alexander's ability as a battlefield commander can be determined. The results of this comparison show that, while in some areas Alexander's tactical ability was nothing original nor inventive, his use of variation within the construct of a base tactical plan was what ensured victory and made him one of the greatest military leaders of the ancient world.

Alexander the Great is one of the most notable military commanders in history – a commander whose campaigns and battles are still studied in many western military academies today.¹ Why is this young king of ancient Macedon the focus of such detailed scrutiny? Certainly the romance of his story (a successful and vibrant leader who dies at a young age) and the sheer scale of his conquests have had a large part to play in Alexander's continuing military and historical legacy. But just how good was Alexander as a battlefield commander? Such questions have aroused scholarly debate and examination of Alexander's major engagements for decades. Yet many of these analyses either simply accept the concept that Alexander was a good tactician, or analyse particular events without detailing the criteria which are being used to judge Alexander's performance on the field. By comparing Alexander's tactics in the four major engagements of his campaign (Granicus in 334BC, Issus in 333BC, Gaugamela in 331BC and Hydaspes in 326BC) to a set of criteria which modern military theorists use to define the art of tactics, it can be seen that while Alexander was a successful commander, there was nothing original nor overly innovative about the base tactics he employed. Instead it was his ability to improvise the elements of this base tactic which was the key to securing victory.

Alexander's reputation as a great general is not a modern concept.² If the account is to be believed, according to Appian both the Carthaginian general Hannibal and the Roman

¹ For example see: Carey, M.G. (1997), *Operational Art in Classical Warfare: The Campaigns of Alexander the Great*, Fort Leavenworth, US Army Command and General Staff College

² The first extant reference to Alexander with the epithet 'the Great' is found in the play *Mostellaria* (line 775) by the Roman playwright Plautus, written around one hundred years after Alexander's death.

commander Scipio considered Alexander the best general of all time.³ Julius Caesar is said to have lamented over the fact that Alexander had accomplished so much by the age of thirty-two whereas he had accomplished so little by the same age.⁴ Napoleon, believed that it was Alexander's ability, and not his army, which allowed him to conquer Persia.⁵ Alexander's tactical abilities are also much lauded by modern scholars. Devine, for example, calls Alexander a 'brilliant and subtle tactician'.⁶ Similarly, Burn calls Alexander 'a great strategist and tactician'.⁷

One of the most comprehensive analyses of Alexander's abilities as a commander is found in the works of Fuller.⁸ Fuller defines the art of strategy as 'operations in plan' while the art of tactics is defined as 'operations in action'.⁹ Fuller bases his examination of Alexander as a tactician on seven different tactical principles:¹⁰

- **Maintenance of the aim or objective:** to gain victory either through attrition or through possession of the field at the end of a battle.
- **Security:** using a strong defensive position to adequately judge the enemy's strength and potential.
- **Mobility:** to be able to move in relative safety towards the enemy.
- **Offensive power:** using the cover of defence to move into a position where a concerted attempt can be made to defeat the enemy.
- **Economy of force:** not exhausting your forces prematurely so that they can be employed offensively when the time is right.
- **Concentration of force:** delivering a decisive blow against a key point in the enemy formation.

³ According to Appian (*Syr.* 10), Hannibal and Scipio had a conversation on the topic of general ship and both placed Alexander at the top of their lists. Hannibal then placed Pyrrhus of Epirus second and himself third. When Scipio asked Hannibal where he would have ranked himself if Scipio had not defeated him at the battle of Zama, Hannibal is said to have replied that he would have ranked himself greater than Alexander. Most scholars consider this passage of Appian's as pure fiction.

⁴ Suet. *Caes.* 7

⁵ Napoleon (1829), *Mémoires écrits à Sainte-Hélène Vol.II (1823-1825)*, Paris, Philippe, 90

⁶ Devine, A.M. (1975), 'Grand Tactics at Gaugamela' *Phoenix* 29.4, 384

⁷ Burn, A.R. (1965), 'The General ship of Alexander' *Greece & Rome* 12.2, 140; for other examples of comments on Alexander's 'greatness' as a commander see: Warry, J. (1980), *Warfare in the Classical World*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 71; Carey, *Operational Art*, 1; Featherstone, D. (1988) *Warriors and Warfare in Ancient and Medieval Times*, London, Constable, 59; Warry, J. (1998) *Alexander 334-323BC*, Oxford, Osprey, 20; Thomas, C.G. (2007), *Alexander the Great and his World*, Oxford, Blackwell, 221; Heckel, W. (2008) *The Conquests of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 27; Connolly ((1998) *Greece and Rome at War*, London, Greenhill Books, 73) seems to be one of the few who hold a more negative opinion of Alexander by stating that 'Alexander may be the most successful general of all time but he can hardly be considered the best'.

⁸ Fuller, J.F.C. (1998) *The General ship of Alexander the Great*, London, Wordsworth, 292-301

⁹ Fuller, *General ship of Alexander*, 293

¹⁰ The same, or similar, principles are found in many of the manuals which outline the principles used by modern military institutions. For example see: Australian Defence Force (2012), *ADDP-D: Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, Canberra, Department of Defence, 6.7; UK Ministry of Defence (2011), *JDP 0-01: British Defence Doctrine*, Wiltshire, Ministry of Defence, 205-215; US Army (2008), *FM-3-0. Military Operations*, Washington, Department of the Army, A1-4

- **Surprise:** attacking unexpectedly and/or in a way that the enemy cannot guard against.

Fuller applies these principles to an examination of many differing facets of Alexander's campaign – battles, sieges, guerrilla war in Central Asia – in a holistic approach. However, such principles are a valuable means of gauging Alexander's ability in individual areas of his campaign as well – in particular his four major set-piece engagements (overviews of which follow in order to place the rest of the analysis into context).

*Granicus - 334BC*¹¹

Alexander's first confrontation with the forces of Persia was fought across the river Granicus in western Asia Minor in the first year of his campaign. The two main accounts of this battle, those of Arrian and Diodorus, paint very different pictures of the encounter. Yet, both contain similarities which highlight Alexander's tactics on the day.

Upon the receipt of information from scouts about the deployment of Persian forces ahead of his line of march, Alexander deployed his forces along one bank of the river Granicus.¹² According to Arrian, Parmenio advised not going into action immediately, but suggested advancing on the next day to provide enough time to cross the river, which is described as deep and with steep banks in places.¹³ In Arrian's account Alexander dismissed Parmenio's advice and ordered an immediate attack.¹⁴ Diodorus, on the other hand, has Alexander wait until the following dawn before crossing the river and deploying his forces on the far bank.¹⁵

Arrian states that Alexander deployed his Thessalian and allied cavalry on his left wing along with the Thracians.¹⁶ The centre of Alexander's line was held by six contingents of his pike-phalanx.¹⁷ To the right of the phalanx, forming a mobile hinge between the centre and the right wing, Alexander placed his 3,000-strong contingent of elite *hypaspists*.¹⁸ The right wing of the formation, commanded by Alexander himself, was comprised of the Companion

¹¹ For discussions and examinations of this battle and the accounts of it see: Badian, E. (1977), 'The Battle of the Granicus: A New Look' *Ancient Macedonia II*, 271-293; Hammond, N.G.L. (1980), 'The Battle of the Granicus River' *JHS* 100, 73-88; Devine, A.M. (1986), 'Demythologizing the Battle of the Granicus' *Phoenix* 40.3, 265-278; Hammond, N.G.L. (1997), *The Genius of Alexander the Great*, London, Duckworth, 69; Bosworth, A.B. (1998), *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander Vol I*, Oxford, Clarendon Books, 114-116; Fuller, *Generalship of Alexander*, 147-154; Bosworth, A.B. (2008), *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 40-41; Heckel, *Conquests of Alexander*, 48; Pietrykowski, J. (2009), *Great Battles of the Hellenistic World*, Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 34-46; English, S. (2011), *The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great*, Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 33-60; Campbell, D. (2013), 'Alexander's Great Cavalry Battle: What Really Happened at the River Granicus?', *AncWar* 7.2, 48-53

¹² Arr. *Anab.* 1.13.2

¹³ For Parmenio's advice see: Arr. *Anab.* 1.13.3; for the description of the river see: Arr. *Anab.* 1.13.4; Plutarch (*Alex.* 16) describes the river as flowing swiftly and with banks that were wet and slippery

¹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.13.6-7; see also: Plut. *Alex.* 16

¹⁵ Diod. Sic. 17.19.3

¹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.3

¹⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.2

¹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.2

cavalry, archers, javelineers and three other mounted contingents¹⁹ On the opposite bank, the Persians deployed a large screen of cavalry, which they thought adequate to engage the Macedonians as they attempted to ford the river, with an equally large contingent of Greek mercenaries positioned behind (*Figure 1-Page 57*).²⁰

The Macedonian attack began with an advance of the cavalry and skirmishers on the right wing.²¹ This was no doubt designed to draw the Persian left wing forward, engage them, and keep them occupied. Arrian later states that this advance force suffered badly in the opening engagement.²² While the Persian left wing was occupied, Alexander moved his companion cavalry obliquely to the right, upstream from the battle.²³ As they began to cross the river, the current of the water pushed the Companions back downstream towards the battle. However, Alexander was able to cross with little initial resistance which suggests that his oblique move had taken the Companions quite a distance to the right of his line.

Once across the river, and with the pike-phalanx and left wing also advancing to pin the remainder of the Persian line in place, Alexander wheeled his cavalry to the left and drove headlong at the flank of the Persian line, a place where we are told the Persian commanders were putting up the most resistance (see *Figure 1-Page 57*).²⁴ Faced with attacks from two directions – from the Macedonian advance force from the front and from Alexander and his cavalry from the side – the Persian left wing broke, soon followed by a rout of the entire Persian line.²⁵ Attention was then turned on the Greek mercenaries - with the pike-phalanx engaging them from the front and the cavalry on both wings.²⁶ It was a resounding victory for the Macedonians.²⁷

¹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1

²⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.4

²¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.6

²² Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.23

²³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.7

²⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.3-8; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.3.16; it is here that the descriptions of Alexander's tactics in the accounts of both Arrian and Diodorus are essentially the same. See: Diod. Sic. 17.19.6-17.20.2; Plutarch (*Alex.* 16) says that infantry on both sides engaged on the far bank of the river. This contingent of Persian infantry along the river bank is not mentioned by Arrian or in the differing account of the battle by Diodorus. However, Diodorus (17.21.4) does state that the Macedonian phalanx routed the Persian infantry. It is unclear whether this is a reference to possible units of Persian infantry posted along the riverbank as Plutarch describes or is a reference to the later engagement with the Greek mercenaries which is described by Arrian (see following).

²⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.1; Plut. *Alex.* 16

²⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.2

²⁷ For the various casualty figures given by the various sources see: Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.3-4; Plut. *Alex.* 16; Diod. Sic. 17.21.6; Just. *Epit.* 9.6

*Issus – 333BC*²⁸

At Issus in the following year Alexander again fought the Persians – this time on a narrow coastal defile, bordered on one side by the sea and on the other by a range of hills, in south-eastern Asia Minor. As he had done at Granicus, Alexander again deployed his pike-phalanx in the centre of his line.²⁹ To the right of the pike-phalanx stood the *hypaspists* in their customary position as a hinge between the pikemen and the right wing which was composed of, as at Granicus, the Companion cavalry and skirmishers with Alexander in personal command.³⁰ The Macedonian left, under the command of Parmenio, comprised the Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, the Thessalian cavalry (which was transferred from the right wing to reinforce the left), and contingents of Cretan archers and Thracians.³¹ On the right wing units of skirmishers and mounted archers formed a line deployed at an angle to the right-rear of the main line (or ‘refused’ in military terminology) to engage advance Persian units who had been positioned on the high ground on Alexander’s right flank which threatened to encircle his position.³² Another line, refused forward-right, and comprised of skirmishers and mercenaries, was deployed to try and outflank the Persian left wing.³³ The remaining contingents of Greek mercenaries were posted in the rear as a reserve (and to possibly counter any encircling move).³⁴

Across the river the Persian king, Darius, positioned his Greek mercenaries in the centre of his line, as a counter to the Macedonian phalanx, with contingents of heavy infantry on either side.³⁵ Other units, some of them missile troops, were dispatched to the heights to try and outflank the Macedonian line.³⁶ Cavalry was massed on either wing with the Persian right more heavily weighted due to the presence of more suitable ground in that area for a cavalry action (hence Alexander’s reinforcement of his left wing with the Thessalian cavalry).³⁷ Due to the narrow nature of the defile, all of the Persian forces (which outnumbered Alexander’s) could not be deployed in line and the Persian infantry was posted in a second line, behind the Greek mercenaries.³⁸ Arrian states that Darius commanded from the centre.³⁹ However, it is more likely that Darius was on the left wing of the infantry line (*Figure 2-Page 58*).⁴⁰

²⁸ For discussions and examinations of this battle and the accounts of it see: Murison, C.L. (1972), ‘Darius III and the Battle of Issus’, *Historia* 21.3, 399-423; Hammond, N.G.L. (1992), ‘Alexander’s Charge at the Battle of Issus in 333BC’, *Historia* 41.4, 395-406; Fuller, *Generalship of Alexander*, 154-162; 395-406; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 55-64; Hammond, *Genius of Alexander*, 83-86; English, *Field Campaigns of Alexander*, 71-109; Pietrykowski, *Great Battles*, 47-60

²⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.3-4; Curt. 3.9.7

³⁰ *Hypaspists*: Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.3; Curt 3.9.7; the Companions: Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.9; skirmishers: Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.2; Alexander’s command of the right wing: Diod. Sic. 17.33.2; Plut. *Alex.* 20; Curt. 3.9.8

³¹ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.4, 2.8.9-10, 2.9.3; Curt. 3.9.8, 3.9.9

³² Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.2; Curt. 3.9.10

³³ Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.3-4; Curt. 3.9.10

³⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.3

³⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.6; Curt. 3.9.1-3

³⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.7, 2.8.10-11; Curt. 3.8.27, 3.9.1

³⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.10

³⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.8

³⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.11

⁴⁰ It seems more likely that Darius positioned himself on the left wing of his infantry formation as Alexander is said to have later charged directly at the Persian king (see following). This could have only occurred if Da-

As at Granicus, the action began on Alexander's right. The skirmishers who had been deployed in the refused line on that flank dislodged the Persian troops manning the heights and 300 cavalry (possibly the mounted archers already stationed there) were left to keep them in check.⁴¹ As the pike-phalanx slowly advanced across the river (which is described as possessing banks which were steep in some places and reinforced with palisades in others), Alexander, at the head of the Companion cavalry, launched a spirited charge across the watercourse at the Persian troops holding the far bank directly opposite him.⁴² The troops stationed on the Persian left would have been reluctant to face Alexander's assault as, had they chosen to stand their ground, they risked being encircled by the skirmishers who formed Alexander's forward angled right wing. Under such pressures from Alexander's opening charge and skilful deployment, the Persian left broke and fled. This allowed the Macedonian right wing to wheel inwards against the flank of the Persian centre which was pinned in place by fierce fighting against the advancing pike-phalanx.⁴³

While this was occurring on the Macedonian right, the Persian cavalry massed adjacent to the sea charged against Parmenio on the Macedonian left who fought a hard defensive action against this assault.⁴⁴ After a fierce struggle Parmenio forced the Persian cavalry back and pursued the fleeing horsemen – leaving the right of the Persian line vulnerable.⁴⁵ With his forces being attacked from the front and both sides, Darius fled – the sight of which caused the entire Persian line to break.⁴⁶ The fleeing Persians were chased down by the pursuing cavalry and the Persian camp was stormed – another decisive victory for Alexander.⁴⁷

rius was not in the exact centre of the infantry line as Arrian states. However, as the infantry formed the centre of the Persian battleline, Darius could still be considered to have 'commanded from the centre', as Arrian puts it, regardless of exactly where in the infantry line he was positioned. This would also account for the seemingly contradictory passages recounting Darius' position at the battle of Gaugamela (see n.57).

⁴¹ Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.4; Curt. 3.9.11-12

⁴² The river and its defences: Arr. *Anab.* 2.10.1, 2.10.5; Alexander's charge: Arr. *Anab.* 2.10.3; Diodorus (17.33.5) states that Alexander drove straight at Darius' position in the centre of the Persian line. See also: Diod. Sic. 17.34.2-4; Plut. *Alex.* 20; Curt. 3.11.7-10

⁴³ Rout of Persian left and Macedonian wheel towards the centre: Arr. *Anab.* 2.10.4, 2.11.1; hard fought battle in the centre: Arr. *Anab.* 2.10.5-7; Diod. Sic. 17.34.9; Curt. 3.11.4-6

⁴⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.2-3

⁴⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.2-3; Diod. Sic. 17.33.6-7; Curt. 3.11.1, 3.11.13-15

⁴⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.4-7; Diod. Sic. 17.34.7-8

⁴⁷ Storming of the Persian camp: Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.9-10; Diod. Sic. 17.35.1-2; Curt. 3.11.20-26; Persian casualties: Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.8; Diod. Sic. 17.36.6; Curt. 3.11.27; Plut. *Alex.* 20; Just. *Epit.* 11.9.10; Macedonian casualties: Arr. *Anab.* 2.10.7; Diod. Sic. 17.36.6; Curt. 3.11.27; Just. *Epit.* 11.9.10

*Gaugamela – 331BC*⁴⁸

Darius faced Alexander again a few years later at Gaugamela. Darius had assembled a massive army – reportedly bigger than the one that had been assembled at Issus.⁴⁹ Darius, possibly learning from his previous reversal at Issus, deployed on a large open plain where his numbers, and especially his cavalry, could be used to better effect.⁵⁰ Arriving late in the day, Alexander dismissed the suggestion of a night attack on the Persian camp – preferring a decisive battle in light of the following day to ‘stealing’ the victory in the darkness.⁵¹

The next day Darius positioned a mixture of cavalry and infantry on both wings of his line, with further cavalry and a contingent of scythed chariots acting as a screen ahead of each.⁵² The centre of the Persian line was a mix of different infantry units from across the Empire ranging from the elite Royal Guard to archers and Greek mercenaries.⁵³ Elephants may have been posted in an advance screen ahead of the centre.⁵⁴ A second line of mixed infantry units was positioned behind the main battleline to act as a reserve.⁵⁵ Reports vary as to where Darius himself was positioned. Arrian states that he was located in the centre, while both Curtius and Diodorus have him positioned on the left wing.⁵⁶ Later events of the battle would suggest that Curtius and Diodorus are correct.⁵⁷

Opposite the Persians, Alexander arranged his troops, 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, in a now common deployment with only a few variations.⁵⁸ The Companion Cavalry were deployed on the right wing with the *hypaspists* as a hinge between the cavalry and the phal-

⁴⁸ For discussions and examinations of this battle and the accounts of it see: Stein, A. (1942), ‘Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of Arbela’, *The Geographical Journal* 100.4, 155-164; Griffith, G.T. (1947), ‘Alexander’s General ship at Gaugamela’, *JHS* 67, 77-89; Devine, ‘Grand Tactics at Gaugamela’, 374-385; Burn, A.R. (1952), ‘Notes on Alexander’s Campaigns, 332-330’, *JHS* 72, 81-91; Burn, ‘The General ship of Alexander’, 140-154; Fuller, *General ship of Alexander*, 163-180; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 74-85; Hammond, *Genius of Alexander*, 103-111; Pietrykowski, *Great Battles*, 60-73; English, *Field Campaigns of Alexander*, 110-157

⁴⁹ For the Persian numbers see: Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.6; Diod. Sic. 17.53.3; Plut. *Alex.* 31; Curt. 4.12.13; Just. *Epit.* 11.12.5

⁵⁰ Diodorus (17.55.1-2) states that Darius had initially thought of fighting on the banks of the Tigris. This would then mirror his deployment at Issus – albeit with more room to deploy his forces. However, this position was abandoned as it was thought that the river was too deep for the Macedonians to attempt a crossing and so a different location for the battle was sought, this time on an open plain.

⁵¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.9.5-3.10.4; Curt. 4.13.1-17; Plut. *Alex.* 31

⁵² Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.3-4, 3.11.6-7

⁵³ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.5, 3.11.7

⁵⁴ Arrian mentions these elephants (*Anab.* 3.11.6) but they are not mentioned in any other source other than in a fragment attributed to Aristobulos (*FrGrHist* 139 F17). Surprisingly, even in Arrian’s account, these beasts appear to have played no part in the battle as they are not mentioned again.

⁵⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.5

⁵⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.5; Curt. 4.11.14; Diod. Sic. 17.58.1

⁵⁷ Alexander assaults the main Persian line from their left and several sources state that Alexander aimed this charge directly at Darius. Interestingly, the events of the previous battle at Issus follow a similar sequence with Alexander striking at the left of the Persian infantry line and directly at Darius. This would suggest that Darius was at least at the left hand end of the main infantry line. However, this could still be considered ‘in the centre’ as Arrian would have it in his account of both battles.

⁵⁸ For the Macedonian numbers see: Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.5

anx in the centre.⁵⁹ Javelineers and archers were posted before the right wing in a protective screen.⁶⁰ Although greatly outnumbered, the pike-phalanx was deployed in the centre in a double-depth of two lines – the idea being that, should the position be encircled, the rearward line could turn about and engage any enemy attacking from the rear.⁶¹ A rear-guard of Thracian infantry was stationed behind the main battleline guarding the Macedonian baggage.⁶² The Thessalian and allied cavalry formed the left wing of the line with contingents of archers and mercenaries forming the hinge between these units and the centre.⁶³ To further protect his position against possible encirclement, Alexander placed units in lines refused to the rear of both wings – similar to what he had done on his right wing at Issus. Extending rearward from the position of the Companion cavalry were contingents of javelineers, archers and mercenaries, with units of cavalry in front of the javelineers and a contingent of mercenary cavalry in front of the whole refused line with instructions to outflank any encircling move made by the Persians.⁶⁴ On the left a similar refused line was deployed consisting of Thracian javelineers and allied cavalry, with a screen of mercenary cavalry before them (*Figure 3-Page 59*).⁶⁵

The battle began with Alexander moving his right wing cavalry obliquely further to the right.⁶⁶ At the same time Darius commenced his attack by launching the Scythian cavalry, which was forward of his own left wing, against the skirmishers positioned in front of the *hypaspists*.⁶⁷ Observing Alexander's oblique move, Darius ordered his own left wing cavalry to shadow them to prevent the Macedonians from executing an outflanking manoeuvre.⁶⁸ The Greek mercenary cavalry positioned ahead of Alexander's refused right flank then charged the Persian troops shadowing Alexander from the rear. The mercenary cavalry was repulsed by a counter-charge of the Persian Scythian and Bactrian cavalry and both sides were required to commit more troops to prevent the position from falling.⁶⁹ For Alexander, the commitment of more troops to the fray meant that Persian attention on their left was somewhat diverted to this struggle, and less Persian troops could be used to shadow his oblique movements with the Companions. This bears many similarities to Alexander's use of skirmishers and cavalry to pin the left of the enemy line in place at Granicus years earlier.

The Persian chariots then charged the Macedonian right wing. Some were taken down by the screen of skirmishers while others passed through these lines only to be taken out by

⁵⁹ Companion Cavalry: Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.8; Diod. Sic. 17.57.1; Curt. 4.13.26; the *hypaspists*: Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.9; both Diodorus (17.57.2) and Curtius (4.13.27) state that the *hypaspists* were positioned behind the Companions. However, this would not correlate with the role of this unit acting as a hinge.

⁶⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.3

⁶¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.9, 3.12.1; Diod. Sic. 17.57.2-3; Curt. 4.13.28; Curtius states (4.13.30-32) that this second line initially deployed facing to the rear.

⁶² Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.5; Curt. 4.13.35

⁶³ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.10; Diod. Sic. 17.57.3-4; Curt. 4.13.29

⁶⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.2-4; Diod. Sic. 17.57.5; Curt. 4.13.31

⁶⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.4-5; Diod. Sic. 17.57.5

⁶⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.1-2; Diod. Sic. 17.57.6; Curt. 4.15.1

⁶⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.2

⁶⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.2

⁶⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.3

the *hypaspists*.⁷⁰ The Persians then attacked along the entire line – including a charge of chariots against the right wing of the pike-phalanx which, as a whole, was rolling forward into action.⁷¹ The formations in the Macedonian centre began to lose cohesion under attacks delivered at different times and by different type of opponents – leaving the centre-left of the line separated and in trouble.⁷² Persian cavalry forced their way through some of these gaps to attack the Thracians guarding the Macedonian baggage behind the line.⁷³ As instructed, the second line of the phalanx about-faced and advanced against the rear of these Persians attacking the baggage train.⁷⁴ On the Macedonian right, Alexander continued his oblique move. This caused a gap to form in the Persian line between the cavalry that was shadowing him and the cavalry which was still engaged in front of the right wing of the Macedonian infantry line. Splitting the forces he was leading to the right, some of the Macedonian cavalry continued advancing obliquely, forcing the shadowing Persian cavalry to follow suit, while Alexander wheeled the remainder of his mounted troops around and drove into the gap making straight for Darius – which suggests Darius was positioned on the left of his own infantry line.⁷⁵ With the Macedonian pike-phalanx pressing in from the front, and Alexander attacking from his left, Darius and most of the Persian centre fled with Alexander and his cavalry in pursuit.⁷⁶

The cavalry continuing the Macedonian oblique move now wheeled against those who were shadowing them. Once engaged, this would prevent these mounted Persian troops from coming to the aid of the beleaguered king. However, rather than face the Macedonian attack, the cavalry on the Persian left took fright – no doubt due to being attacked by this force on the one side and having Alexander charging on the other – broke, and fled.⁷⁷ The Macedonian left flank was still in trouble and Parmenio, commanding that sector, sent urgent requests to Alexander for support.⁷⁸ Alexander broke off his pursuit of Darius, swung around to attack the Persian right from behind, and put it to flight after a fierce struggle.⁷⁹ The pursuit of Darius was resumed while daylight allowed and into the next day. Darius managed to evade capture but the Persian army was all but destroyed.⁸⁰

⁷⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.5; Diod. Sic. 17.58.2; Curt. 4.15.2; Diodorus (17.58.4-5) suggests that these chariots were taken out by the pike-phalanx. However, the chariot attack on the centre of the Macedonian line appears to have occurred a little bit later (see following).

⁷¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.1; Curt. 4.15.3-5; this is most likely the event that Diodorus is describing at 17.58.4-5 and even here the charge is probably only against the right wing of the pike-phalanx.

⁷² Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.4-6; Curt. 4.16.1; Plut. *Alex.* 32

⁷³ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.5; Diod. Sic. 17.59.5-7; Curt. 3.15.5, 3.15.9-11

⁷⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.6; Curtius (4.15.12) says that the Persians were attacked by cavalry rather than by the second line of the phalanx.

⁷⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.2; Diod. Sic. 17.60.1; Curt. 4.15.20; Plut. *Alex.* 33

⁷⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.3; Diod. Sic. 17.60.3; Curt. 4.15.32; Plut. *Alex.* 33

⁷⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 3.14.3

⁷⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.1; Curt. 3.16.2; Plut. *Alex.* 33; Diodorus (17.60.5-7) states that these messages never reached Alexander.

⁷⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.1-3; Curt. 4.16.3; Plutarch (*Alex.* 33) says that the battle on the Macedonian left wing was resolved before Alexander arrived.

⁸⁰ The pursuit and escape of Darius: Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.4-5; Diod. Sic. 17.61.1; Curt. 4.16.7-25; Persian casualty figures: Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.6; Diod. Sic. 17.61.3; Curt. 4.16.26-33; *P. Oxy.* 1798

*Hydaspes – 326BC*⁸¹

Alexander's fourth and final large-scale engagement occurred in India on the banks of the Hydaspes River. Alexander, descending from the Great Salt Range, encamped his forces on the western bank of the river. Opposite him, on the eastern bank, the Indian king Porus marshalled a large army to counter any Macedonian advance.⁸² Reluctant to make a direct assault across the river, Alexander employed a series of feints, night manoeuvres and deceptions to keep Porus and his army in place and blind to his intentions.⁸³ Under the cover of a stormy night, Alexander marched a large part of his army 27km northward to a place where the river could be more easily forded, while the remainder of his forces, under the command of Craterus, were kept in place opposite Porus with orders to make a demonstration of an attempt to cross in order to deceive him about the Macedonian movements.⁸⁴ Craterus was also given instructions that, if Porus moved his force out of camp and left the opposing bank only lightly guarded, he was to cross the river with all speed and attack the Persian line in the flank and rear.⁸⁵

Alexander's advance force crossed the river on rafts made of skins filled with chaff and on specially constructed segmented boats which had been transported with the army and assembled at the water's edge.⁸⁶ After gaining the opposite bank, Alexander organised his forces for the march south against Porus.⁸⁷ A skirmish took place between Alexander's forces and advance units of the Indian army under the command of Porus' son near the place where the Macedonians had crossed.⁸⁸ Survivors of this skirmish reported to Porus that Alexander was advancing on his position. This placed Porus in a predicament. Should he move against Alexander, Craterus and his forces could cross the river and strike him from the rear. If, on the other hand, he moved against Craterus, Alexander would attack him from behind. Porus marshalled his forces and advanced northward to meet Alexander, leaving a contingent of troops in place to keep Craterus in check.⁸⁹ Alexander, the last infantry contingents of his advance force having now crossed, rested his men.⁹⁰

Porus deployed his shock troops, a large contingent of elephants, evenly spaced across the front of his line. The Indian infantry were drawn up behind the beasts, in a staggered for-

⁸¹ For discussions and examinations of this battle and the accounts of it see: Stein, A. (1932), 'The Site of Alexander's Passage of the Hydaspes and the Battle with Porus', *The Geographical Journal* 80.1, 31-46; Hamilton, J.R. (1956), 'The Cavalry Battle at the Hydaspes', *JHS* 76, 26-31; Fuller, *General ship of Alexander*, 180-199; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 125-130; Hammond, *Genius of Alexander*, 164-167; Pietrykowski, *Great Battles*, 73-85; English, *Field Campaigns of Alexander*, 180-215

⁸² For the Indian numbers see: Arr. *Anab.* 5.15.4; Diod. Sic. 17.87.1; Curt. 8.13.6; Plut. *Alex.* 62

⁸³ Arr. *Anab.* 5.10.3-4; Curt. 8.13.18-22; Plut. *Alex.* 60

⁸⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 5.11.1, 5.12.1-2; Curtius (8.13.22-27) says the Macedonian advance and crossing happened on a dark cloudy day.

⁸⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 5.11.4

⁸⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 5.12.3-4, 5.13.3; Curt. 8.13.22-27; Plut. *Alex.* 60; Diodorus does not mention this crossing of the Hydaspes.

⁸⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 5.13.4-5.14.2

⁸⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 5.14.3-5.15.2; Curt. 8.14.1-8; Plut. *Alex.* 60

⁸⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 5.15.3-4; Plut. *Alex.* 60

⁹⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 5.16.1

mation covering the gaps between the animals.⁹¹ Indian cavalry was placed on both wings to protect the flanks of the line, and contingents of chariots were placed before the cavalry in a protective screen.⁹²

Alexander placed his contingents of cavalry on his right wing – the Companions furthest to the right with mounted archers opposite the chariots on the Persian left wing – and with the infantry holding the centre.⁹³ Cavalry units under the command of Coenus, which had initially been deployed on the left flank, were redeployed to the right. Alexander's plan, similar to that used at Gaugamela, was to draw the Indian cavalry opposite his right wing further to the right with an oblique movement of the Companion cavalry. Once a gap had formed, Coenus was instructed to charge into the gap and strike at the shadowing Indian cavalry from behind (*Figure 4-Page 60*).⁹⁴

Alexander set the mounted archers on his right against the massed Indian left wing – taking out many of Porus' chariots and preventing forces from this sector other than the Indian cavalry from moving to shadow Alexander's oblique opening move with the Companion Cavalry.⁹⁵ This is the same as had occurred at Gaugamela. When the Indian left wing cavalry had followed Alexander far enough to create a significant gap in the Indian line, as instructed, Coenus and his cavalry stormed into this breach to attack from the rear. Simultaneously, Alexander wheeled the Companions about to attack from the front.⁹⁶ Faced with attacks from two directions, the Indian cavalry broke and retired to try and find safety among the elephants on the left wing.⁹⁷ Some of the elephants on the Indian left turned to face Alexander's pursuing cavalry while the remainder moved against the Macedonian infantry who was now advancing.⁹⁸ Skirmishers brought down many of the beasts and their drivers while the rest crashed headlong into the pike-phalanx, inflicting terrible casualties.⁹⁹

The routed cavalry on the Indian left attempted a counter-attack, but this was repulsed by Alexander and the Companions and it was forced back onto the left wing of the infantry line – with Alexander aggressively pressing the pursuit.¹⁰⁰ Many of the elephants, exhausted and frenzied with wounds, many now also driverless, rampaged across the battlefield, killing and injuring friend and foe alike as the surviving beasts attempted to make for safety.¹⁰¹ With the ease of pressure due to the withdrawal of the elephants, the Macedonian phalanx

⁹¹ Arr. *Anab.* 5.15.5; Curt. 8.14.9; Diodorus (17.87.4) says that the units of infantry were positioned in the gaps between the elephants rather than covering the gaps from behind.

⁹² Arr. *Anab.* 5.15.7; Diod. Sic. 17.87.4

⁹³ Arr. *Anab.* 5.16.2-3; Curt. 8.14.14-15

⁹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 5.16.3; Curt. 8.14.14

⁹⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 5.16.4; Diod. Sic. 17.88.1

⁹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.1-2; Curt. 8.14.17; Plut. *Alex.* 60; Plutarch also says that a concurrent attack took place against the Indian right wing.

⁹⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.2-3; Curtius (8.14.18) says Porus ordered the elephants to reinforce the beleaguered cavalry.

⁹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.3; Diod. Sic. 17.87.5-17.88.1; Curt. 8.14.22

⁹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.3; Diod. Sic. 17.88.1-3; Curt. 8.14.24-29; Plut. *Alex.* 60

¹⁰⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.3-4

¹⁰¹ Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.5-6; Diod. Sic. 17.88.3; Curt. 8.14.30

reformed its shattered lines and continued to advance on Porus' centre while Alexander directed the cavalry against the retreating elephants. Unable to withstand the advance of the pike-phalanx, the Indian army broke and fled through gaps in the encircling Macedonian cavalry.¹⁰² Porus himself, fighting valiantly to the last from the back of the largest elephant, surrendered – bringing Alexander's last major battle to a triumphant end.¹⁰³

Alexander as a Battlefield Tactician

Many scholars describe Alexander as a brilliant and innovative commander who altered his tactics to suit his opponent.¹⁰⁴ Yet just how innovative Alexander's tactics are is very much dependent upon the level of focus given to the scrutiny of their employment. For example, when looking broadly at Alexander's four major battles, the tactics that he employed are all fundamentally the same – those of the 'hammer and anvil'.

Warfare in the Hellenistic Age, developing out of the methods of warfare employed by the Greeks at the end of the preceding Classical Age, centred upon the co-ordinated use of the various arms of an army to create opportunities where a decisive blow against an enemy formation could be delivered. For the armies of the Hellenistic Age, the two dominant forces within an army were the large phalanx of pike-bearing infantry and the more mobile cavalry and both of these forces played a different, yet inter-related, role on the battlefields of the Hellenistic world – with the cavalry acting as the 'hammer' against the phalanx's 'anvil'.

Many scholars have accepted the principle of the hammer and anvil tactic and have used it as the basis for their own examinations of Hellenistic warfare.¹⁰⁵ One need look no further than Alexander's four major engagements to see the 'hammer' and the 'anvil' in effect. In

¹⁰² Arr. *Anab.* 5.17.7

¹⁰³ Arr. *Anab.* 5.18.4-7; Diod. Sic. 17.88.4-6; Curt. 8.14.31-46; Plut. *Alex.* 60; for Indian losses see: Arr. *Anab.* 5.18.2; Diod. Sic. 17.89.1-2; for Macedonian losses see: Arr. *Anab.* 5.18.3; Diod. Sic. 17.89.3

¹⁰⁴ For example see: Tarn, W.W. (1930), *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 61; Warry, *Warfare*, 71; English, *Army of Alexander*, 121; Pietrykowski, J. (2009), 'In the School of Alexander: Armies and Tactics in the Age of the Successors', *AncWar* 3.2, 21; Conversely, Devine ('Demythologizing the Battle of the Granicus', 265) suggests that the encounters at both the Granicus and Hydaspes were only small scale battles which were 'from a tactical stand point, simple and straightforward'. How such a claim can be made for a battle such as the Hydaspes, which involved thousands of men on both sides, was the first major engagement where Alexander faced a large contingent of elephants, and was, according to many of the ancient accounts, the hardest and bloodiest of any of Alexander's engagements, is not explained.

¹⁰⁵ For example see: Fuller, *Generalship of Alexander*, 48; Gabriel, R. (2010), *Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander*, Washington, Potomac, 65, 69; Pietrykowski, 'In the School of Alexander' 24; How, W.W. (1923), 'Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian Wars', *JHS* 43.2, 119; Warry, *Warfare*, 104; Anson, E.M. (2010), 'The Introduction of the Sarisa in Macedonian Warfare', *AncSoc* 40, 65; Cawkwell, G. (1978), *Philip of Macedon*, London, Faber and Faber, 155, 158; Featherstone, *Warriors and Warfare*, 59; Skarmintzos, S. (2008), 'Phalanx versus Legion: Greco-Roman Conflict in the Hellenistic Era', *AncWar* 2.2, , 30; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 266; Snodgrass, A.M. (1999), *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 115; Cummings, L.V. (1940), *Alexander the Great*, Boston, Riverside Press, 208; Tarn, *Military and Naval Developments*, 1, 11, 26; English (*Field Campaigns of Alexander*, 140; *Army of Alexander*, 22-23, 36) is one of the few who argues against the hammer and anvil analogy and states that the pike-phalanx was the strike weapon of Hellenistic warfare, rather than it being a defensive platform, and that the lengthy *sarissa* was similarly an offensive weapon rather than a defensive one.

each of these confrontations Alexander's base tactics were to advance the pike-phalanx to pin the opposing line in place (the 'anvil') while the right wing cavalry charged ahead to either knock out or nullify the enemy's left wing so that it could then turn inwards to deliver the decisive blow against the enemy centre from the side (the 'hammer').

The pike-phalanx was able to pin the opposing formation in place through the use of the main offensive weapon of the phalangite – and possibly the signature weapon of the entire age – the lengthy *sarissa*. At twelve *cubits* (or 5.76m) in length in the time of Alexander, the *sarissa* enabled any warrior wielding it to engage an opponent at a distance which was greater than the total reach of that opponent; who was generally armed with a much shorter weapon such as a spear, sword or axe. Furthermore, due to the length of the *sarissa* and the interval of the phalanx, the weapons held by the members of the first five ranks of the phalanx projected ahead of the line creating a serried row of pike-points.¹⁰⁶ So long as the integrity of the formation was maintained, the pike-phalanx was almost unbeatable when confronted head-on.¹⁰⁷

Due to the weight of the *sarissa* (approximately 5kg in the time of Alexander) the weapon was wielded in both hands and little offensive actions (in terms of thrusting) could be carried out. However, the essence of Hellenistic warfare was not to employ the pike-phalanx as a lumbering wall of stabbing pikes. Rather the purpose of the pike-phalanx was to advance against an enemy and use the length of the *sarissa* to immobilise that enemy. This was accomplished by simply pressing the tip of the weapon into the shield of an opponent to keep him at bay and incapable of further action.¹⁰⁸ Once held in this position, it was then up to more mobile troops such as cavalry and skirmishers (and sometime even unengaged infantry) to sweep around the wings of the immobilized enemy formation and attack it from the side. Such tactics can be seen in use in many of the major battles of the Hellenistic Age.¹⁰⁹

In all four of Alexander's major battles his tactics follow this standard principle of the hammer and anvil – hold the enemy centre in place with the advancing pike-phalanx, immobilize part of the enemy's left wing with skirmishers or other missile troops, and swing around to deliver a right hook with the Companion cavalry (see Figures 1-4).

¹⁰⁶ Arr. *Tact* 12.3; Ael. *Tact. Tact* 13.3; Asclep. *Tact* 5.1; Polyb. 18.29-30

¹⁰⁷ Many ancient writers refer to the invincible nature of a well maintained pike-phalanx. For example see: *Excerpta Polyaei*, 18.4; Livy, 44.41; Plut. *Alex.* 33; Plut. *Aem.* 19

¹⁰⁸ Plutarch (*Aem.* 19) states that this is exactly what the Macedonians did in their clash against the legions of Rome at Pydna in 168BC; following the defeat at Issus, Darius increased the length of the swords and lances used by the Persians as he considered that the Macedonians held a distinct advantage with the reach of their weapons (Diod. Sic. 17.53.1). This shows that Macedonian success was, in part, due to the length of the *sarissa*.

¹⁰⁹ For examples of the employment of the hammer and anvil tactic in battles of the Hellenistic Age other than Alexander's see: Chaeronea (338BC): Diod. Sic. 16.86; Plut. *Pel.* 18; Plut. *Alex.* 9; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.2.2; Paracacene (317BC): Diod. Sic. 19.27-32; Gabiene (316BC): Diod. Sic. 19.39-43; Gaza (312BC): Diod. Sic. 19.80-85; Ipsus (301BC): Diod. Sic. 20.113-21.2; Plut. *Dem.* 28-29; Heraclea (280BC): Plut. *Pyrr.* 16-17; Asculum (279BC): Plut. *Pyrr.* 21; Dion. Hal. 20.1-3; Raphia (217BC): Polyb. 5.63-65, 5.79-86; Mantinea (207BC): Polyb. 11.11-18; Plut. *Phil.* 10; Magnesia (190BC): Livy, 37.39-44; App. *Syr.* 30-36

There is a clear reason why Alexander's cavalry charge was always directed against the opponent's left wing. In the warfare of the ancient world shields were normally carried in the left hand while weapons were carried in the right. Once their left wing cavalry had been routed or otherwise nullified, any enemy pinned in place in the centre by the pike-phalanx was left with two choices: turn to face Alexander's charging Companions, or continue to face the pike-phalanx. However, either choice left the opponent in a no-win situation. If the enemy chose to turn to face Alexander, then they would be forced to expose their right, unshielded, side to the lowered pikes of the advancing phalanx. If, on the other hand, the enemy chose to continue facing the pike-phalanx, then Alexander's charging cavalry would simply ride them down from their left. Once the protection of the Persian/Indian left wing cavalry was removed, any formation remaining in the enemy centre really had only two choices: flight or death. Had Alexander chose to attack with his cavalry from the left on the other hand, the enemy could turn to meet them and still present their shields to the advancing phalanx and so be able to resist this attack better. Alexander never did so and always attacked in a way that made the enemy vulnerable no matter which direction, or which threat, he chose to face.

However, this tactic was not an innovation of Alexander's, but rather that of his father, Philip II. In his engagement against the forces of the Illyrian King, Bardylis, in 358BC, Philip adopted an oblique formation with his right wing advanced as he noticed that the enemy front was strong but its sides were weak and it was against the enemy's left flank that Philip directed his main attack.¹¹⁰ At Chaeronea in 338BC, Philip also deployed with his right wing advanced. Then, using a series of feints to draw the enemy left wing forward onto less favourable ground, Philip put the enemy left to flight while their centre was pinned in place.¹¹¹ The actions of Philip at both of these engagements bear strong parallels to the later actions of his son – parallels which are too close to be pure coincidence.

If there was nothing original in Alexander's tactics (being that he used the same base tactic as had been used by his father), and if he follows the fundamentally same tactic in every battle (pin the enemy centre, right hook with cavalry), can Alexander really be described as an innovative tactician? This is where the scale of focus comes into play. Looking at the broader tactical picture can only result in a negative answer in regards to innovation. Clearly Alexander had learnt what worked, and what worked well with the troops under his command, and he continued to use the same method of attack to brilliant effect. However, the true tactical genius of Alexander becomes visible when the focus of the examination of his tactics is narrowed to look at all of the things that Alexander employed and undertook in order to ensure that every major battle he fought was set up in a way that would allow him to use the base tactics which he knew would secure victory. The best way to compartmentalise this narrower field of tactical investigation is to use the criteria for a successful tactician as set down by earlier military theorists and examiners like Fuller.

¹¹⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.4.6; Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.2; for an examination of this confrontation see: Hammond, 'Philip and Bardylis', 1-9; Philip himself had probably adopted and adapted the tactic that had been used by the Thebans at the battle of Leuctra in 317BC which had also employed the use of an oblique line. See: Plut. *Pelop.* 23; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.3.15; *Excerpta Polyaei*, 14.7

¹¹¹ Plut. *Pel.* 18; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.2.2; Diod. Sic. 16.86.1-6

Alexander and the maintenance of the aim or objective

Alexander never lost sight (at least in the first half of the campaign) of the larger strategic goal of conquering the Persian Empire. His policy of first denying the Persian fleet safe harbours along the Mediterranean coast by capturing cities like Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza went a long way to ensuring that the campaign would be one based upon a clash of land armies, an area of warfare he was all too familiar with, rather than with fleets of ships. On several occasions Darius sent messages to Alexander offering him terms and concessions. Yet Alexander always refused such offers in the light of his broader goal – the conquest of Persia in revenge of the Persian invasion of Macedonia and Greece a century and a half earlier.¹¹² In battle Alexander also never lost sight of the ultimate aim of any engagement – to obtain victory – either through the annihilation or submission of the enemy.¹¹³ Alexander never fought a defensive engagement and always sought to fight in an offensive capacity. At both Issus and Gaugamela, Alexander is said to have been pleased that the Persian king and such a large part of his army were present as it would then allow him to settle matters in one decisive encounter.¹¹⁴

Alexander and the Use of Security

In all four engagements Alexander initially deployed his troops in a strong and secure position. At Granicus the front of his line was somewhat protected against unexpected enemy attacks by the river running along his front (the Persians thought essentially the same thing). At Issus his formation was not only protected by the river frontage but by the sea on his left and hilly terrain on his right. At Gaugamela, with no natural features to provide protection, the Macedonian army was deployed with strong rearguard wings, a rear line of reserves guarding the baggage, and a second line of the phalanx, all of which created a hollow trapezoid shape to secure against possible encirclement. At the Hydaspes, little is said of the influence of natural features such as the river in Alexander's initial deployment. However, his ability to move his Companion cavalry to the right (i.e. towards the river) suggest that this encounter was fought at some distance from the water's edge. Porus is said to have advanced on Alexander. This is the only time in the four main engagements where Alexander was not able to adequately prepare his position after observing a static enemy formation opposite him for a considerable period of time and there are no pre-battle conferences with officers where the grander tactical plan is outlined as there was at Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela. This may account for the lack of reinforcement on both of the wings of the Macedonian line in this battle and for the much more basic arrangement of the various contingents of troops compared to their deployment in earlier engagements. However, even at the Hydaspes with seemingly less time for preparation, Alexander still deployed his troops in accordance with the pre-conceived battle plan of employing his standard hammer and anvil tactic and after his infantry had been adequately rested.

¹¹² For example see: Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.1-9; 2.25.1-3

¹¹³ Clausewitz (*On War*, 1.2, 1.4) states that the ultimate object of war is to get an enemy to submit to one's will by securing victory over them and imposing conditions of submission on them which are more attractive than any other alternative, such as continued resistance.

¹¹⁴ Issus: Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.3-9; Gaugamela: Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.1-4; Diod. Sic. 17.56.3; Plut. *Alex.* 32

All of these secure formations allowed Alexander to view the enemy arrangements (even if only for a short time at the Hydaspes), judge their potential strengths, weaknesses and probable avenues of attack, and to make last minute alterations to his own deployments once the enemy's disposition had been sufficiently observed. At Issus, for example, Alexander moved cavalry from his right wing to reinforce his left in order to counter the massed Persian cavalry opposing him there. Similarly, at the Hydaspes Alexander used the security of his position to move Coenus' cavalry from his left flank to his right as part of his broader battle plan to exploit the weakness in the Indian line which he was sure his oblique advance as part of the hammer and anvil tactic was to create.

Alexander and the Use of Mobility

The expert use of the varying grades of mobility of the different types of troops at his disposal to create a co-ordinated, multi-directional, assault on an enemy position is perhaps Alexander's greatest ability as a battlefield tactician and his greatest accomplishment as a battlefield commander. Alexander clearly understood the different speeds at which the various contingents of his army could operate at effectively and this enabled him to formulate plans which not only dictated the tempo of the engagement as a whole but to also create and exploit gaps in the enemy line that these various movements would create. The phalanx, for example, would have been able to advance in relative security, but somewhat slowly compared to more mobile troops, behind their wall of extended pikes while skirmishers engaged any enemy on the left of their line and while Alexander and his cavalry moved obliquely to the right. The use of skirmishers and cavalry to engage the enemy centre-left ensured that this part of the line was held in place – unable to advance against the pike-phalanx (thus partially disrupting the enemy line should the rest of it advance into action) – and meant that enemy troops from this quarter could not be sent to reinforce any contingent shadowing Alexander's oblique movements or to fill in any gap that would be created from the shadowing move. The co-ordination of these three elements – lumbering but secure pike-phalanx in the centre, engagement of the enemy left, and oblique advance to the right to create a gap in the enemy line – were the three essential elements to the hammer and anvil tactic.

Timing was also essential in the successful implementation of the hammer and anvil tactic. If the flanking attack was committed too early, before the pike-phalanx was able to pin the opposing formation in place, the enemy could simply turn to meet this threat with little risk. On the other hand, if the flanking attack was delayed or committed late, the pike-phalanx had to be able to hold the enemy in position long enough, without being encircled or over-run, for the flanking units to arrive. The critical nature of timing explains why many of Alexander's flanking movements initially move obliquely to the right. Not only did this action create many of the gaps that his flanking units were able to later exploit, but it also provided the pike-units in the centre the necessary time to advance into contact and pin the opposing centre in place.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ The essence of timing is probably another tactical trait that Alexander had learnt from his father. At Chaeronea, the feigned retreat of Philip's advanced right wing allowed him to draw the Athenian left wing forward, rout it with a counter-attack, and also provided enough time for the rest of the phalanx, which had been deployed obliquely to the left-rear of Philip's position, to advance and pin the opposing line in place.

Luckily for Alexander, he fought against different commanders in most of his four main engagements who were thus unable to learn from prior defeats. Even the one opponent he did face twice, Darius, tried to mitigate the circumstances of his defeat at Issus by fighting on an open plain at Gaugamela which was better suited to his larger army and where all his troops could potentially be brought to bear. Yet even here Darius deployed his infantry in two lines in his centre rather than creating one long one which would easily outflank the smaller Macedonian formation. This suggests that Darius had learnt from his defeat at Issus and had recognised that an encircling move by Alexander and his cavalry, following the same tactic that Alexander had used at Issus, was a distinct possibility. Fear of encirclement also explains why Darius sent his own left wing cavalry to shadow Alexander's oblique move – possible encirclement had to be countered, but the cavalry could not charge into any gap in the Macedonians line (in effect using Alexander's own tactics against him) as Alexander's use of missile troops to engage the enemy centre-left and his positioning of skirmishers in a refused line to the right-rear, meant that there was no gap to easily exploit. The same could not be said of the Persian line which, once the left wing cavalry moved off, had the flank of the infantry line exposed. It is Alexander's brilliance at manipulating the situation to create opportunities to employ his standard tactics, and the failure of Darius' nerve, which saw the Persian king undone for a second time.

Alexander and the Use of Offensive Power

The strong, secure and co-ordinated method of deployment adopted by Alexander at all four of his main battles added to the offensive power of the army as a whole. With the wings of his formations protected by either mobile troops and/or natural features, Alexander's slower pike-phalanx was able to advance in relative safety towards the enemy in order to undertake their primary function – to pin the enemy centre in place. While this could be seen as mainly a defensive operation on the part of the pike-phalanx, it was a vital to ensure that the main offensive thrust – the flanking attack of the right wing cavalry – could be executed effectively and in a timely manner.

Alexander and Economy of Force

The key to economising the offensive power of an army is to employ it in such a way that the individual combatants do not rapidly tire while still effectively engaging the enemy. For the members of Alexander's pike-phalanx, the very nature of their equipment and how it was used in part dictated the economy of their actions. Due to the weight of the *sarissa* it is difficult to undertake a lot of offensive thrusting actions without quickly becoming fatigued. This accounts for why the phalanx's primary function was to simply pin the enemy centre in place rather than engage them in a battle of attrition. By having the members of the first five ranks lower their weapons and present them ahead of the line, the formation could advance in the surety that any opponent who charged against them would either be held back by the length of the weapons or would simply impale themselves with the momentum of their own charge. Once the enemy line was held back, all the members of the phalanx had to do was simply keep their pikes lowered and pressed into the shields of those facing them, and keep their formation together, until any flanking move arrived to attack the enemy from the sides. This lack of offensive action by the pike-phalanx meant that its members could undertake such actions with very little stress placed on the muscles of the arms.

Furthermore, the shield carried by the pikeman was supported by both a central armband (through which the left forearm was inserted) and a shoulder strap which ran across the body to sit on the right shoulder. The small diameter of the shield (64cm) allowed the left hand to extend beyond the rim of the shield to help carry the lengthy pike. Importantly, as the shoulder strap was connected to the shield, and the shield mounted on the arm, this also meant that the shoulder strap bore some of the weight of the *sarissa* as well. This allowed the pikeman to carry his primary weapon in the lowered position required of his main action almost indefinitely.

Alexander's use of skirmishers and/or mounted archers to pin the left flank of the enemy centre in place also demonstrates the use of economy of force. By employing missile troops to engage the enemy from a distance, that section of the enemy line (regardless of whether they were infantry, cavalry or chariots) would suffer casualties without being able to respond in kind unless they moved against the troops firing at them. At the Granicus the Persians directly engaged these missile troops inflicting severe casualties. Similarly at Gaugamela, both sides were required to commit more and more troops to actions fought in front of the left of the Persian infantry line. Despite these setbacks, these engagements still had the desired effect of keeping the left of the Persian line occupied while Alexander's cavalry moved to the right. The presence of other units in the Macedonian line which protected these missile troops, such as contingents of cavalry, other skirmishers or the *hypaspists* – all of which were stationed either beside or behind the missile troops on the right of the line at all four of Alexander's battles – any enemy contingent could also not move in force against the attacking missile troops without risking being surrounded by these supporting units. Additionally, having only some units advance against the missile troops would disrupt the integrity of the enemy line. Nor could these units move to shadow Alexander's oblique advance of the right wing cavalry without running the risk of being attacked from behind. Thus the left of the enemy formation was placed in a position where they had no options other than to retreat, advance into an action which they could not win, or hold their ground and suffer casualties.

Alexander's oblique advances with the Companion cavalry also demonstrate an understanding of principles of economy of force. None of these movements are recorded as being undertaken at a charge. Rather the cavalry contingents only advance in a specific direction, presumably at a brisk trot rather than a full gallop. This would have had a number of advantages. By moving slowly, Alexander ensured that his movements could be observed so that the enemy would be forced to send troops to mirror his movements. This is the very essence of the hammer and anvil tactic, without a commitment by the enemy to send troops to shadow the oblique advance, the manoeuvre may not succeed in creating the gap that Alexander meant to exploit and so the initial advance had to be observed by the enemy. Secondly, moving at a slower pace gave the pike-phalanx the required time to advance and pin the enemy line in place before the flanking charge of the cavalry could be made. Finally, the horses of the units making the oblique advance would be warmed up, but not exhausted, prior to the eventual charge into any gap that formed in the opposing line.

Finally, the defensive actions on the left wing of the Macedonian line at battles such as Issus and Gaugamela are also the use of economy of force. By not moving to engage as the centre and right wings of the line did, fighting a defensive action on the left both maintained unit cohesion in this sector and kept troops rested while the opposing side was forced to advance into action. Unit cohesion and lack of any level of fatigue was crucial in encounters where the Macedonian left was heavily outnumbered as occurred at Issus. Thus the movements of every unit of the Macedonian army in all of these encounters was something of a co-ordinated 'dance in unison' with each contingent operating in a specific way so that all elements of the army functioned within the principle of economising their offensive power.

Alexander and Concentration of Force

Consistently directing his primary attack at what he perceived to be a crucial point in the enemy line is the other of Alexander's great attributes as a battlefield tactician. Through the use of his oblique advances of his right wing cavalry, Alexander ensured that a gap was created where he could strike hardest at the point where he believed that the decisive blow to disrupt the enemy could be struck. In many of the battles – Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela – this point was considered to be the location of the senior commander (or one of the senior commanders in the case of Granicus). As if to confirm the success of such a conclusion, in all these of these battles the Persian army began to waver and break as soon as their commander had either been slain or had turned in flight. The concentration of the most offensive action at a key point in the line is another aspect of Hellenistic tactics that Alexander would have learnt from his father – and so is not something original to Alexander's tactical decision making, but is merely part of his operational repertoire. What was considered the key point in the enemy formation, however, differed in its implementation between Alexander and his father. In 358BC, for example, Philip directed his attacks against what he perceived to be the weakest point in the enemy formation in his battle against Bardylis.¹¹⁶ At Chaeronea in 338BC, Philip commenced actions against the Athenian left with his advanced right wing while the strongest part of the enemy line, the position of the Theban Sacred Band, was opposite the Macedonian left.¹¹⁷ Philip may have modelled his stratagem on that used by the Thebans at the battle of Leuctra in 371BC – in which the Thebans directed their attack at what they considered the strongest point in the enemy line, the position of the Spartan king, Cleombrotus.¹¹⁸ Philip, however, seems to have altered this principle to strike at the weakest point in an enemy line rather than the strongest.

Initially, Alexander seems to have followed the same principles as his father. When fighting the Taulantians in 335BC, Alexander also directed his attacks against the point in the enemy formation 'where they were likely to make the greatest onslaught on the enemy at his weakest point'.¹¹⁹ During his campaign in Asia, on the other hand, Alexander's concentration of force more closely follows the Theban model with his attacks directed at opposing commanders – with only the method of delivery (using cavalry rather than infantry) being the main difference. The successful delivery of a concerted attack at a key point in an enemy's position is also reliant upon many of the other factors which were vital to the hammer

¹¹⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.4.5-6; Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.2; see also: Just. *Epit.* 7.6.7

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 18; see also: Diod. Sic. 16.86.1-6

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Pelop.* 23; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.3.15; *Excerpta Polyaei*, 14.7

¹¹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.6.10

and anvil tactic such as timing. Alexander's successful use of such a tactic on four separate occasions can only be considered a demonstration of the abilities of an astute tactical commander.

Alexander and Surprise

Alexander's greatest use of surprise was not in attacking an enemy without warning. Rather it was through manipulating the circumstances of the battlefield to place an opponent in a position where he could not win. Such a principle applied not only in separate sectors of the battlefield, or even the actions of individual contingents (such as his use of missile troops to hold the enemy left, his oblique advance of his left wing cavalry to create exploitable gaps in the enemy line, or the use of the pike-phalanx to pin the enemy centre), but also to an engagement as a whole. His deployment of Craterus with part of his army on the far bank of the Hydaspes, with orders to cross only once the main engagement had begun, meant that no matter which force Porus turned his army to face, he would be attacked from behind by the other unless he intentionally split his forces and chose to fight on two fronts with two numerically weakened forces. Thus on both a sector level and a battlefield level, Alexander used the elements of his army to either remove or nullify parts of the enemy army, to move his own troops into a position where they could be used to the best effect, and to create the opportunities required to ensure he gain victory – opportunities that the enemy was almost powerless to prevent.

Alexander as a Tactician

By examining how Alexander's battlefield tactics across his four major set-piece battles comply with the principles set down by military theorists and commentators like Fuller, a more comprehensive picture of Alexander's abilities as a battlefield commander emerges (table 1).

Criteria	Granicus	Issus	Gaugamela	Hydaspes
Maintenance of aim or Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Security	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mobility	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Offensive Power	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economy of Force	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Concentration of Force	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Surprise	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 1: A comparison of Alexander's four major battles to Fuller's criteria of the tactical arts.

The results of the application of the analytic criteria suggest that Alexander was a masterful tactician with a clear understanding of the finer details of what would make his larger base tactic succeed. Whether elements of these tactics were inventions of Alexander's or something he had learnt from his father or elsewhere is irrelevant. The important part of the tactical art is how they are applied on the battlefield – not whether they are simply known or from whom they are learnt. Similarly, whether it is considered less innovative that Alexan-

der used the same base tactic time and again, or whether the slight variances in his deployment and implementation of the hammer and anvil tactic can be considered ground breaking, are fundamentally redundant arguments. The proof of tactical ability on the battlefield is measured in the results as well as how they are achieved. This is Alexander's true genius as a commander – not only knowing what works, and what works well for the troops at his disposal, but also possessing the ability to adapt the use of these troops in such a way as to create the perfect environment and opportunities for the base tactics to be utilized to their fullest measure. As Warry states; Alexander used a standard tactic throughout his campaign but that tactic was 'implemented with astonishing versatility, improvisation and resource as time and place required'.¹²⁰ This clear knowledge of the abilities of his army and how best to employ them is what allowed Alexander to remain undefeated in any major battle and truly deserving of the title 'the Great'.




Figure 1: Overview map of the battle of Granicus

¹²⁰ Warry, *Alexander 334-323BC*, 20




Figure 2: Overview map of the battle of Issus




Figure 3: Overview map of the battle of Gaugamela





Figure 4: Overview map of the battle of the Hydaspes

Women and costumes of Naoussa, the end of an era

Eugenia Zaliou-Basiakouli, Writer - Researcher

This is a luxury big shaped book (*Ph.1*) with 300 pages, 213 black and countless color photos, 180 pages of analysis of costumes, 15 pages devoted to male costumes and 72 informants to present the history of traditional costumes in Naoussa as collected and recorded by Mrs. Eugenia Zaliou-Basiakouli. This is an important issue, lifework of its author-researcher, who fills the incomplete bibliography and references to female (and not only) costumes of Naoussa-Macedonia-Greece. It is a multi-faceted approach of local costumes supported and automatically animated through a great selection of photographs from the archives of the author. Includes verbal information gathered literally the eleventh hour to record the historical and social context of Naoussa from 19th to the beginning of the 20th century, in particular the status of women in the local community.



Ph.1 Book cover



Ph.2 A couple new married 1913

The extensive main section of the book on the Naoussa's female costume contains not only purely descriptive but also a series of interesting approaches of sociological nature, through the stories that provided too many informants, referred to a special section of the book. The edition is supplemented with a small annex for male Naoussa's costume and an annex for the Vlach sartorial ensembles. Numerous unpublished families photographs are published in the book, and stunning images of parts of costumes, embroidery and jewelry accompanying them (*Ph.2*).

Alexandros Oikonomou, architect, had the general layout of the issue, while the bound and designs that adorn the book are by the artist Nikolas Bliatkas. The design and artistic editing and publishing production is by John Papakarmezis, publications' Nafs / ILP productions.

1. GENERALLY

The folk culture within the Greek area, in the same way as the folk art, managed to develop themselves under the status of the long servitude to the Turks quite independently within the community. Still the folk culture portrays the living standard and the cultural level of a closed and quite often isolated community, which has already formulated strict morals and customs by following a specific way of living, which transforms the figures in time in a very slow rhythm.

The town of Naoussa

At the feet of Mount Vermion in Macedonia - Northern Greece, in a natural embrace formed



Ph.3 NAOUSSA beg. 20th cent.

by successive levels that descend gradually toward the plain, lays Naoussa (*Ph.3*). From an altitude of 330 meters it overlooks the entire fertile plain of Emathia that extends to Thessaloniki. This particular area on Vermio was inhabited from most ancient times. Extended ruins in the area indicate that Naoussa has evolved at the site of an important city of the antiquity, the city of Mieza. Among the many scattered archaeological

findings of the area the Great Macedonian Tombs, the Agora and the Theater and the School of Aristotle in the Nymphaion are considered the most significant.

The re-establishment of present-day Naoussa coincides with the initial years of the Ottoman invasion in Macedonia, at the beginning of the 15th cent., when the Turks endeavored to gather and resettle the inhabitants who had found refuge in the surrounding forests and mountainous inaccessible points, due to the violent incursions earlier. The town was granted various privileges which allowed it to develop certain areas of handicrafts and become an important economic center of central Macedonia.

During the 18th and up to the beginnings of the 19th century, Naoussa, due to the privileges that it had obtained, was developed financially and shined for its prosperity and the welfare of its citizens. The industry and the trade met an interesting flush and were a significant means of wealth. The rich citizens of Naoussa who were trading not only within the Ottoman Empire's borders but abroad as well, and mainly in Vienna, Moscow, Odessa and Germany, were embellishing their wives with the most beautiful things they could obtain from abroad. This of course refers mainly to the fabrics and the jewel, as the form of the

costumes of Naoussa in 18th, 19th and the beginning of the 20th century as well, was such as it had been strictly determined as inheritance from the traditional figures of the previous generations.

Withstanding its prosperity, in February 1822, Naoussa finds itself at the center of a large scale revolt within the context of the Greek Revolution, which had already broken out in other areas of the Ottoman Empire. After a series of military operations the town falls in the face of the outnumbering forces of the enemy in April 1822. The town was destroyed and its privileges withdrawn. But a few years later Naoussa finds again its active character and become an important industrial center of Macedonia and the Balkans (*Ph.4*).



Ph.4 From Naoussa to Cairo Egypt 1870

2. THE WOMEN'S STATUS IN NAOUSSA'S SOCIETY



Ph.5 Family photo 1914

As it was already mentioned before, the female costume of Naoussa is directly related with the family environment and the traditions of the area (F5). The woman was reflecting with her external appearance the financial and social status of her father or her husband. The female costume indicated very consistently the role of the woman in the house, where very easily somebody could discern just from the apparel the married from the single woman, the widow, the mother in law etc. The hair style, the head cover, the colors, the decorative design and embroideries, the addition and the removal of the various accessories in the dress, were all depicting the social importance of the woman in the role of mother and wife (*Ph.5*). Let's not forget that in those years the family environment was quite preservative, with the male appearance to predominate and the role of the woman to be quite limited (*Ph.6*).




Ph.6 Married couple (European clothes) 1910

During the previous century, in Naoussa, when the town revitalizes after the total destruction during the Greek Revolution of 1822, and mainly from the midst of the 19th century, the status of the woman in the society stops being exceptionally disadvantageous and is constantly mitigated (Ph.7). While in



Ph.7 Engagement couple 1923



Ph.8 Dowry agreement 1881

most of the places of the Greek area the woman participates in the difficult jobs of the countryside, the woman in Naoussa was very rarely engaged with agricultural works. A sole exception was her participation in the grape-harvest, which had a celebration character. She had plenty time for the loom and for the breeding of silkworm. The girls of Naoussa started to work out of the house for the first time when the first factories opened (spinning and weaving mills). But after their marriage most of them stopped working in the factory, because working outside was considered pejorative. In the case they belonged to an agricultural family with a low income, they were

following their husbands in the fields helping them there, and mainly in the period of the fruits gathering (*Ph.8*).



Ph.9 Weddings 1912

A main type of recreation was the celebrations, the weddings, the baptisms, and the fairs etc., (*Ph.9*) which were taking place on specific days of the year. For this reason, due to the fact that the “celebration costumes” were not worn often, many of them were preserved in a good condition up to nowadays (*Ph.10 - 14*).



Ph.10 Loom 1950



Ph.11 Married couple (traditional female costume) 1917



Ph.12 Silver wedding crown 1902



Ph.13 Bride's & groom's families (1911)



Ph.14 Young girls working at spinning mill



Ph.15 New married young women
1909

3. THE FEMALE COSTUME

The female costume of Naoussa belongs to the “urban costumes” such as the costumes of Veria, Siatista and Kastoria as well (Ph.15). But the costume of Naoussa is being discerned for the quality of the fabrics, the rich variety of the embroideries and the cover of the head (Ph.16). On the other hand the male costume, as it used to be found in the entire Greek area, in the same way in Naoussa as well, is severe in color and concise in decoration. It is in total contrast to the female costume which has dashing colors, manifold decoration and many accessories. There follows an attempt for a more concise description of the elements that compose both the male and the female traditional costume of Naoussa in its various transformations as well as in its diversities which

were being determined strictly by the age, the family and the social status of each person and especially in women, where these distinctions were more austere. (Ph.17, 18)



Ph.17 Grandmother and granddaughter 1900



Ph.16 A lady with a festive dress begs. 20th cent.



Ph.18 New married couple 1910

Costume analysis

The female costume of Naoussa was consisted of many elements and accessories. Depending on the age, the financial and social status of the people it had important differentiations



Ph.19 Wedding dress fin 19th cent.

and it was distinguished for the quality of the fabrics and the wealth of the embroideries (Ph.19). A characteristic folk proverb that was very common said “eat whatever you wish and dress with whatever suits you”. It had quite many difficulties in its wearing. In order someone to wear it there was needed great virtuosity and specific procedure, which was quite time-consuming. All the accessories of the costume were worn for the whole duration of the year. During the winter period they were using moreover the heavy overcoats.

The newly married women were taking as dowry all the necessary clothing for each age and circumstance. More clothes for the two first ages, the younger and the middle one, and less for the older. The mothers, were leaving to their daughters as a dowry in their turn now all the parts and the accessories of the “good dress” that were preserved in good condition.

The costume consists of the following basic parts:

3.1 The dress (Foustani)

The dress has been established in the modern Greek clothing after the 17th cent., when the separation between the layman and the pastoral clothing took place and thus the variations of the national attire were formulated. This garment has elements from the Byzantine or the west customary and has been worn both in the continental and the insular Greece. In Naoussa, Veria and Siatista the shape of the dress is dated before the beginnings of the 19th century.



Ph.20 Details of the female dress

Foustani is the basic part of the local female costume. It is waist-short, with a skintight midriff and a full skirt with well ironed folds. It is consisted basically of two parts: the torso part which is sewed skin tightly and the skirt which is quite full with *soufres* that are modulated into folds. The torso part has in front a cutting in the neck, which ends in a semicircle opening, the *skala* (Ph.20, Ph.21, Ph.22).



Ph.21 Embroidered cuffs



Ph.22 Detail of cuff and sleeve



Ph.23 A new married rich couple 1905

The wedding dress is at the same time the festive one as well, the *silibi* with the gold as they used to call it. It was always one colored in light coloring and gold-embroidered (Ph.23). Next we can find



Ph.24 Silk dress (second) 1870

the second one, the *deftero*, which is a silk sprigged foustani, in more vigorous colors and with fewer gold embroidery (Ph.24).

There follows the third one, the *trito* which is silk with gold and the forth, the

tetarto dress which is always wool with *hartzia*. More casual dresses are the *faneles*, the *stabes* and the *alatzades* which are also embroidered with *hartzia*.

All the foustania are embroidered in the collar, the *skala* and the sleeve-lets of the sleeves according to their quality and their type. The silk and the wool foustania are wholly primed internally, that is dubbed. In the more casual ones they were placing primer only in the torso part, which was forming in the midst the *flabaro*, the *kapoulia*. The dresses are a part of the dowry that covers the 1/5 of the total cost of the dowry and their number many times surpasses the 20.

3.2 The chemise (Poukamiso)

The chemise is a basic and common garment in all the kinds of the female costume, like in the male as well. It is regarded as the development of the ancient pallium, of the Roman *tunica*, and of the Byzantine *dalmatic*. The material of its production, the shape and its decoration differentiate from place to place, depending on the climate, the indigenous financial status, as well as on the survival of former clothing characteristics or more recent west influences.

The shirt (chemise) of Naoussa is discerned from the quality of its fabric and not from its decoration. It is the well known silk cashmere shirt, which was weaved in the loom. The bride was wearing it for the first time in her wedding and then whenever she was dressed in her good dress throughout her life. Another second type is the *maroulato* shirt, which was sewed with *spin fabric*. The everyday ones, called *aradina* shirts, were white made from silk and cotton, shinning white or fabric in ougia weave. The shirt consists of one central, one-piece leaf both front and behind, and two lateral, that add width. It is a closed cloth, with a vertical opening for the neck and long sleeves. The way of sewing in all the various types of the shirt is the same, with slight only differentiations in the width, the length and the decoration, depending on the quality of the weaved fabric or the age of the woman who was wearing it. Especial attention was paid to the production of the wedding shirt as well as to its decoration that was consisted of gold embroidery.

3.3 Colars (Trahilia)



Ph.25 Golden embroidered collars (trahilies)

Trahilia is one of the basic accessories of the costume (Ph.25). One of its most significant characteristics is the rich gold embroidery and the lace, the well known *bibila* with the various and luxuriant combinations. The weaved fabric, with which they were making the *trahilia*, was weaved by the women in the home loom, and regarding its quality it's the

same fabric with that they were using for the shirts. Trahilia has a rectangular shape and a vertical opening in the centre separates it into two equal parts. These are being folded in a specific way so as to emphasize their rich and manifold decoration, the fully-golden embroider and the wide bibles.

Tsahalis, which embroideries and bibles were made only by craftswomen, are being distinguished in the *protest (first)* with many gold embroideries, the *deters (second)* with less gold and the *tires (third)* with lesser than that. The bride was getting for dowry up to 25 trahilies.

3.4 The Fastenings (Zosimata: podia-zostrā -zonari)

Podia. According to the age and the circumstance, we have the following smocks in the costume: The *wedding podia*, which were made from a finest silk fabric, similar to the dress, embroidered all over with gold-cordons. This is succeeded by the *defteri (second)* podia which is silk print. There follow the *trit i(third)* and the *tetarti (fourth)*, that were being worn with the respective foustani either silk or wool. For the more casual dresses the smocks are simple without embroider. The reverse side of the smock was being primed with print prime. The smocks have in their waist a loose waistband from garment, in order to protect the *kolani (special buckle)* not to be over worn, until almost the 1900. When the *kolani* was removed from the costume, the waistband becomes narrower. Apart from the podia which was an accessory of the dress, we also see the more casual ones, which they used to wear in order to protect their clothes during the jobs time. These are the simple ones, weaved in the loom, and they cover the whole front part of the body.



Ph.26 Fastening
(zostra)

Zostrā. The *zostra* is very big square bandanna, decorated, usually silk, wool or *lahourenio*, which is folded into two parts in triangle shape, and zones the waist and the hips, being tight in the left with a knot. It is worn over the podia (Ph.26). Its colors were proportional to the age and always in a contrast coloring of the dress's colors. We can discern different types of zostra, among which is: The silk embroidered "*klonarati*" that resembles a big tablecloth. The silk, embroidered in the loom "*silk into silk*" and it is long with grille fringes. The silk without embroider, which can be either ready-made and bought or handmade at home, the "*glossa*" zostra which is simpler and more useable, and begun its appearance when the previous types of zostra were nullified etc. The *zostres* were being worn by the newly married women or women of an older age, until the age of 40s for a "festive dressing". When they were mourning this



Ph.27 Couple with their children
1911

was removed and replaced by the zonari (*Ph.27*).

Zonari. The zonaria are weaved silk in the loom or readymade weaved but bought. Their length was usually reaching the two meters and in their finish they had fringes with a grille bounding. All the women were wearing a zonari according to their age and the circumstance in crimson, brown, brick, green, or blue color. With zostra's appearance, around 1900, the zonaria started gradually not to be used so much and they were mostly worn by women of an older age.

3.5 Chesterfields (Ependites)

Libadi is the simplest and necessary overcoat they used to wear over the foustani throughout the year. It is short, skintight, sleeved jacket, found mainly in the urban costumes. All over in its finish and in the sleeves as well, they were cordoning it and forming *karma* with gold or hartzia. The casual libadi were less embroidered. The fabric they were using was black baize, garment, *atlazi*, velvet or kalamatiano silk fabric, depending on the age and the era they were wearing them. Internally they were being vested with white prime and all around with red webbing.



Ph.28 Chesterfield Saltamarka front

saltamarka was worn both in summer and winter like the libadi.

Under the saltamarka they were putting on a sleeveless vest, the *gileki with the golds*. Under the libadi or the saltamarka, during the autumn, the spring and the winter, they were wearing a fur circle-shaped collar, sewed on a vest of lining, the *kontogouni*.

Saltamarka is the wedding overcoat (*Ph.28, Ph.29*). It was being sewed almost with the same style like the libadi as well, but it was different in the wealth of the embroideries, which were made only with gold thread. A dense gold-embroidered decoration all over the collar was creating complex patterns and a wide gold decoration was highlighting the seams of the sleeves. The fabric they used was black garment and very rarely a velvet one. The



Ph.29 Chesterfield Saltamarka backside

The winter overcoats are: the *makrilebado*

which is a thin fabric-made overcoat, shorter than the foustani. All over its finish it was embroidered with golden string (*hrisogaitano*) or small lace. A dense gold decoration covers the whole surface of the collar, the seams of the sleeves in their joining, and in the armpits as well. On the very small back, they achieved the addition of width by putting many thin

fold, the *flabara*, ironed towards the centre, which started just over the height of the waist and formed rich folds.



Ph.30 Chesterfield scourtela

The *skourtela* is a winter-weight fabric-made overcoat (Ph.30). It was being sewed like the makrilebado, with the only difference the front leaves on which it had a large fur, almost of ½ meter, in gold-beige color. The skourtela and the makrilebado internally in the torso part and the sleeves are vested with white prime and the rest part with stripped or print prime. The front leaves all over in their two vertical edges, are furthermore decorated with a crimson lace.

The older women were wearing as an overcoat the *sako*. They were usually unstitching the skourtela and with the same material they were making the sako. Its length was up to the knee and it was internally primed with brown or black fur.

3.6 Headcovers (kefalokalymata and kefalodemata)

The head cover (*kefalokalyma*) is one of the basic accessories of the female costume, especially in Naoussa. It is that which seals and integrates its superbness. The woman of Naoussa was putting on for the first time in her marriage the *founda* (in former eras) or *tipilouki* (beginnings of our century). This was a present given always by the groom.



Ph.31 Top of head cover

Founda consists of the red fez, on which a small round golden embroider, called *tepes* is placed and all over it there are dense golden fringes (Ph.30). It is important to be underlined the either six-ray or eight-ray star that is embroidered on the top of this head cover. This reveals the direct relation with the Macedonian *episimo* (*official*) which was found in the graves of Lefkadia, and the reliquary of the Macedonian king Philip II in Vergina (Ph.31). From the top of the cover and from a golden braid (*kosa*) falls down a tuft, made from silk and blue cordons, that are covered with gold (the rich women had a solid gold tuft). Under the fringes the *bogosis* is placed, which is a stamped folded bandanna, the edges of which are always tight on the left



Ph.32 A lady with a headcocer 1925

The *tipilouki* has many similarities with the tuft and differentiates a) in *tepe*, which apart from the golden embroider has florins or pearls, b) it does not have a tuft, c) it has an impressive flower (*lou-loudi*), which consists of many small blossoms worked with bibila (Ph.33).

and fall down with the *fountakia* of the hair on the ear (Ph.32).



Ph.33 A lady with headcover (tepelouki)

The older and mourning women were wearing for festive cases the *fitosi siouto*. That was made from a black or red fez, covered entirely with a dense lay of black silk. In its below part they were tying a dark-colored or black bundle. For the less official occasions and more casually, the women were tying on their heads the *tsipa*, one silk or cotton square bandanna. The *tsipa* was folded triangularly and tied tightly over the left temple, leaving its two edges free.

3.7 The various accessories

Mafesi: the *mafesi* was placed over the trahilia almost in the centre of the skala of the dress. It is a silk square fabric which they used to fold forming thus a thin belt (*zonari*). They were passing it around the neck and fitting it on the left part of the midriff.

Manikakia (small sleeves): supplement the female costume, were made from cashmere and were worn respectively under the sleeves of the dress.

Mantilaki (handkerchief): is also one additional decorative ornament. It is silk and it was put by the married women in the front part of the dress that is on the *zonari* of the *podia* (Ph.34).



Ph.34 Two young ladies with festive costumes 1914

3.8 Underwear (katasarki, foustes, etera)

The women of Naoussa during winter and summer as well were wearing for underwear a cotton undershirt, which was white and called *katasarki*. The *katasarki* did not have sleeves and it buckled in front with buttons.

The *foustes* consist of the torso part (sleeveless) and the main skirt with the *flabara* aiming at projecting the backside of the body. They are distinguished into wool-cotton in striped weaving, and all-wool made winter clothes.

The *etera* (drawers) were made from fine calico or white weaved fabric. They are being discerned into the *etera* with short *vrapodia* (up to the middle of the thigh or little upper from the knee) and in the *etera* with long *vrapodia* (that tied up in the middle of the leg), called "*vrapodia with podonaria*" which were used by the elders.

3.9-3.10 Socks – Shoes

Socks. The socks, which were reaching the middle of the leg, were from wool or cotton. The women were weaving them with five weaving needles forming thus a cord in order to tie them on the knee. The good wool socks are named *piitia*. The *piitia* are white and have multicolored zakar design in the point and the heel.

Shoes. Outside the house they were wearing the *stivalia*, a kind of short leather boot, which was either buttoning in the front with *foles* or was tied up with cords. Another kind of shoe is the *gofa*, which is leather, brown or black, buttoned on the side or tied up in front, with cords or simple with a toque. Inside the house they were using the slippers which were either leather, simple or with shoehorn, or fabric-made open from black satin with a colored

bow and embroidered in the sides, or closed from velvet and satin fully embroidered (*gofes*) (Ph.35).



Ph.35 Embroidered wedding shoes

3.11 Grooming

The women of Naoussa were proud and dressy at the same time. They gave particular care for cosmetic purposes, enhancing their natural beauty with special preparations (*fkiasidia*), whose manufacture was a secret passed on from mother to daughter. The most prevalent was an ointment with mercury, considered excellent that most of them did themselves. They gave special emphasis to the grooming of the bride and the young woman. But also the older women used them, always in the context of a decent appearance. Hair coloring was a dear habit. Before marriage the bride dyed her hair with "henna", a plant pigment that gives blond-red colour. After 1912, the bride stopped dyeing her hair red and then the married Naoussa's woman feature is jet-black hair, which indicates severity, but also stresses, through contrast, the whiteness of the skin, which was, together with the red cheeks, a sign of beauty and health.



3.12 The jewelry and other ornaments of the costume

The costume is integrated and decorated with various jewels which become more in the case of a bride or a newly married woman. The girls were wearing bubble earrings or loops, bracelets, rings and the more financially prosperous a necklace with florins the *armathia*, which becomes richer in the engaged girls. The base of the neck was decorated with a necklace, worn skintight, the *giordani*. The *giordani* was made of pearls with many chains of small pearls, gold or silver wire (Ph.36).

Ph.36 Jewelry



Ph.37 Earrings

One of the necessary ornaments in the good dressing were the florins, which were the engagement and the wedding present and which covered the opening of the trahilia. Depending on the financial status, the rich women were wearing many florins put on one another, while in the poorer ones these were less and sparsely put. They were sewing the florins on a yellow fabric, which tied back in the neck with small strings. The rich ones were additionally wearing on the chest many chains of big pearls. The gold watch was also necessary, with the thick chain past over the neck. On the *mafesi* they were always putting one or two gold pins. On the hands we can see the *bilitzikia* that is bracelets either gold or silver wire. (Ph.37, Ph.38)



Ph.38 Sketch of an earring

They were putting gold or silver rings in almost all the fingers, ornamented with valuable or semiprecious stones, in various shapes and colors. The almond-shaped rings were also very important. Furthermore we can see a big gold cross with chain which was worn as a talisman (*Ph.39*).



Ph.39 Golden and silver necklace



Ph.40 buckle (collani)

Until the beginnings of our century the women of Naoussa were wearing in their waists the *kolania*. (*Ph.40, Ph.41, Ph.42*)

These are special brooches decorated with multicolored semiprecious stones. They were clasping in the front side of the waist. We can discern three types: the *sirmatero kolani*, best and most expensive of all the others, the *kolani with dahtila* (fingers), and finally the *silver aspro*, which is considered inferior.



Ph.41 Detail of collani (wedding buckle)



Ph.42 Wedding buckles (collania)

3.13 The costume according the occasion and the age

a. Bridal - festive costume

It is arguably the most heavy and rich costume, with the largest magical-symbolic significance. Combines precious dresses, silk shirts, golden neck, chesterfields and luxurious head cover. Feature gold jewellery and coins are plentiful and impressive. The age of adornment was short, at most a decade. This period is shortened more than any grief, beyond the widows anyway brings the end of the festive dress. As women had few opportunities to really enjoy their bridal costume, it was of great importance, in their consciousness.

b. Daily costume


The costume in the typology is the same in the basic components of both every day and festive. The daily attire is simpler than festive, with fewer pieces, accessories and embroidery. For chesterfields they used only limpadi and for jewelry worn only simple earrings, wedding ring and a ring. The qualities of the fabrics were simple and colors depending on age. Prevalent for older women was blue and brown, and for older dark gray or black.

c. Elderly – widow costume

In the guise of a married older woman characteristic is a quantitative and qualitative change. The costume is getting leaner. Feature is the dark colours: brown, dark blue, green, black and gold embroidery lack. The severity of colours is due to age, but also because they rarely an elderly woman would not have anyone to mourn.

d. Child – Teenage costume

It is worth mentioning that the girls from the child age and up to their puberty were wearing clothes which were the same with the clothes of the adult women regarding their basic shape and design (*Ph.43*). There were differences in the quality of the fabrics, which were mainly weaved in the house loom, and more rarely bought. Their embroidered decoration was limited with very little gold. The dresses (midriffs-skirt) were long-sleeved and reached the ankle. They had a closed necktie and a vertical opening with buttons, always buttoned in their hooks. The closed necktie with the closed buttons was a characteristic feature of a small girl or a non-married woman of a bigger age. For overcoats they were wearing the gileko, libadi, bolka (a short overcoat) from saiaki or knitted jackets. The underwear (shirt-skirt-nickers) was weaved or made from fine calico and their shoes were leather and clasped. As far as the hairstyle is concerned they were making koses (psyche knot) with a parting in the middle, fastening the hair with a wide ribbon.



Ph.43 Grandmother with her grandsons

e. The dress of the "Nymphi" in "Boules" (Ph.44)



Ph.44 The 'bride's'(nyphi) costume in 'Boules'

flowers instead of hair and adorned with colored ribbons, falling forward (like "strings" of the bride), and around, to the shoulders, hanging tulle. Nymphi's face (who is always acted by a man) is covered by a white mask (prosopos).

The attire of the "Nymphi" (bride) at the local Carnival Happening "Boules" is essentially a "mocking" variant of the bourgeois women's dress, unlike the male dancers costumes ("Boules"), which has nothing to do with the local traditional male costume. It consists of very fancy long-sleeved dress, which has a fitted bodice and a large opening similar to that of traditional Naoussa's dress. The lower part is wide strained, and has internal wire hoops that add volume. The head is covered with paper or plastic

3.14 Unknown vestments names


3.15 Non written rules for the costumes

There were unwritten rules how to worn each piece separately, rules were accepted by all, since they functioned as a non-linguistic communication system, revealing the values system of the community. One of the main functions of the garment is the function as a code, since the clothing is described as "*an open book for those who know his writing.*" The hair, the headband, the colours, patterns and embroideries, adding or removing components in costume was manifest in the social importance of women in the role of mother and wife.

3.16 Materials and designs

In determining a site's attire, the material from which it is made is particularly important. Therefore the type of fabric used for making the women of Naoussa's garments and the place of production and origin is essential for the study of costume (Ph.45)

Silk: Until 1940 sericulture was thriving in Naoussa. The silk was the second source of income, after the vines. Apart from organized



Ph.45 Detail of a golden embroidered collar (trahilia)

workshops, almost all houses "produced" silk. The silkworms were both for family needs and for sale. The occupation with silk requiring special technique and it was the prerogative of Naoussa's housewife. With special silk artisans made the "*birsim*", thick or thin special thread in different colours. With this they embroidered dresses, jackets, chesterfields etc. Fabrics for festive dresses, shirts, jabot, zostres and men's shirts and cummerbunds were silk, as well as the good and linen tablecloths. The silk was used for weaving and large cushions for sofas and with colorful silk thread, elaborately embroidery (*tsevredes*)

Cotton: Naoussa was never dealt with the cotton. Great impetus for widespread use of cotton as a raw material supplied by the local cotton industry that operated in the city.

Wool: Most families procure the necessary quantity of raw wool in May from Saturday's bazaar. Women cared for processing wool, yarn until done. This weaved underclothes, stockings (*skoufounia, piitia*), skirts, sayaks, rugs, etc., and used for the warp and weft on the loom. Generally, each family took care to cover by their own the needs in woolen goods.

Gold thread – Textiles: Feature and main material for embroidery to bridal and festive wear, was the gold thread and braid. Also "*hartz*" from thin or thick silk braid, gold wires, *tirtiria* and sequins. For the dresses was used silk, wool, cotton fabrics, local and foreign. Silk taffeta as thick, colourful and plain satin, ramose – golden-leaves silks, that adorned with rich gold embroidery. For chesterfields garment were using luxurious fabrics, satin, marigold etc.

Embroidery: The embroidery on technical terms is called "*terzidika*". It is embroidered with oriental or western motifs, a product of modern embroidery art based on brushed aside. The main motifs are issues that come from plants and geometric shapes. There is also the "*syrmakesika*" embroidery, only for the head covers (tassels - *tipiloukia*). To them the decoration is usually done with floral and gold thread pinned with silk on the face side of the fabric (*Ph.46, Ph.47, Ph.48*).



Ph.46 Detail of an embroidery



Ph.47 sketch of a broidery



Ph.48 sketch of a broidery (2)

3.17 Sewing – cost of the costumes

The female costume cost a whole fortune. In order to endow the daughter or the sister, the men of Naoussa were obliged to work hard. The poor girls were many times borrowing or even buying from other married women the wedding dress, because they did not have the financial ease to make their own one. The dowry of a rich girl, who was married in 1908, cost for the clothing and the jewels 33.070 piastres, except for the *nahti* of 250 quids that is a total cost of dowry 58.070 piastres. The dowry of another prosperous girl that was married in 1879, cost for clothing and jewels 18.450 piastres and with the cost for house and land (*bahtse*) 35.550 piastres.

All the clothes in the female costume were sewed and embroidered only by men sewers. These were also making the gold embroiders in the dresses, the chesterfields (*ependites*) and the head covers. Due to the fact that the women did not use to go out, the sewers were going to the houses and were taking the measures there. They did not make any trying on. Only the shirts and the *trahilia* were made exclusively by the women and of course all the fabrics in the loom as a home handicraft.

3.18 Abandonment of the costumes

Until the beginning of the 20th century no significant changes were made in the traditional costume. But after the Balkan wars and the emancipation of Macedonia there happened some essential changes in the family and social life of the citizens. In Naoussa, the bigger percentage of the men abandoned the local traditional costume around 1920-25. After the war in 1940 only some few elders were still dressed traditionally. The west fashion and mainly the soldier uniforms affected very decisively the costume. The European trousers and the jodhpurs replaced the indigenous bloomers (*Ph.49*).



Ph.49 Neighbors at an outing

Some important changes take also place in the female costume, although the women preserved for a longer period the traditional dressing. First the rich girls and then the poor ones were gradually abandoning the traditional dressing and adapting the “European”, that was transferred from the south Greece. Nevertheless we should underline the fact that there were cases, exceptions better, where the girls who used to be dressed in European clothes, after the wish – demand – of the mother in law, were forced to wear on their wedding day the traditional local costume, which they kept wearing throughout their lives (Ph.50).



Ph.50 The last women wearing traditional costumes everyday 1992

The Second World War (1939-1944) is the last landmark until which the woman of Naoussa was wearing right and faithfully her traditional costume. After that there have been many alterations in the form and composition, but these were changes that were detractive and led to its final abrogation.

The folklore associations, tradition actors

It is worth mentioning that today the use of the traditional costumes (female - male) is practising from various folk associations, standard in their wedding variation. The dance troupes keep tradition alive by participating in various events within and outside our town. They display the traditional clothing on several occasions, especially during the carnival, the Clean Monday and the Sunday of Orthodoxy.

4. MALE COSTUME

The male costume of Naoussa, being examined internally, is distinguished into two types: *the costume with the anderi* and *the costume with the salvaria*. Inwardly we can see always for undergarment the *katasarki*, the *binivreki*, and the *shirt* which no costume miss. Everything is being made by the women in the domestic loom.

A. Costume with *anderi*



Ph.51 Man with *anderi* (1890)

The Greek bourgeois were used to wear the long dress that is the Asiatic “*anderia*” (Ph.51). Morphologically speaking the clothes of the Turks, the Jewish and the Armenians such as those of the orthodox clergy as well, were the same with that of the Greek bourgeois. The parts that compose the type of this costume are the following:


The *shirt*: It is *kismirenio* (made from cashmere) for the bridegroom, white in color and made from cotton and silk, *ougia* weaving for the official one, *panitiko* (made from simple fabric) for daily use and for the job *alatzenio*, cotton made – light blue, striped or check. Everything is being sewed in the same way. They have a short erect collar similar to that of the priests, straight long sleeves which length comes almost up to the middle of the thigh. The bridegroom ones are embroidered with silk.

The *anderi*: That is a kind of an open long-sleeved costume. The two front leaves are crossed and it has peculiar long sleeves. Its only decoration is the vertical wide or narrow stripes (*londres*) and the garnishing of the acres with cordons of *birsimi*, all over the finish and the seams. It is made from silk either purchased or weaving fabric. The fine *anderia* were arriving sewed right from the East. Internally it is being primed with cotton *astari*.

The *tzioubes*: It is a winter long overcoat made from a black or blue dress, which they were wearing over the *anderi*. Its length is almost the same with the *anderi* and it is being decorated roundly with fur (Ph.52).

The *soultouko*: This is a more recent kind of chesterfield, being sewed from a black or blue dress and the more casual ones from *saiaki*. Its collar is with lapels and it is being decorated with velvet. Its length reaches the middle of the leg under the knee.

The *mindani* or *miitani*: It's a kind of a crossed vest with sleeves which was worn over the *anderi*. The fabric is the same with that of the *anderi* or silk cotton, *bambakoto*. It closes with buttons and it is being decorated in the seams with black cordons.



Ph.52 A man with *tzioubes* (mid 19th cent)

The *gileki* or *ileki*: This is a vest without sleeves which is buttoned vertically in the front, with small buttons. It is worn under the *anderi* and it is primed as the *mindani* as well.

The *zounari* and the *louri* which fasten in the waist: the official *zounaria* are striped, silk, and tight and they have fringes. The everyday ones are black, weaved in the loom with fine wool and they are quite loose, without fringes. The *louri* is leather and the men were mainly wearing it with the work clothes. The small children who were wearing *anderi* necessarily had in their waist the *louri*.

B. Costume with *salvaria*



Ph.53 Typical men's costume

In this type of male costume, which predominated mainly until the beginning of the 20th century, the shirt, the *soultouko*, the *mintani*, the *gileki*, the *zounari* and the *louri*, are similar to those of the male costume with *anderi*. The differentiations and the additions that occurred are the following (Ph.53):

Salvari or *sialivari*: it is a kind of trousers, which is loose in the upper part, similar to the knickers of the islands, and it reaches and ties at the same time at the point right down the knee. In the waist it is fastened with the *vrazozouna* or a lace which passes through a knickers cord, which usually has a crimson color. The fine *salvari* are sewed from black or blue garment and the everyday ones from black *saiaki*. In the *rouhenia*, all the seams are decorated with cordon (Ph.54).



Ph.54 An aged couple (man wears *salvaria*) 1920

The *gileki*: It is crossed. The official ones are sewed with black or blue garment and the everyday ones with *saiaki*. In the seams it is decorated with black cordon and all over the finish with mustard colored. There is also a small vest pocket in the right for the watch.

After the emancipation, the “greek” cover of the head is the black velvet *skoufia*, which was gradually replaced from the *tragiaska*. The daily *skoufia* is from *saiaki*.

Under the knee that is in the point where the *salvari* ended they were fastening the *vodetes*, that is long ribbons of special weaving, something like garters, in the edge of which there are tufts of the same color. Their fastening was such so as to have the tufts falling down in the middle of the calf. The *vodetes* are usually black.

C. Underclothes – rest accessories

The underclothes are in both of the two types of the male costume.

Underwear: As for underwear they were using the *katasarki* and the *binivreki*. The *katasarki* is a white undershirt, with long sleeves, and which they were wearing all over the year. The *binivreki* is long underwear that reaches the ankle and ties with a balbriggan lace. The winter is weaved in the lito and the summer one is from cotton. The bridegrooms were used to fix the *binivreki* with *vrazozounes*. For the sleep they were wearing a stripped weaved “nightgown”, which length reached the middle of the calf. The way of its sewing is the same with the shirts.

Rest accessories: An obligatory cover of the head during the period of Turkish domination is the hard *fez* made from *baize* in crimson color. All around it there was either *sariki* or it was simple, depending on the social status

The *skoufounia* are wool socks, handmade knitted, long up to the knee. They were fastening them with their lace. Those for the weddings and the fine *skoufounia* are white, made from silk and wool or wool with *karikia*. The everyday ones are black, knitted with *kanoura*. On Sundays and on celebrations they were wearing socks over the *skoufounia*, which are balbriggan gaiters (*gettes*), in length proportional to that of the shank. The socks were sewed with cotton fabric or with a black or blue garment. The winter ones are from *saiaki*. They are buttoned up from behind with small clothing buttons or with *kopsiades* (*kopitsa*) in following periods.

The *giminia* are black leather shoes like mules, very hard, campanulate in shape. The grunter rustic shoes (*gourounotsarouha*) were used in the various works in the fields. Finally, a necessary ornament for the official dressing is considered to be the watch with the chain, which is hanged in the *gileki* or the *mindani*.

5. THE VLACH'S COSTUMES

After 1770 an important number of vlach families came and established in Naoussa bringing with them the art of gold and silver, the arms-making, the cattle-raising products and their merchant spirit, which contributed a lot to the town well growth.

The vlach traditional costumes, used until the end of 20th century (especially the women) are distinguished in summer and winter vestments and most of them are from wool

homemade woven, when the festive ones are from silk and cotton with special ornaments (Ph.55).



Ph.55 A new married vlach couple 1929

A. Women's costume

The women's costume follows the discrimination as the indigenous ones, as bridal-festive and every day's. Featuring the long waisted dress that reaches the ankle. The bodice is closed up to the neck and is decorated in the centre with a vertical strip. Festive dresses are preferred dark tissues with embossed flowers, paisley, leaves and twigs. Especially loved the black tissue with different colored dark patterns. The dress accompanied by the same colour apron. Hair plaited was covered with large square bandana (*tsipa*) with narrow lace perimeter same colour with the dress.

Complement the bridal-Vlach festive costume is jewellery, usually made up of gold coins.

B. Male costume

In men we meet the costume "kamiasia" with long piece tunic with a few pleats in front, reaching to the knees. The festive one was a thin white woven, while the every day's was from cotton light blue or grey. In the waist area is fixed with a piece of fabric. Other type male Vlach costume is "bourazania", salvaria woven in black or white colour, which they wore on livestock operations. (*Ph.56*)



Ph.56 Honeymoon travel at Thessaloniki 1935

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Skopje's Political Efficiency: Converting a National Goal to National Policy

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1.0 Background Information

Although the focus of this paper is Skopje's political efficiency, one must first have a general idea about the formation of a nation's national security policy. I am offering in very general and rudimental terms enough information regarding a country's national security as I deem necessary to establish a reasonable background. Politics and war although differ in means of delivery, they aim at identical objectives, i.e. the imposition of one's will over another. Thus, when one reads a text that in one's mind it is associated with war, one should convert one's thoughts as if the subject refers to politics.

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military thinker who is widely acknowledged as the most important of the classical strategic thinkers stated in his book *On War*, stated, "We see therefore that war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means" is accepted.¹ Nonetheless, it does imply that war and politics have the same point of departure, which is not true. The fact is that war pre-existed politics, since the first human conflicts had to do with hunting grounds, family or clan disputes, not politics. Simultaneously, we must consider that war is not always an act by violent means.

Today we must redefine "war", because it is not always an instrument of political prevalence by violent means. It can also mean prevalence by peaceful means such as world markets, economic growth, renewable resources, and progressive innovations. The series of means that Clausewitz implicitly cited are resources that promote markets, markets that bring growth, growth that generates money, money that stimulates infrastructure, infrastructure that builds stability and stability that fosters security. All of them necessitate democracy and political will.

2.0 The Development of a Nation's National Security Policy and Strategy

The reality of the 21st century has modified the traditional philosophy of what constitutes the national security of a country as guided by the concept of the country's national interests. In order for a country to develop a foreign policy that is right for its needs, i.e. to pre-

¹ Karl Von Clausewitz, "On War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 280.

vent political settings detrimental to it while simultaneously to enhance its international image, its government must have established its national interests. Such interests cannot be in a drafting mode just before danger appears. Then it would be too late.

The contribution of the academia to the National Security policy is imperative. The National Security Council considers academic arguments, but it does not adapt the conclusions unchanged. Clausewitz has argued, "...the human resolve does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties, ..." suggesting, very correctly I might add, that modification to a realistic point of any theory we want to implement is a must. Experience of a situation in reality as opposed to in the abstract is very important because in theory, everything is perfect, whereas in practice one must expect the unexpected.²

But the issue is more complicated than that. Oftentimes theory cannot translate into practice because those in charge do not have the concept of how to do it. To that effect, Antoine Henri Jomini separates those generals who are simply learned men from those who, although never attended a school, have the eye to see the battlefield and understand positions and the outcome before the armies are even assembled.³

The issue on the formulation of the national security policy is extremely complex, meticulous, and voluminous. Scholars spend a lifetime scrutinizing, arguing, offering different views and perspectives, which usually are only a speck of this gigantic concept. From the goals of a nation to the use of national power, i.e. the ability and willingness to "flex its muscles" when necessary in order to achieve the set goals, the process takes time. Of course, power is nominal until tested. One must consider all intended and possibly most preconceived unintended consequences of the policy. Furthermore, one must consider that democratic countries formulate their policies after public debate, which not only slows, it also restricts the process. In a closed political system such as a dictatorship or authoritarianism from either the left or the right, such an issue does not exist.

In general, ideals of a nation are found in philosophical, legal, and religious documents as well as in the customs and morals imbedded in the life of a nation's citizens. In particular, best sources for information related to ideals the citizens of a country value most are in declarations of independence, constitutions, and other similar documents.

For instance, expressed clearly, the ideals that Greeks idolize are found in the declaration of Greece's independence decided and written in Epidavros in 1822. These values are Justice, Personal Freedom, Ownership, and Honor. In addition, one finds values found in ancient writings, and the New Testament are those which have developed the Greco-Christian culture, and in my opinion, they best represent the Modern Greek nation. As one gets deeper into the subject, one cannot but conclude that personal freedom and ownership are the fundamental elements of prosperity, which advances the consolidation of human capital and education. Those two components promote science, technology, and innovation. The

² Karl Von Clausewitz, "On War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 268.

³ Antoine Henri De Jomini, *The Art of War* (St. Paul: MBI Publishing, 1992), 269.

last three elements developed to a balanced and stable economic growth are relevant to national security. They are part of the Greek psyche.

Values determine the goals that the nation wants to achieve in order to feel physically and psychologically secure and prosperous. National goals, in turn, determine national interests, which the pertinent government oftentimes traditionally categorize as vital, critical, and serious and prioritize them as core, contiguous, and peripheral. On the other hand, according to the realist view, one divides national interests by importance (vital vs. secondary), duration (temporary vs. permanent), specificity (specific vs. general), and compatibility (complementary vs. conflicting).

Regardless of the above categories and priorities, national interests are apportioned into two dimensions and two aspects. The dimensions that a country views as its national interests are the official and the pragmatic. On the official dimension, a government builds its domestic and foreign policies. On the pragmatic dimension, the government implements a pragmatic comprehensive policy through which the country aims to pursue a higher position among world powers. Besides the official and pragmatic dimensions, a government maintains high physical and psychological aspects of their citizens' lives.

Physical aspects of the National Security are comprise of security forces (military, paramilitary, police and intelligence that embody the defensive corps), which bestows high morale and national values such as pride for the country and patriotism. Psychological aspects include but are not limited to sociological, economic, monetary, political, educational, and national health, etc. Good governance promotes prosperity and boosts morale thus contributing to the national security of a country, which is perceived distinctly from a different point of view by each country.

Although the duty of the military and paramilitary forces is the defense of the country from conventional, asymmetric and unconventional warfare, the security of the country from domestic enemies are the law enforcement agencies such as the police with its internal intelligence branch. Regarding intelligence that derives from external sources, it can be achieved through a process called the Intelligence Cycle, an ongoing process that includes planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback. Sun Tzu (or Sunzi), the ancient Chinese military general and strategist said:

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.⁴

In the chapter, "Knowledge of the Enemy - Strategic Intelligence" John Keegan explains:

⁴ Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 123.

Alexander the Great, presiding at the Macedonian court as a boy while his father, Philip, was absent on campaign, was remembered by visitors from the lands he would later conquer for his persistence in questioning them about the size of the population of their territory, the productiveness of the soil, the course of the routes and rivers that crossed it, the location of its towns, harbours and strong places, the identity of the important men. The young Alexander was assembling what today would be called economic, regional or strategic intelligence, and the knowledge he accumulated served him well when he began his invasion of the Persian Empire, enormous in extent and widely diverse in composition. Alexander triumphed because he brought to his battlefields a ferocious fighting force of tribal warriors personally devoted to the Macedonian monarchy; but he also picked the Persian Empire to pieces, attacking at its weak points and exploiting its internal divisions.⁵

Open source information (publications and press), diplomatic missions, military attachés, commerce representatives, social media, polls, etc. including a simple feedback on certain events or actions provide information about culture, governance, life in general in other countries, and even possible future events or actions. Such information is relevant and important to the development of intelligence by the pertinent national intelligence agency, which uses the Intelligence Cycle in order to bring the country to an advantageous position vis-à-vis the opponent. The governmental agencies in turn use the analyzed information in order to proceed to its integration with ongoing operations. A never-ending feedback and evaluation are necessary tools for the uninterrupted function of the program.

The crystallization of the national security policy, which splits into domestic and foreign, is cultural and depends on a number of issues all related to national interests. Policies also depend on intelligence received. In governments where prudence prevails, intelligence guides the national security policy; it does not follow the national security policy. The national security policy must be clear and firm, and its realization requires a vision for the future of the country, a strategic intent that clarifies the vision and converts it to a mission.

The development of strategy in an effort to accomplish a successful outcome in the national security presupposes the conclusion of the proper application of theory and combination of the elements of national power (“hard” and “soft”) into strategy. Both must be effective and adaptable in overcoming challenges to a country’s national objectives from state and non-state stakeholders, and transnational threats. Strategy must contain all foreseeable possibilities regardless of the current size, geopolitical situation, economic conditions, diplomatic abilities, or military capabilities of the threat or country, starting with one’s neighbors.

Then the question of what constitutes success comes into play. In traditional warfare, the defeat of the opposing military force constitutes victory, but it may not necessarily translate into a national success. This is the thought behind Clausewitz’s dicta “war is never an

⁵ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: The value and limitations of what the military can learn about the enemy* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 7.

isolated act” and “the result of war is never absolute.”⁶ The end of one war will mean the beginning of another by the defeated power hoping for an anticipatory revanche. Success in a given conflict is mostly dependent on a combination of political, social, and economic conclusions.

The social effect at the conclusion of an exclusively military victory in a traditional sense and a combination of political, social, and economic success separate a bad strategist from a brilliant strategist. Napoleon the Great, despite his initial military successes, proved to be a bad strategist because embracing only his military and neglecting sound domestic and foreign policies, he was defeated in his effort to dominate Europe and indeed the world. The defeat of Napoleon, a militarily brilliant tactician, proved fatal to him and his country. If he had been a brilliant strategist, he would not have died in exile.

On the other hand, the Emperor of Prussia, Frederick the Great of the Prussian House of Hohenzollern demonstrated his strategic genius. He forged appropriate alliances, presided over the construction of canals, and fed his people by introducing new crops such as the potato and the turnip to Prussia while he simultaneously launched wars that expanded his kingdom. “Old Fritz who is remembered for his feats of guile on both the battlefield and the potato field,” is a personality of an excellent strategist.⁷ He died in an armchair in his study at the palace of Sanssouci (Potsdam) on August 17, 1786. The people of Germany remember him by leaving a potato on his grave. The people of Pennsylvania have honored him by naming a city just north of Philadelphia, *King of Prussia*.

The required strategic thought develops the adaptation to changing geopolitical contexts such as traditional state alliances, complex contemporary environment shaped by multifaceted national security, economic, diplomatic, informational, and political co-dependencies. In addition, non-state stakeholders play a more prominent role on the global stage than in previous eras and they are expected to do so in the future. Understanding how the interaction of these evolving factors influences the formulation and execution of strategy enhances the ability of leaders to address emerging challenges.

The product of the national security involves a number of variants that dominate the ever-changing international conventional and asymmetric geopolitical stage and geostrategic importance of stakeholders.

⁶ Karl Von Clausewitz, “On War,” in *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr, (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 268-271.

⁷ Christoph Niemann, “The Legend of the Potato King”, *The New York Times*, October 12, 2012. URL <http://niemann.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/the-legend-of-the-potato-king/> accessed August 14, 2013.

The National Security Diagram



3.0 Ideologists of Opportunism

Over and above Skopje's efforts to achieve its goal, one must consider the *fifth phalanx* of some die-hard communists of Greece who have not realized that communism as a political system and as a controlled economy have failed. They attack Alexander the Great for not being democratic, as if the same people know the meaning of democracy.

In a convoluted ideological whirlpool, even some members of the Greek Parliament side with Skopje blaming Greece for the problem. The issue of Macedonia as Skopje has embraced it does not allow anyone to embark in costly human capital adventurisms because of their multi-lust fantasy or self-imposed hallucinations. The belief that the people of the two countries are connected with "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" (even without reciprocity) and that the two governments are the problem is outlandish. The people of the FYROM after half a century of education on the Hegelian left, and without a break, fell into the teachings of the Hegelian right. In both cases and for different reasons they were indoctrinated to hate the Greeks. Based on such indoctrination, what are the chances that they would feel and express "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" to the people of Greece?

Lenin's idea of "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" could apply to the behavior among socialist countries. Not only we have nothing of the kind in the relations between Greece and the FYROM, but even when we had the so-called socialist countries, the "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" were just empty slogans. At a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev "revealed that a clash between Stalin and the Chinese government had barely been averted".⁸ As this example indicates, these slogans are rubbish as exemplified by the implementation of "brotherly love" and "eternal friendship" in a form of the invasions of East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1978).

Although the focus of this paper is not Marxism – Leninism, I want to emphasize a few things that Communism has advocated. Communism defines democracy as both a political trend and as a state form while it branches it out into *bourgeois*, *petty bourgeois*, and *proletarian socialist*. If we were to apply Marxism – Leninism to the ancient world, the Athenian democracy used slave labor, which, although it was the norm at that time in ancient societies, it was condemned by Marx and Lenin.⁹

Communists who believe that Alexander the Great does not deserve a statue because he was not a democrat should not only study history, but they should study Marxism – Leninism as well. Their understanding of Marxism lacks a practical foundation, as Lenin stated, "it is one thing to know the propositions and formulas of Marxist- Leninist philosophy, and quite another to apply them in science and practice. The latter requires special skill. In turn, this skill presupposes a sustained, strictly consistent devotion to the Party, the adherence to a class point of view."¹⁰ Not one of these simple-minded communists who have re-invented themselves as patriots, freedom fighters, and democrats possesses that "special skill." Those, who cannot comprehend what Marxism had advocated fall into traps, which according to Lenin, "highly eminent Marxists" such as Kautsky, Otto Bauer, and others, even Georgi Plekhanov to a certain degree, had fallen. Lenin declared them all as being ideologists of opportunism.¹¹

By attacking Alexander the Great as not respecting the bourgeois democracy of Athens, *ipso facto* these communists defend the Athenian political system, which according to Marx-Lenin was "corrupt." If one is to apply one's understanding of Marxism-Leninism in order to make one's case against Alexander the Great, it is only fair for one to apply the same philosophy against the ancient Athenian polity. Thus, the simple-minded communists clash against their own political ideology.

To use modern terminology, putting the issue of political ideology and behavior in the right context, important ancient cities such as Megara, Thebes, Sparta along with prominent Greeks, i.e. the Lacedaemonian Leonidas who died fighting the Persian imperialism, did not know the meaning of or did not care about democracy. Not one of the Spartan generals

⁸ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 175.

⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), passim.

¹⁰ *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, Military Soviet Thought (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 294.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), I, passim.

such as Gylippus of Syracuse or Lysander, who forced Athens to capitulation in 404 BC, fought against “democracy.” They all fought against the Athenian hegemony. Non-democratic potentates and generals couldn’t care less about the political system of Athens. They cared about their own benefit and the geopolitical advantage and geostrategic importance of their tribal states. The political system of their tribal states or their own philosophical conviction did not make them more Greek or less Greek.

I also find the argument of some others that Alexander the Great was a conqueror, as insulting the intelligence of all people. The Macedonian king who united Greece, save Lacedaemonia, under his scepter was not Alexander the Great, but his father, Philip II, a fact that indicates the historical irrelevance of these “Greeks.” Nevertheless, the same “democrats” do not think of the Athenians, Thebans, Corinthians, Phocaeans, Spartans et al. as conquerors. By present day standards which these communists invoke, the above Greeks were not only conquerors, but also colonialists. They had colonized the shores of present day Sicily, Italy, France, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, let alone the Middle East. One can still find evidence of Greek presence in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

According to Xenophon, Athens surrendered to Sparta in 404 BC, and its allies surrendered soon after, marking the end of the Peloponnesian War. The capitulation stripped Athens of its walls, its fleet, and all of its overseas possessions. The Athenian hegemony was over. Sparta’s allies, especially the Corinthians and the Thebans, demanded that Athens should be burned to the ground and all its citizens should be enslaved. However, the Spartans, magnanimous as they were, refused to destroy a city that had done a good service at a time of great danger to Greece, alluding to the Persian Wars. This was not just a conquest, but also an occupation.

Let us take the issue of the *helots*, whom the Spartans not only conquered, but enslaved in the harshest manner possible. To this day we use the phrase working “as a helot,” i.e. as a slave. What about Sparta’s neighboring state of Mesina? Weren’t the Spartans conquerors? What can the same people say about the conquest of Sparta over Thebes? How can they explain the issue of the island of Melos? After Athens forced the Melians to surrender, they killed all males capable of bearing arms and sold the women and children into slavery. Then they brought Athenian settlers to the island. Nobody believes that all this had happened in the name of democracy. One can read in Pericles’ Funeral Oration all about the Lacedaemonians who were benevolent enough not to burn Athens to the ground after its capitulation. Where exactly had been the democratic values of the Athenians? Sparta had more democratic values and human compassion than Athens. War colleges of the United States require their students to study the Peloponnesian War in which,

“[At the U.S. Naval War College,] students are required to read Thucydides in their first course, with additional study available. Thucydides also appears on syllabi in required courses at the Army War College. It has been argued that the study of Thucydides was particularly important in neoconservative circles connected with the University of Chicago... Most people’s exposure to Thucydides comes through the Melian Dialogue, a pithy account of a brutal Athenian massacre of the inhabitants of the island of Melos.

The Melian Dialogue is generally taught as an introduction to the unsentimental view of politics adopted by Realist theory, although some professors teach it as an indication of the degradation of Athenian democracy.¹²

In order for one to discern the communist mentality on the name issue, I am offering an anecdote which happened during the USSR years. In one of the USSR's Asian republics, a man named Nikifar made the news for his high productivity. The newspaper *Pravda* or Truth, an official publication of the Soviet Communist Party, publicized Nikifar's success, which made him an overnight hero. But there was a problem. *Pravda* referred to him as Nikifor, not Nikifar. The local Communist Party boss dragged poor Nikifar to Court, where he changed his name to Nikifor so that *Pravda* proved correct. The lesson from this is that *the Communist Party might not be always right, but it is never wrong*. I am certain that although on the façade the issue is democracy, far deep in their minds is the unimplemented *Balkan Soviet Socialist Federation* and Comintern's godchild, the "Macedonian" nation. Comintern might not have been right, but it would never be wrong.

What points directly to the hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness of these particular communists of Greece is the fact that Marx and Engels used Alexander the Great's name as an example of a man who made the world a better place. Engels got the idea of agricultural collectivization from the information provided by Nearchus, Admiral to Alexander the Great.¹³ In addition, the Institute of Marxism – Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR called Alexander the Great, "a great soldier and statesman."¹⁴

One wonders why people who all their lives have argued against Greece's bourgeois democracy and in the past they literally fought against it in an attempt to overthrow it in favor of a proletarian democracy (Greek Civil War), now turn around to the defense of such "decayed" democracy?

The point is that such thoughts indicate narrow-mindedness at best. One may not judge the past using modern-day standards as one cannot blame Gutenberg for not inventing Microsoft Office. Scoring points at home, directed toward their similarly narrow-minded crowd, might be good for the publicity of the petty bourgeois ideologists of opportunism; it does not do any good to Greece. If they do not like the political situation in Greece, they can change it through the democratic process available to them; but they had better think twice, because they might achieve what they have longed for.

One must wonder if Alexander the Great was such an anti-democrat or source of all ills, as communists opine, why do the Skopjans so rabidly want to make him their hero and legendary ancestor? Is it possible that the South Slavs have learned something that the com-

¹² Robert Farley, "Over the Horizon: The Enduring Relevance of Thucydides," *World Politics Review*, Feb 23, 2011. URL <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7975/over-the-horizon-the-enduring-relevance-of-thucydides>, accessed July 10, 2013.

¹³ Frederick Engels, "Origin of the Family, Private Property, and State," *Selected Works*, Fifth Ed, Vol. III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 235.

¹⁴ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Fifth Ed. Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 564.

munists of Greece simply have not learned? Or do the same communists follow their euphoric recall, dreaming the revival of the Balkan Soviet Federation?

On April 12, 1948, in a letter addressed to Stalin, Josip Broz explained:

The experience of a successful revolutionary development should materialize in every country of people's democracies as being an extension and addition to the Great October Revolution, which is something new in revolutionary practice, but it is entirely in the spirit of the science of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁵

Perhaps at that time such thinking was the norm, but today we all know what happened to the USSR and the rest of people's democracies. Even China, despite its official name, has since 1989 taken the road to capitalism. I would remind the communists Pythia's maxim to the Emperor Julian the Apostate's ambassadors in Delphic dialect, "Tell the king that, the ornate flute has fallen down; Apollo has home no more, neither has the seer laurel, nor the spring gurgles; even the babbling water has dried up."¹⁶ Emperor Julian got the message and stopped any attempt to bring the 12 Olympian gods back as the official pantheon of Byzantium. I hope the Greek communists get the message as well.

4.0 Indications and Warnings

As one of the heirs of communist Yugoslavia, Skopje represents not only the old regime, but it has also proclaimed itself the heir of the Bulgarian terrorists, i.e. komitadjis (1893 - 1908). Through its domestic and foreign policies, it seeks revenge against Greece for the result of the Balkan Wars (1912-3), the exchange of population with Bulgaria (1924), and the Greek civil war that deprived Skopje from the opportunity to form a Slavophone communist government in Thessaloniki.

Since the FYROM is no match for Greece, Skopje has already proven that it is willing and capable to launch its national power. It intends to pursue its goal through patrons, as did the Bulgarians in 1885 and the Albanians in 1999. The FYROM regresses to the propaganda strategy of the komitadjis that made them known to Western Europe and Russia.

The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin wrote,

All of us must now embark on stormy revolutionary seas, and from this very moment we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda... Let us say less about principles whenever circumstances and revolutionary policy demand it – i.e., during our momentary weakness in relation to the enemy – but let us

¹⁵ Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za Biografiju* (Beograd: Kultura, 1955), 518.

¹⁶ «εἶπατε τῷ βασιλεῖ, χαμαὶ πέσε δαίδαλος αὐλά. οὐκέτι Φοῖβος ἔχει καλύβαν, οὐ μάντιδα δάφνην, οὐ παγὰν λαλέουσαν. ἀπέσβετο καὶ λάλον ὕδωρ». One must bear in mind that the Oracle of Delphi was dedicated to the god Apollo, the god of Sun and light.

at all times and under all circumstances be adamantly consistent in our action. For in this lies the salvation of the revolution.”¹⁷

As Paul Bousse,¹⁸ another anarchist, stated: “When one resorts to that line of reasoning one is on the trail that leads, besides theoretical propaganda, to propaganda by the deed. Propaganda by the deed is a mighty means of rousing the popular consciousness.”¹⁹ Briefly put, both Bakunin and Bousse argue for the same thing: do whatever to show the flag; do whatever to make a point. Words do not work; actions do. It is exactly what Skopje has done and keeps doing. Skopje funds its resident representatives (Ouranio Toxo and UMD) in Greece who promote cultural events imported from Skopje or open cultural centers in western Macedonia. One might remember the interview that Kostas Simitis, the former Prime Minister of Greece, gave to Charlie Rose during the bombing of Belgrade by NATO. To the comment of Mr. Rose that the Russians were very vocal, showing his contempt toward the Russians, Simitis said something to the effect, let them be vocal; that’s all they can do.

In the last few years, we have encountered during the Feast of St. Elijah’s Configuration, the celebration of the Ilinden Revolt in Meliti. The infamous event of Ilinden is celebrated in Meliti of Florina Prefecture. Skopje’s surrogates bring music bands from the FYROM offering entertainment to a local population that seeks a chance to have fun. The issue is not as much that the music is Slavic, but the lyrics of the songs, which the local population dances to, although they do not understand them. Words such as “Greek murderers” or the lyrics of the song “Pearl of the Balkans” or “Get out, Young Man” Greeks dance to without understanding their meaning. Transmitted through Skopje TV to the FYROM, citizens see that “Macedonians,” according to the Skopjan reporters, dance to songs of vengeance designed against Greece and Greeks. They even show those reports to foreign dignitaries and diplomatic employees including employees of the Greek Liaison Office in Skopje as “proof” that the people in the “Aegean Macedonia” are “Macedonians,” not Greeks.

How important the FYROM diaspora considers the recognition of them as “Macedonians” is obvious from the fact that it does everything it its power to advertise their “plight” against Greece. Skopje violates the UN Charter and the Interim Agreement by getting into the Internal Affairs of Greece. Just before the last EU elections in Greece, Bulgarian Customs officers intercepted mail sacs directed to Greece with pre-addressed envelopes that included stuffed ballots for the Ouranio Toxo and a €100 bill in each.

Recently, Skopje’s Foreign Ministry disseminated false information on the number of Slavs with FYROM national conscience living in Greece, which according to the same source has

¹⁷ Sam Dolgoff, *Bakunin on Anarchy*, “Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis,” September 1870, 2nd ed., Black Rose Books, June 1, 1980.

¹⁸ The term was popularized by Paul Bousse who wrote an article under the name “Propagande par le fait” published in the *Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne* on August 5, 1877. His companion article, “Hoedel, Nobiling, et la propagande par le fait,” was published about a year later at the *L’Avant-garde*, June 15, 1878.

¹⁹ Robert Graham, ed. “Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas” in *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*, (Tonawanda, NY: Black Rose Books, 2005), 150.

reached 700,000 people. According to the same source, the number of 700,000 “Macedonians” living in Greece is based on an alleged census that took place in 1925.

To begin with, the Minister has lied when he mentioned that the 162,506 people counted in the 1925 census were “Macedonians.” Greece has never recognized “Macedonians” as an ethnic group. Besides, Comintern had not yet recognized the so-called “Macedonian” nation. The census was taken in order to determine the number of ethnic Bulgarians living in Macedonia in view of the voluntary population exchange under the agreement of Politis – Kalfov and the subsequent *Abecedar* book for Slavophone Greeks.

Since the census was counting Bulgarians in the Macedonian region of Greece, one cannot understand why Skopje is concerned about their whereabouts, unless it admits that its “Macedonians” are actually Bulgarians. In that case, the world would like to know how many Bulgarians live in the FYROM as a matter of fact, not as a result of FYROM’s hallucinations. But the Slavs have done and do all possible to promote their “ethnicity.”

Ninety two thousand Bulgarians left Macedonia for Bulgaria. The rest declared themselves Greeks. The dissemination of the *Abecedar* by the Greek government was cancelled for two reasons. The first reason was the pressure from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which had viewed the Slavophones of Greece as Serbs, not Bulgarians. The second reason was that the Slavophone Greeks felt offended because they considered themselves as Greeks. The surprise census that Skopje advertizes does not consider the population exchange. Then, at the end of the Civil War of Greece, almost all of the remaining Slavophones left for Yugoslavia either to avoid being thrown into prison for criminal activities during the Civil War, or because they believed the communist lies that the Greek Army was after them. Some of them had left during the WWII such as Dimitris Tupurkas, or Tupurkovski from Trigonon of Florina Prefecture, who had left during the WWII for Yugoslavia in order to train with Tito’s Partisans and then return home in order to kill Greeks. He joined the JNA and retired with the rank of Major. His son, Vasil Tupurkovski, is a politician of the FYROM. The present FYROM Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s origin is from Macedonia, and although his grandfather fought against the Italians, his parents chose Tito’s communist paradise.

But let us see the number 700,000 from a simple statistical point. Assuming that the 1925 census is correct, the 162,506 Bulgarians who used to live in the region of Macedonia of Greece would have reached 700,000 by 2013 only if the annual growth were at the impossible constant minimum of 1.7% (or 0.017). The true statistics belying the claim of the FYROM MFA are closely related to the fact that in the last EU elections that took place in Greece, only about 3,000 out of approximately 8.5 million voters had indicated that they have Slavic ethnic conscience. The elections monitored by the EU are very genuine, unless Skopje doubts the credibility of the EU. In that case, Skopje should stop its efforts to join a body that it considers untrustworthy. Yet, the fact is quite the opposite.²⁰

²⁰ “Lithuanian Ambassador Jushka: ‘Macedonia’ is not a priority of Lithuanian Presidency of the European Union” *Press 24*. <http://press24.mk/litvanskiot-ambasador-jushka-makedonija-ne-e-prioritet-na->

5.0 Greece's Self-Inflicted Wounds

The foreign policy of Greece is the result of series of dogmatic actions that have gradually developed into a complex, convoluted, and politically polarized undiscerning course of action. Since its independence, Greece's Ministry of Foreign Affairs fights inherited traits of the Greek bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire while old prominent families have been determined to defend their privileges and the status quo of business as usual in the new administration, this time Greek. In other words, many of the ills of modern Greece have their roots in 1830, when the newly formed first modern Greek political parties had such names as the Russian Party, the French Party, or the English Party. To this day, nothing has changed but the names of the political parties; the managing families, their interests or attitudes are the same as before. Politics is a constantly recycling process. As a result of such recycling, the country faced a great dilemma when its northern neighbor, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was dissolved.

On January 3, 1992, a few months after FYROM's declaration of independence (September 8, 1991), an informal meeting of experts from Greece and Skopje took place in Athens. The goal of the meeting was to expedite bilateral issues resulted by Skopje's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. Since all diplomatic instruments are based on the name of the country in question, the issue of the name was at the center of all discussions. The Skopje delegation refused to discuss the name issue and, consequently, the talks failed. Then on February 18, 1992, in an attempt to promote consensus of all political parties on the Macedonia name issue, the then President, Konstantine Karamanlis, convened the first meeting of Greek political party leaders. A few months later, on April 12 and 13, 1992, the second meeting of Greek political party leaders took place. During the first day of the meeting, Greek Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras (present Prime Minister) revealed a seven-point proposal regarding the Macedonian name issue.

On the second day (April 13, 1992), the leaders agreed that Greece would recognize the new state if Skopje was willing to exclude the term "Macedonia" from its official appellation. The only party leader that was concerned about Greece's legal safeguarding its borders with a treaty over the name of Skopje was Aleka Pappariga of the Communist Party. However, on the same day, Prime Minister Konstantine Mitsotakis and Foreign Minister Samaras disagreed on a future policy and strategy of Greece regarding Greece's reaction to a possible recognition of the new state, i.e. Skopje by the international community as "Macedonia." Mitsotakis dismissed Samaras from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and took over the Foreign Ministry himself.

While the European Union and the U.S. government accepted the Greek position, on January 26, 1993, six days after Bill Clinton was sworn in as the new President of the United States, Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis changed position on the matter. Despite the existing agreement (April 13, 1992) of the leaders and without the knowledge of Greece's

litvanskoto-pretседatelstvo-so-evropskata accessed July 29, 2013 and "Message of Lithuanian Ambassador Shocks FYROM," *Macedonia Hellenic Land*, URL: <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/4188/77/lang.el/> accessed July 29, 2013.

President Constantine Karamanlis, Mitsotakis hired the Greek American Public Relations firm “Manatos and Manatos,” to form the “Ad Hoc American Hellenic Leadership Committee.” That Committee, unbeknown to the Greek American Community which it allegedly represented, faxed a letter to the newly elected President Clinton, stating that Greece was willing to compromise on the name issue. Here is the clause:

Greece has reacted favorably to proposals submitted to the UN for the peaceful settlement of a dispute which leave open the avenue of international arbitration. We urge your support for these proposals. It is necessary, however, to block the Skopje application to the UN, **if these proposals are going to lead to meaningful negotiations.** The protection of democratic stability in Greece and the containment of the conflict in the Balkans, will serve the cause of peace as well as the interests of the United States. [Emphasis is mine]²¹

On November 6, 1995, the Greek political leaders, with the exception of Samaras (*Political Spring* established in June 1993, decided in favor of an “honorable compromise” of their country’s national security with the FYROM. However, such a compromise was not necessary at that time. One looks toward an “honorable compromise” only when one already faces defeat.

During the period between the Interim Agreement and present time, Greece’s *laissez faire* attitude toward Skopje has not changed. Actions of the leaders of the Greek political parties have brought a series of intended mishaps and unintended ominous consequences, which proved that politicians of Greece do not qualify to hold the offices to which they are elected.

According to the former MFA of Greece, Dora Bakoyanni (daughter of Con. Mitsotakis), Greece has awarded Skopje 80% of what it sought by constantly giving in. Thus, Skopje has no incentive to allow Greece to receive the remaining 20%. Holding to the already possessed 80%, it negotiates the remaining 20% adhering to the dictum “what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.” It has been the traditional Skopje’s approach to the name issue since 1991.

The policy-makers of Greece had expected the opposite. They are still in denial and indeed perplexed. They have given everything they could to Skopje expecting reciprocity and yet Skopje not only has not reciprocated, but instead, it has launched an all-out social network undertaking, an aggressive diplomatic campaign, and well-planned and executed global operations of disinformation building up concrete support of the world public opinion claiming anything Macedonian as its “inherent” right. It is, in practice, an offensive war of cyberspace to “reclaim” its rights on Macedonia, which rights have been the conclusion of a myth that Macedonia was once theirs and they want it back! It is a war intended to regain the “lost” territory of Macedonia promised to Skopje by Tito and the Greek communists had the latter won the civil war in Greece!

²¹ Chris Spyrou [or Spirou], Speech to the *Association of Greek Alumni of American Universities*, Athens, December 15, 2004.

In an interview with the FYROM newspaper *Utrinski Vesnik*, Mrs. Bakoyanni said,

Greece wishes a solution that respects the sensitivities of both peoples. We proposed a name with a geographical qualifier, which would distinguish your country from the Greek Macedonia. In addition, this name must affect all uses [erga omnes]. If you ask the Greeks, they will respond by 85-90% that the term Macedonia should not be included in the name of your country. This is popular belief in Greece. Politicians in Greece have ignored the political cost in order to find a solution. We expect from Skopje to show the same courage but they are already very late.²²

As Dora Bakoyanni has admitted, not only politicians disregard the feelings and will of the Greek people, but also they are incapable to even negotiate their own political stance on the matter. One would think that the Greek political establishment has learned and as a result would implement a clear and cohesive foreign policy. Instead, they rely on personality driven policies as understood and employed by each Minister of Foreign Affairs and their, oftentimes, subject matter irrelevant staff. Former Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party Mr. Spyrou furthermore claims,

At the time, Lee Herbert Hamilton, a former member of the United States House of Representatives, member of the Democratic Party was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress. According to the journalist Michael Ignatiou in an interview given by Mr. Hamilton, published in the daily newspaper *Πρωινή* of New York a few days after the official recognition of Skopje by the United Nations, Mr. Hamilton stated, “you compromised with a lightning speed so that we did not have a chance to help you. You left us dumbfounded. The correspondence of the same journalist from the United Nations was, “The Greek government lost a unique opportunity to gain significant advantages in the battle against Skopje when due lack of communication with Washington and amateur handling, it accepted an “honorable compromise” without waiting the announcement regarding the position of the new American government on the matter.”²³

But let us see what exactly Mrs. Bakoyanni’s negotiating skills and political “shrewdness” has offered on the table. On December 7, 2009, under the title “The Unknown Dialogue,” the newspaper *Ethnos* of Athens reported that Mrs. Bakoyanni had already agreed to ditch the “erga omnes” red line of Greece while she had no problem recognizing the ethnic and language designation of Skopje.²⁴ According to the report, on September 20, 2008, Mrs. Bakoyanni had accepted the above points as basis for negotiation. Here are the points that

²² Dora Bakoyanni, «η πΓΔΜ δεν θέλει ουσιαστικές διαπραγματεύσεις», *To Vima* 12/07/2011.

<http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=410609&h1=true#commentForm> accessed on July 9, 2013.

²³ Chris Spyrou, Speech to the *Association of Greek Alumni of American Universities*, Athens, December 15, 2004

²⁴ “Ο άγνωστος διάλογος,” *Έθνος*, 7 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, “Απόρρητο έγγραφο της πρεσβείας μας στο Παρίσι αποκαλύπτει ότι στο τετ α τετ Μπακογιάννη - Μίλοσόσκι, η πρώην υπουργός απεμπόλησε «erga omnes», ταυτότητα και γλώσσα.” <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=8742863> accessed July 28, 2013.

she worked so hard for. Mrs. Bakoyanni's exploits before and after Bucharest²⁵ are the following:

- Six months after Bucharest, she does not even mention in discussions of the «erga omnes», i.e. Skopje's name would be for all uses.
- Use of name. She assures Skopje that "the Greek side does not deal with the Skopje Constitution" (author's note: while it is imperative to guarantee implementation of the solution as «erga omnes» requires constitutional revision).
- Identity and language: She proposes the term "Makedonski in Cyrillic as a determinant of language and ethnicity of the people of Skopje." Basically, she had not only accepted the existence of a "Macedonian identity, ethnicity and language," but she practically proposed the recognition of this entity by Greece itself.
- History: Problematic is the reference of Mrs. Bakoyanni in reply to Mr. Milososki that "the history of Macedonia is a matter that belongs to the past."!?!? ²⁶

I want to add a few more instances of failure of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs as the clinching of the European country cyber-acronym MK by the FYROM, because the Greek representative suddenly had problems with his airplane ticket. Thus, although the Conference had taken place in Crete, Greece was not represented. Mrs. Bakoyanni's actions indicate the degree of impertinence on issues of national security. That applies to her MFA and political advisers as well.

When Skopje wanted to send troops to Afghanistan, the MFA of Greece was Dora Bakoyanni and the Minister of Defense was Evangelos Meimarakis. The question of the Skopjans was whether the Greeks, as full members of NATO, would let them participate as "Macedonia" or as "FYROM." Although the Skopjans were willing to show the flag even under the country designation FYROM, Mrs. Bakoyanni told Mr. Meimarakis to be silent on the subject and so he did not object at all. Thus, the Skopjans went to Afghanistan bearing the name "Macedonia" on their country's nametag, instead of FYROM, compliments of Mrs. Bakoyanni and Mr. Meimarakis.

President Bush's ambition to expand NATO resulted in the Adriatic Charter signed in Tirana under the aegis of the United States on May 2, 2003. The Greek Parliament ratified the indirect membership of Skopje to NATO as Republic of "Macedonia", not the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Thus Skopje knocked on the door of NATO as Republic of "Macedonia".

²⁵ Δώρα Αντωνίου "Το παρασκήνιο πριν από το βέτο στο Βουκουρέστι - Τα Wikileaks για το Σκοπιανό" Η Καθημερινή, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_23/03/2011_436712 accessed on July 29, 2013.

²⁶ "Ο άγνωστος διάλογος," Έθνος, 7 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=8742863> accessed July 28, 2013.

The recognition of the FYROM as Republic of “Macedonia” on November 7, 2004 was the result of the detrimental for Greece events that could be avoided had the subsequent governments of Greece since 1991 done their job methodically, responsibly using a well thought strategic plan. All Greek governments without exception handled the issue of the FYROM with the perfect dexterity of an amateur.

The excuse offered by the current Greek government was that the Adriatic Charter had arrived to Athens as a package. Nothing can be further from the truth. NATO decisions are taken by consensus, which means that Greece had agreed to the Adriatic Charter and its contents before it was disseminated by Brussels to the governments of the member states for ratification. The MFA of Greece chose docility over the importance of their country’s national security. Hence, the door opened to the recognition of the FYROM as Macedonia [sic] by the United States 18 months later with, perilous for Greece, ramifications. Another foreign policy failure came about when the FYROM contingent deployed to Afghanistan branding the name “Macedonia” on the uniforms of its soldiers, instead of the FYROM, because Greece did not object.

But the issue is not problematic only on the government side. Every Greek owned company that does business in the FYROM signs a contract with the “Republic of Macedonia [sic],” not the FYROM. Characteristic is the case of Alpha Bank which was explaining its business in Macedonia [sic].²⁷ Nevertheless, this is only one occasion. The question is, how many other companies have done and do the same.

Despite the constant provocations, which through its media, all levels and dimensions of education - formal, informal, non-formal²⁸ - and even diplomatic missions where Skopje incites ethnic hatred against Greeks at home and abroad, Greek politicians put the country’s national security and territorial integrity in the name of good neighborly relations. While they are fully aware of the consequences, the political elite of Greece are still willing to compromise. Greece’s complacent attitude would be facing Skopje’s persistent disregard for the final name agreement, a behavior fully exhibited soon after the Interim Agreement was signed. It is doubtful if any of them has thought that such a compromise could prove to be not only utopian, but also pernicious.

²⁷ Macedonia Hellenic Land. <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2108/77/lang,el/>;
<http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2111/77/lang,el/> ;
<http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/21350/> All above were accessed August 23, 2013.

²⁸ In an overly simplified manner the differences between the three types of education are: **Formal education** – Organized, guided by a formal curriculum, leads to a formally recognized credential such as a high school completion diploma or a degree, and is often guided and recognized by government at some level. **Non-formal learning** – Organized (even if it is only loosely organized), may or may not be guided by a formal curriculum, i.e. (business, government) seminars or conferences. In **informal learning**, the teacher is simply someone with more experience, such as a parent, grandparent or a friend. **Press/TV and Social media (Social media: Blogs, Social networking, Microblogging, Virtual Worlds, Photo and Video sharing services)** could fall in any of the above categories depending on how they are used.

6. Skopje's Venomous Heritage

Skopje has consistently argued that its constitutional name was chosen by its people. This simply is not true. The name "Macedonia" was imposed on its inhabitants by the one party dictatorial system in 1943 in Jajce, Bosnia by the Decision #3 of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia or AVNOJ on November 29, 1943.²⁹ After 50 years of constant education and training, it was expected that the citizens of the area would unquestionably accept the name Macedonia. Even so, the question of the referendum concerning the independence of the country on September 8, 1991, did not include a question regarding the name of the country. The communist government, under new management and name, again gave the name of the new independent republic to the voters as if it was a done deal. One could perceive the question on Skopje's independence as deceptive, since it was promising an eventual union with Yugoslavia. At that time, Yugoslavia existed.

The "constitutional name" that Skopje has chosen is not the real issue; it never was. The real issue is Skopje's aspirations that hide behind the chosen "constitutional name" and the appropriation of Greece's history. Skopje actually has appropriated Bulgarian and Serbian history for the same reasons and based on similar excuses, it claims territories of Bulgaria (*Blagoevgrad*) and Serbia (*Prohor Pčinjski*). The real reason behind all this is the appropriation of the lands that the history of those countries represents.

Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), by international law and norms, all six republics became heirs of the country's all positive and negative issues. The property of the SFRY and its legacy applies to all former republics within the federal entity. Some negative issues are the maltreatment and forced deportation of the Swabian Germans from mainly the region of Banat, Vojvodina, and the facilitation of the kidnapping of Greek children from all over Greece for the sole purpose of the indoctrination to Marxism-Leninism, and forced "Macedonization".

Skopje's version that the Greek national forces had expelled "Macedonian" children, Milan Ristović explains that Greek children from all over Greece were offered to the Yugoslav forces in order for them to transport the children to Romania and Hungary.³⁰ Milan Ristović further states that, "...in January of 1950 there were 2000 children in Bulgaria, 3,500 in Czechoslovakia, 3,000 in Hungary, 500 in Poland, 6,500 in Romania, and 11,000 in Yugoslavia, a total of 26,500 children."³¹ Eudes also mentions that according to the Red Cross reports, there were 23,693 of them: 10,000 in Yugoslavia, 3,801 in Rumania, 3,800 in Hungary, 2,660 in Bulgaria, 2,235 in Czechoslovakia and 2000 in Albania.³² According to official

²⁹ The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia is more commonly known by its Yugoslav abbreviation AVNOJ, which in Serbian is Antifašističko veće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije and in Croatian: Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije.

³⁰ Milan Ristović, *A Long Way Home. Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia 1948-1960* (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 2000), 20.

³¹ Milan Ristović, *Long Return Home, Children Refugees from Greece in Yugoslavia 1948-1960*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2000), 95.

³² Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanos. Partisans and Civil War in Greece...1943-1949* (London: Monthly Review, 1972) 317.

accounts, the total number of child victims kidnapped during the civil war of Greece were 29,877.³³ Specifically, in 1948, 24,871 children; in 1949, 5,006 children; no kidnapping was reported in 1950. These are the same children that the communist world before, and now Skopje, euphemistically and in bad taste calls “children refugees”. For this crime the UN condemned Yugoslavia and asked it to expedite the repatriation of the children (UNGAR 517, dated February 2, 1952, UNGAR 381, dated November 17, 1950, UNGAR 382, dated December 1, 1950). Skopje, as heir and facilitator of the communist Yugoslavia, is responsible for each account.

One more legacy of Skopje is its voluntary espousal of the deeds of the Bulgarians of Macedonia, who in the first quarter of the 20th century savagely roamed and terrorized the Macedonian countryside. They acted against Greece and Greek interests either within the Ottoman Empire or from the Bulgarian Principality using intimidation, murder, armed insurrection, war crimes (Treaty of Neuilly articles 118)³⁴, and other felonies. One must consider that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, requested the extradition from Bulgaria of 1,662 persons “accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war,” 216 of whom were leaders of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, aka IMRO.³⁵

According to the FYROM’s Preamble to its Constitution, “particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic” are part of the heritage of the country. The Ilinden Revolt started at about 6:30 pm of Sunday, July 20 [Old Style], in the town of Krushevo. The Turkish forces of “liberation” came into the town, which was already in flames, early in the morning of Thursday, July 31, 1903. Revolutionary socialist, i.e. communist Karev’s brigands, started their work by killing, pillaging, and burning the non-Bulgarian areas of the town for ten days.³⁶ The Ottoman troops finished the town off. It was a revolt led by criminals, who after they re-invented themselves as freedom fighters, continued their trade of hatred and the skill of killing, raping, burning, pillaging at the expense of Greeks and Greek speaking Vlachs and Albanians as if one tried to excel over the other in doing so. Although it is advertized as an “uprising,” a word that gives the connotation of a widespread revolt, the truth is that the event took place in a relatively small area

³³ Colonel T. Papathanasiades, “The Bandits’ Last Stand in Greece.” Edited by Colonel H. R. Emery. *U.S. Military Review*, Vol. XXX, Number 11, February 1951: 22 – 31.

³⁴ ARTICLE 118

The Bulgarian Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies.

The Bulgarian Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office, or employment which they held under the Bulgarian authorities.

³⁵ Joseph S. Rousek, *Balkan Politics: International Relations in No Man’s Land*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 152 fn 8.

³⁶ Keith Brown, *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 190, 209. Compare to George W. Gawrych, “The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-14,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 22, 3 (Jul., 1986), 307-330; 308.

of the northern part of the Manastir (Monastirion / Bitola) vilayet or province.³⁷ Since it was local, it was a “revolt.”

Misirkov explained to what extent “Macedonian” was the Ilinden revolt as follows: “We can call [the revolt] whatever we like, but in fact it was only a partial movement. It was, and still is, an affair of the Exarchists: that is, a Bulgarian ploy to settle the Macedonian question to its own advantage by creating a *Bulgarian Macedonia*.”³⁸

The “Boatmen” of Thessaloniki (Οἱ Βαρκάρηδες τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης), who by all accounts were a gang of thugs, anarchists and terrorists, who transformed themselves into “revolutionaries,” indiscriminately bombed buildings of Thessaloniki, ships in its port, and killed unsuspecting citizens.

Others preferred acts were more profitable. Under Yane Sandanski, a Bulgarian socialist revolutionary, i.e. communist and follower of Plekhanov, whose gang was responsible for the area of Serres, present day Greece, staged a number of terrorist acts that affected the infamy of the IMRO.³⁹ The most famous act of these felons was the kidnapping of Ms. Ellen Stone for whom the U.S. government, at that time, paid US\$66,000 in ransom (present

³⁷ The Monument of the Ilinden Revolt aka “Makedonium”!

<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Makedonija140.jpg> accessed July 29, 2013.

³⁸ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 45; also see К. П. Мисирковъ, *За Македонските Работи* (София: Либерални Клуб, 1903), 9. The original text is: Ние можеме да го велиме како сакаме, но до действителност оно беше само частично. Оно беше и ет работа на екзархистите, кои се величаат „бугари“, а следователно, тоа ет бугарски маневр, да се решит македонското прашаи’е само во бугарцка полза, то ет да се создайт една „Бугарцка Македонниа“.

³⁹ Aka in English as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Over the first thirty years the organization changed names numerous times. In May 1866 in Bucharest, Romania, Lyuben Karavelov and Vasil Levski started the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee (BTCK) having its purpose the preparation of the people for a national uprising. It dispatched young Bulgarians to spread the message among the Bulgarian people. A few years later, on August 1, 1870 (for some in 1869) Bulgarian émigrés in Romania founded the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCK), which Lyuben Karavelov was an influential factor. Vasil Levski, Dimitar Tsenovich, Panayot Hitov, were involved as well. On July 10, 1876 (for some in 1868) the Bulgarian Charitable Society (BCBO) was established with the sole purpose the coordination of the ‘Bulgarian cause’ in Macedonia and Thrace. In 1872 the Macedonian Society was established to counter Greek Ethniki Etairia. In reality the “Macedonian Society” fully established the Bulgarian propaganda territories west and south of Bulgaria. In April 1885 the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee (BTCRK) was established and on October 23, 1893 the Bulgarian Macedono- Odrinski (Thracian) Revolutionary Committee (BMORK) and according to some historians the organization changed its name sometime between 1896 and 1897 to Bulgarian Macedonian-Odrinski Revolutionary Committee (BMORK). However, in 1902 it was renamed to Secret Macedonian - Odrinski revolutionary organization (TMORO) and in 1905 to Internal Macedonian - Odrinski revolutionary organization (VMORO). The organization as independent unit ceased to exist in 1910, although its members under Protogerov continued their association with the Bulgarian government. During the Balkan Wars and WWI, the organization fought against Bulgaria’s adversaries and in 1920 split into two organizations. One of them became known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (aka IMRO) and the other as the Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization. The last one disappeared after the treaties of Severs and Lausanne. The right wing of the IMRO that was responsible for the assassination of Serbia’s King Alexander in 1924. Although allegedly both wings of the IMRO signed the famous May Manifesto, the fact is that only the leadership of the left had actually done so. The left wing of the IMRO was responsible for Comintern’s recognition of the “Macedonian” ethnicity, as the third Slavic ethnicity in the Balkans besides the Serbian and Bulgarian on January 11, 1934. The new political parties in Bulgaria and the FYROM are namesakes of the old IMRO with no connection to either wing of the old organization in any way.

equivalent of about US\$15 million),⁴⁰ has become Skopje's heritage by its own admission. They had originally demanded 25,000 gold Turkish liras, or approximately US\$110,000, which for that time, the sum was colossal. The reason for such terrorist act was the need for money that would finance their weapons supplies.

This kidnapping was the first terrorist act ever against a U.S. citizen. And to top this, Skopje has erected statues in testimony to the exaltation of these criminals.⁴¹ Even by standards of those times, these people were considered terrorists.

7. Skopje's Beliefs and Norms

The Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, as modified by the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), did not set the present state borders in the Balkans. It established ONLY the borders of Bulgaria in relation to its neighbors, which excludes the borders between the FYROM and Greece. Bilateral treaties, conventions, and protocols had already established the remaining borders of the south Balkan countries. Besides, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Article 62.2.a) is clear: Treaties establishing borders may not change or be nullified.

Preying on people's ignorance, Skopje claims that article 15 of the UN Charter gives them the right to have the "Macedonian" nationality. Nationality, in international legal terms and norms, is a loose term for citizenship, not ethnicity. The UN Charter states that every person must have a country that he or she calls home and everyone is entitled to a passport. According to provisions of article 2 of the UN Charter, ethnicity and language constitute an internal issue for each nation-state. It is the reason why countries do not recognize ethnicities and languages of another country.

For instance, the nationality of a U.S. national is *United States of America* regardless of one's country of origin or ethnicity. Not every U.S. national is a U.S. citizen, i.e. the American Samoans, but they carry U.S. passports. Passports of all countries of the world that have the designation of nationality on their passports bear the name of the country as nationality, i.e. citizenship. The U.S. Constitution not only does not recognize ethnicities, but it does not even include a provision for an official language.

Ethnicity is a personal matter and falls under one's individual right, which differs from group rights. The belief that nationality is equivalent to ethnicity existed only within communist Yugoslavia and other multiethnic nation-states such as the USSR. It derived from Lenin's definition of a nation, as it appears in Joseph Stalin's book *Marxism and the Nation-*

⁴⁰ Teresa Carpenter, *The Miss Stone Affair: America's First Modern Hostage Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 57, 73, 157.

⁴¹ Statue of the Boatmen in Skopje.

<http://www.macedonians.com.au/forum/showthread.php/12628-Skopje-2014-The-Boatmen-of-Thessaloniki-1903-Sculpture-Gemid%C5%BEii-%CE%93%CE%B5%CE%BC%CE%B9%CF%84%CE%B6%CE%AE%CE%B4%CE%B5%CF%82> accessed July 29, 2013. The title Gemidji 1903 in Cyrillic is obvious (Гемиџии 1903).

al Question published in *Works*, English Edition (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946).⁴²

Greece is not a federal or confederate state with constitutionally set borders, but a unitary country with administrative areas. The borders of these administrative areas approximate the borders of the ancient tribal or geographic areas, modified to serve present needs and norms of Greece. The existence of the Ministry of Northern Greece, which includes Macedonia and Thrace, is testament that Greece considers these regions vital for its national security. Also, Skopje contends that Greece changed the name of its northern province from Northern Greece to Macedonia just before the fall of the Wall. The facts belie such a notion.

According to Greek Historical Archives (file 79), the General Administration of Macedonia was established in 1914. That means that Greece had established not only its presence in Macedonia, but she also officially restored the name after more than 480 years under Ottoman rule.

On March 6, 1987, Greece re-arranged its Ministry of "Northern Greece" to the administrations of "Central and Western Macedonia" on one hand and "Eastern Macedonia and Thrace" on the other, returning to the provincial arrangement of the era of the Colonels (1967 – 1974). At present, the Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace is located in Thessaloniki.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)⁴³ exchanges information with intelligence agencies of other allied countries as country-members of NATO, but also with other friendly countries under the National Disclosures Policy.⁴⁴ As changes in the communist world were unfolding and communist countries were democratizing, intelligence agencies directly affected by the changes, such as the Finnish Intelligence Agencies,⁴⁵ were constantly exchanging information with the U.S. Intelligence Community. While that was happening, both U.S. national security advisors to President George Herbert Walker Bush, Condoleezza Rice, an expert on the USSR, and Brent Scowcroft, U.S. leading expert on international policy, insisted that they could foresee that 1991 would not be "a period for great initiatives."⁴⁶ In addi-

⁴² Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin*, tr. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 157.

⁴³ Per the website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) "The U.S. Intelligence Community is a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations, including the ODNI, within the Executive Branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather and analyze the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities." The IC member agencies in alphabetical order are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

⁴⁴ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 6.

⁴⁵ The Finnish Intelligence Agency (*Suojelupoliisi*) and the Finnish Military Intelligence Service (*Pääesikunnan tiedusteluosasto*),

⁴⁶ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 347).

tion, the CIA could not even predict the USSR communist coup of August 18 - 21, 1991.⁴⁷ When the fall of the USSR took place, the U.S. Intelligence Community was caught by great surprise. They were admittedly embarrassed. They could not believe what was going on; nobody had predicted it.

Coming to the specific issue of Yugoslavia, Marten van Heusen, a career foreign service officer, was appointed to replace Condoleezza Rice at the National Security Council (NSC). Heusen visited Yugoslavia in the summer 1990. In his report to the NSC published in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), he stated that the Yugoslav politicians would agree to a solution keeping the country together so that Yugoslavia would stay intact. He wrote that the Yugoslav politicians “will muddle through, because the collapse of the nation is so dark a future that the Yugoslav, especially the JNA⁴⁸ officer corps won’t allow it to happen.”⁴⁹

On September 27, 1990, about two weeks before the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 15 - 90, Ambassador Zimmerman felt that “the [Yugoslav] nation’s unity had substantially decayed, over the last six months, mainly as the forces of nationalism had grown to the point where political decentralization was almost inevitable.”⁵⁰ Under the title *Yugoslavia Transformed*, dated October 18, 1990, the NIE states “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic Reform will not stave off the breakup.”⁵¹

The U.S. Administration and the U.S. Intelligence Community (at that time, 16 intelligence agencies), the best intelligence apparatus in the world, could not predict the end of the USSR a few months before it happened and the same could not foresee the disintegration of Yugoslavia before October 1990. Yet, Skopje wants the world to believe that Greece knew about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1988!

Skopje also disseminates that “nobody objected,” to the name Macedonia held by Skopje since its inception. They obviously missed that in 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius disputed the name not only of the “republic,” but also of the “Macedonian” ethnicity. In Greece, while the civil war was being fought, the UN had charged Yugoslavia with both inspiring the civil war and giving material aid to the insurgents.

In 1962, the then Prime Minister of Greece Konstantinos Karamanlis, himself a Macedonian, started talks with Josip Broz Tito about changing the name of the republic of “Macedonia.” Tito was very receptive to the idea, but the nationalist cabinet of Skopje opposed it. As the discussions between Karamanlis and Tito continued, Greece held elections on November 3, 1963, which Karamanlis lost to George Papandreou, a Socialist, and the talks dis-

⁴⁷ Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1993), 424).

⁴⁸ JNA is the Serbo-Croatian acronym for Jugoslavenska narodna armija or Yugoslavian People’s Army

⁴⁹ NIE (Aug. 2006), 709.

⁵⁰ The Intelligence Community Case Method Program, “Appendix B. A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslavia: From the National Communism to National Collapse*, U.S. Intelligence Community Estimate Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990. National Defense University. Approved for Release Date: Aug 2006 (NIC 2006-0004 December 2006) 711.

⁵¹ NIE 15 - 90 (May 2006) 654.

continued. The fact that the Greek government was talking to Tito's government about the name of Skopje means that Greece had objected to Skopje's name.

Sometime after April 21, 1967, the dictatorial regime (1967 – 1974), divided the Ministry of "Northern Greece" into the administrations of "Central and Western Macedonia" and "Eastern Macedonia and Thrace." After the fall of the regime, the new government brought back the Ministry of "Northern Greece."

The problem is not what Greece has done or has not done. The problem is what Skopje has done and keeps doing. In 1978, while in Novi Sad during dinner, I responded to a pertinent question from one of the guests stating that I was a Macedonian. The host, an officer of the Yugoslavian Navy, who knew my background "corrected" me by saying that I was a Greek, not a Macedonian. Even after I explained to them what I meant, they were incredulous to the fact that I considered myself a Macedonian within the Hellenic domain. To them, a Macedonian simultaneously could not be Greek.

In another trip to Yugoslavia, a Serbian female colleague of mine said, "you [the Greeks] have Macedonia, as well." My response was, "You are wrong; Macedonia is part of Greece. With the exception of the area of Bitola/Ohrid, no other location in Yugoslavia qualifies as Macedonia." She could not understand it. Her one-party dictatorship "education" did not permit her to perceive the fact that she was historically wrong.

In October 2010, I had an experience in the amphitheater of the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle, Western Australia when one of the Skopjans present, provocatively wearing a red T-shirt with the golden Sun of Vergina, while his friends were laughing, he yelled, "Philip [II] was a Slav!" Of course, these people could not infer that if Philip II of Macedonia was a Slav, it would make Skopje's prevailing view that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct nation not related to any other Balkan nations, moot. Since they believe that they descent from the ancient Macedonians, the same argument makes them Slavs, as well. It seems that the whole country agrees that all of them are *Macedonians*, but they still have to persuade themselves and everyone else on their ethnicity.

The fact is that the regional identity of the Macedonians of Greece, as it is of Greeks of all regions, is very strong and it is exhibited both in Greece and the Greek diaspora. Characteristic of such identity is the expression of the former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, who in January 2007 at a meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, stated, "*I myself am a Macedonian, and another two and a half million Greeks are Macedonians.*"

The present educational system in the FYROM is based on the former one-party communist dictatorship that allows the previous political doctrine and national interest to guide history as long as it revolves around *Macedonianism*. It is the same system that "improved" the Bulgarian political concept under which the present FYROM used to be Macedonia!!! Somehow, Paionia and Dardania, the ancient lands that form the bulk of the FYROM territory, have disappeared from the ancient world as if they never existed. This understanding of the ancient world has continued to thrive after the independence of the FYROM, thus increasingly becoming stronger and stronger. Some of the Skopjans have even re-baptized

Paionians and Dardanians to “independent” Macedonian tribes, in their effort to justify the name of the FYROM as “Macedonia.”

According to the Greek MFA website [<http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/>], the Greek government is cognizant of the FYROM’s violations of the Interim Agreement. All violations hit the heart of Greece’s national security. It is understandable that the last thing Greece wants is to be blamed as being “non-constructive,” but Greece has not done anything against the constant provocations from Skopje. But here is the issue. I disagree with the characterization by the Greek MFA that “the name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the promotion of an assumed irredentism that hides territorial ambitions on the part of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*.” Since neither the FYROM nor its inhabitants ever controlled Macedonia, their actions are not the result of a lost fatherland to be “irredentist”, but it is simply expansionistic. I also find the depiction of the Macedonia name issue being a matter of “sovereignty and territorial integrity” very interesting, but also confusing. Since the name issue is so important to the territorial integrity of Greece, why is the Greek government willing to compromise on the name of Macedonia, i.e. the country’s national security? One only wonders exactly how the same politicians will answer future generations of Greeks who ask them, “Why did you allow a discredited and irrelevant adversary to take away from Greece what our forefathers suffered pain for and shed a lot of blood and tears for to keep it Greek?”

In the book *Mein Kampf*, Hitler made it clear that Germany’s aim was “the acquisition and penetration of the territory east of the Elbe” adding, “We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east.”⁵² That was his goal and when he came into power, he implemented it.

The same is true regarding the goal of Skopje, the acquisition and penetration of the territory south of Mount Vorras or Kajmakchalan. Not one of Skopje’s diaspora, which by the way votes in the FYROM’s national elections, hides the fact that their dream is the “unification” of all Macedonian lands. Not one of the politicians in Skopje hides the same goal since they are all behind the funding of festivities, statues, and naming of streets and buildings and their insistence of their “constitutional name” and ethnicity.

Whether the framers of Yugoslavia considered the Skopjans Slavs or descendants of the ancient Macedonians was reflected in the legal system of the federal state.⁵³ It is important for one to keep in mind that it is the same system that nurtured and molded the *Macedonism* of the Skopje Slavs. The explanation below is a simplified version of the system devoid of political explanations; however, it is based on Tito’s interpretation of Marxism.

⁵² Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Volume I - A Reckoning, Chapter XIV: Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy <http://www.angelfire.com/folk/bigbaldbob88/MeinKampf.pdf> accessed on June 18, 2014.

⁵³ Yugoslavia was a term that unified the six South Slavic nations. The idea of Yugoslavism grew out of the *Illyrian Movement* in the mid-1800s, in its development included Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, and to some degree even Bulgarians. South Slavic languages and dialects are similar enough to the point that their speakers understand each other without special training.

The architects of post-WWII Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito, charted the foundations of the new state of Yugoslavia after considering all the ethnic groups within communist Yugoslavia. Among the delegates to the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, aka, AVNOJ from Skopje representing the Slav population of Greek Macedonia was Dimitar Vlahov, and representing the Bulgarian Macedonia was Vlado Popotomov (or Pop-Tomov).⁵⁴ Both of them were Bulgarians. Dimitar Vlahov was a former Deputy of the Bulgarian Parliament representing the Communist Party of Bulgaria,⁵⁵ and Vlado Poptomov became the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria in 1949.⁵⁶ On December 26, 1943, in an encoded telegram to the pseudonym Walter, one of Tito's *nom de guerre*, Georgi Dimitrov, the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party, protested the inclusion to the AVNOJ of both Vlahov and Poptomov as being Bulgarians.⁵⁷

The original name of the communist Yugoslavia was People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with each constituent republic bearing the title, People's Republic.⁵⁸ In order to bring the People's Republic of "Macedonia" in line with its communist roots, Skopje made the communist partisan song the anthem of the republic, which today is the FYROM's national anthem with some modifications, e.g. Vlahov's name has been wiped out of the anthem. The framers wanted to ensure that the ethnic Slavic groups formed the backbone of the country. Simultaneously, they realized that the Serbs, who were more numerous than the other Slavs, were a factor they could not ignore. Tito wanted a politically "balanced" country, a Slavic Yugoslavia with Marxist flavor.

According to the system of *Nations and Ethnicities (Narodi i Narodnosti)*, the Slavic peoples of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia – the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Muslims and "Macedonians" - each ethnic group was considered a *narod* or nation, because their origin was inside Yugoslavia. If the mother country of an ethnic group lay outside Yugoslavia, it was defined as a *narodnost* or ethnicity, but not a minority in the legal sense. This was how the Albanians, Germans, Russians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Hungarians, etc. were classified. Officially, Yugoslavia did not recognize minorities because in a country that all peoples are equal before the law, the issue of minorities was non-existent. Recognition of a minority oftentimes is accompanied by privileges that make the minority having more rights than the majority. After all, such recognition would be against Marxism's "national question." The differences however are more obvious in the matter of official languages. Languages of *nations*, i.e. Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and "Macedonian," were official throughout Yugoslavia; however, the languages of the *ethnicities* were official only within their own republics or provinces.

The system of *Nations* (ethnic Slavs originated from within Yugoslavia) and *Ethnicities* (ethnic others) had little to do with the size of an ethnic group and only with whether the

⁵⁴ Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za Biografiju* (Beograd: Kultura, 1955), 380. Also compare John Bell, *Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 66.

⁵⁵ John Bell, *Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 66.

⁵⁶ Ivo Banač (Editor), *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 111.

⁵⁷ Ivo Banač (Editor), *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 291.

⁵⁸ In this form, the People's Republic of "Macedonia" was established in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on August 2, 1944.

origins and mother-country of a specific group was inside or outside Yugoslavia. For example, since only the Slav peoples were allowed to form a Republic, the Montenegrins, the Slovenes, and the Slavs of Skopje, although fewer in number than the Albanians, formed a Republic, while the Albanians, despite their greater numbers, were only an ethnic group or other living in an autonomous Province within a Republic, i.e. Serbia.

Based upon the system of *Nations* and *Ethnicities* as laid down by Tito and the architects of a socialist Yugoslavia, including delegates from Skopje, only Slavic nations whose mother country was within the AVNOJ Yugoslavia could form a constituent republic of the country. Other Slavic ethnic groups such as Slovaks, Ruthenians (aka Pannonian Rusyn) were considered *Ethnicities* because their mother country was outside the national borders of Yugoslavia. The leadership of Yugoslavia had determined that the prevalent people of Skopje had met the two determinants to classify them as Slavs as required for the formation of their republic, i.e. their mother country was within Yugoslavia and they were Slavs.

The “Macedonia name dispute” is not a simple political issue as some Greeks suggest, nor it is a matter of a simple usurpation of the Greek history, as others believe. It is in the heart of the FYROM’s national interests. Ancient history is being used as a covert act of aggression and expansionism. Claiming ancient Macedonian heritage, Skopje sets the foundations for a legitimate claim of entitlement over the land of Macedonia. It challenges Greece’s territorial integrity and because of it, it hits the heart of Greece’s national security. The meaning of *Macedonia* and its derivatives, as has evolved in the FYROM and its diaspora, is not veneer, but rather it is as essential to them as the air they breathe.

8. Skopje’s Values

Although the FYROM is not a communist country anymore, the whole system of *Macedonianism* was built on communist ideology and political agenda in the Balkans. Its mentality is still authoritarian with an understanding of the early 1900’s. A communist organization, Comintern, under Joseph Stalin based on Lenin’s definition of a nation, baptized the Bulgarians in Macedonia, as “Macedonians.” The communist regime, under Joseph Broz Tito, molded and nurtured the new nation of “Macedonians” and every single institution of Tito’s Yugoslavia, focusing on this constituent republic, was established in order to reinforce Skopje’s “Macedonian” ethnicity, language, history, and general heritage.

What the people of the FYROM value most is the incorporation of “Aegean Macedonia” to their country. The title “Aegean Macedonia,” which circulates in official and unofficial circles means that Skopje and its citizens do not recognize Macedonia proper as an integral part of Greece, but as an occupied region integral to the FYROM. In addition, judging from the gigantic flag that depicts Skopje’s understanding of Macedonia, which should “unite,” a flag that additionally brands the golden Sun of Vergina on a red background, one cannot but conclude that the dream and therefore the goal of the Skopje Slavs is a united Macedonia under their government. The flag of a “United” Macedonia made its official debut during the government sponsored 20th anniversary of the FYROM’s independence.

From statements of common people and photographs of Skopje's officials, we reach the same conclusion. On the international front, Skopje has not been idle, but has actively worked on everyone including the U.S. government.



**Skopje, September 8, 2011,
20th Anniversary of Independence Celebrations.
The flag of a "United Macedonia"**

In a Country Handbook published by the U.S. Department of Defense, the map of geographic Macedonia prepared by a professor of Skopjan descent depicted the Greek and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia as "Occupied Macedonian Territories."⁵⁹ Although the matter was made known to the governments of the United States and Greece, it took a few years and a lot of yelling from the Greek American organizations to both Greece and the United States for the U.S. Department of Defense to withdraw the booklet.

In another case, an unclassified map published by the CIA and sold by the U.S. Government Published Office (GPO) bore gross historical inaccuracies. The timeline branded on the side of the FYROM map started at the ancient Macedonian Kingdom of Philip II, but somehow in the modern era switched to the FYROM with Mr. Gligorov being the President of the modern state moving the ancient Macedonian territory and the heritage north. In both cases, the Greek government was as loud as a dead sardine.

In April 2010, the U.S. Department of State published an article in its official magazine entitled: "Skopje – Ancient Macedonia Builds Modern Democracy." The author, Ms. Stephanie Rowlands, claimed that Skopje is the legitimate heir of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia. The force behind it was the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) and United "Macedonian" Diaspora (UMD). Nevertheless, the issue of ancient Macedonia, per se, is not

⁵⁹ Marcus A. Templar, "Twenty Years after Independence: Activities of the Government, the Citizens, and the Diaspora of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the FYROM) for the Appropriation & Possession of the Name "Macedonia." <http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2875/76/lang,el/> accessed on July 10, 2013.

as important as it is that the article had connected the “the Pearl of the Balkans,” i.e. Lake Ohrid to a song with the same title, which clearly states that the “three Macedonias” should unite. Of course, this union would materialize at the expense of Greece and Bulgaria. Thus in the eyes of the FYROM Slav nationals, the U.S. State Department had espoused the FYROM’s nationalist dream for a “united” Macedonia as the Comintern had agreed to, an encouraging act. The government of Greece remained idly and oddly disengaged.

The slogan “Macedonia is One” which must unite under a “Macedonian,” i.e. Skopjan government, is what the people of the FYROM value most. That makes the incorporation of the Bulgarian and Greek part of Macedonia the FYROM’s national goal. The adoption of the history of ancient Macedonia by Skopje is not a misguided or perceived heritage, but it is an organized scheme that the *Macedonists* and *Pan-Slavists* needed in order to a). Galvanize the FYROM masses and thusly offer a reason for them to fight for their “heritage,” and b). Trick the international community into going along with the “will of the people” as it did for the Bulgarians in Eastern Rumelia (1885) and the Albanians in Kosovo (1999). For those who believe such a thing is impossible I suggest that they study the history of the IMRO and draw their own conclusions. Territorial expansion of Skopje to the south and southeast, even if it seems impossible at this point, might be possible in the future. The desire of the FYROM’s Slavic population for the Slavic control of all Macedonian territories as their inherent right makes it the people’s national goal. The official FYROM, in order to reflect the goal of the nation, has manifested that goal in the form of its national interest, as is apparent in its domestic and foreign policies. Such a manifestation is consistent with the psycho-synthesis of insecure polities that see “enemies” all around them, such as Turkey, North Korea, Iran, etc.

The Skopje diaspora is very organized and actively assists anti-Greek elements located within Greece in the form of a political party such as Ουράνιο Τόξο or media Nova Zora (Νέα Αυγή). The anti-Hellenic website MakNews is registered to Lubi Uzunovski of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Additionally, Skopje has people working either directly or indirectly as consultants for Wikipedia (and other Wiki’s such as Wikimedia, Wikianswers, Wikispace, Wikisource, etc.) who are very instrumental in anything that has to do with issues of Macedonia. Wikis employ FYROM staff under the directorship of the President of the Association, Dimce Grozdanoski who feed the Wiki websites with information created in Skopje and thus they disseminate their unopposed view on issues that should concern Greece. Grozdanoski is currently employed as an IT advisor in the Government Administration of the Ministry of Education and Science of the FYROM.⁶⁰ If, to the academic, political, and journalistic world, Wikimedia is insignificant and below their standards, they must realize that it is easily accessible to everyone, especially to children who educate themselves by doing their homework using this new source as reference. One of the first websites that comes up first on any subject is Wikimedia and its similar appellations.

⁶⁰ <http://www.linkedin.com/in/dimcegrozdanoski> (accessed October 29, 2011).

Diplomatic employees such as Ambassadors, Consuls, and high-ranking employees of the FYROM MFA are photographed before “United Macedonia” maps. They portray in their personal social network pages a “United Macedonia” being in their heart and slogans like “Macedonia’s Name will not perish” appear under the map of a “United Macedonia.” These kinds of maps are reminiscent of the Argentinean maps proclaiming the Falkland Islands as Argentine territory under occupation. Such maps had precipitated the April 1982, 10-week Argentina’s war with the UK that cost 650 Argentinean and 255 British lives ending with Argentina’s surrender.

In the domestic arena, *Macedonianism* is fully protected through various laws, which disallow educational institutions to discuss the issue of the ancient Macedonians. Free speech is only on paper. Various government sponsored institutions and the Church exalt *Macedonianism* and encourage it. When the racist and offensive *Macedonian Prayer* made its debut in government sponsored TV stations, neither the official Church nor the government of the FYROM condemned it. With the blessings of the Skopjan Church, churches within the FYROM and abroad depict pagan symbols and personalities. In the village Musomishta (only 800 meters south of Goce Delchev – Nevrokopi) in southwestern Bulgaria, the Sun of Vergina is branded on the floor of the church of Saint Nicholas. In addition, according to History Professor Bozhidar Dimitrov, Director of the Bulgarian Museum of National History, a church in the FYROM depicts on its walls icons of the “saints” Philip II and Alexander the Great, both pagans, which according to the Canons of the Eastern Orthodox Faith constitutes a sacrilege.⁶¹ The Church of Skopje by harboring the depiction of pagan symbols and personalities embraces heresy.

In their foreign policy, all diplomatic moves resonate from and aim at the implementation and expansion of *Macedonianism* abroad. Foreign dignitaries attended a vigorous and elaborate presentation on why the FYROM Slavs are Macedonians drawing legitimacy from various sources including Greek, purposely misinterpreted in order to justify the desired result.

In those presentations the bottom line is that the meaning of words patriots and nationalists are reversed. Skopjans are demonstrated as patriots although they want to grab Greece’s territories and Greeks are nationalists despite the fact that they only want to keep what is theirs. Why does Skopje go to such extent? Michael Roskin argues,

At least one element of the medieval churchmen survives in national interest thinking. Humans have souls, and these are judged in an afterlife, they argued. Accordingly, humans can be held to exacting standards of behavior with curbs on beastly impulses. States, being artificial creations, have no souls; they have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their survival. States are amoral and can do things individual

⁶¹ “Bozhidar Dimitrov: Placing pagan symbol - star of Vergina in Christian church is sacrilege” (Бождидар Димитров: Поставянето на езически символ – Звездата на Вергина на християнска църква е кощунство) (Sofia: *Agency Fokus*, July 23, 2013), <http://www.focus-news.net/?id=n1809055>

humans cannot do. It is in this context that churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas proposed theories of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Clausewitz also contributes to the national-interest approach. All state behavior is motivated by its need to survive and prosper.⁶²

But in the discussion of territories and claims over Macedonia, the human element or human terrain is completely missing. Besides, the question is how Skopje is going to achieve the occupation of Macedonia. Even if one assumes that Skopje succeeds in taking over effective control of the area, how is Skopje going to deal with the 2.5 million Macedonian Greeks? Although this is a very good question that makes the Skopjan claim laughable, the fact is that those who understand the Skopje's thinking would not even smirk. From personal knowledge, their plan under Tito was the expulsion of the Greeks from Macedonia.

Skopje is very cognizant of reality and so are those of its own diaspora. Nonetheless, they refuse to connect their desire to see Greeks out of Macedonia with the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, such expectations are not groundless. The behavior of the Greek politicians in the last century feeds such thoughts. The pogroms of the 1950s by Turkey went unanswered, the invasion of Cyprus still lingers with the Greek leadership of the island ready to compromise the existence of their own country. The political "leadership" in Athens found the junta to be its easy scapegoat hoping to free themselves from the responsibility for the political instability and constitutional crisis they had imposed on Greece that gave the junta the excuse to intervene on April 21, 1967.

In Western Thrace, the Turk Consul General is actually in charge because the MFA of Greece, which is responsible for the area, is absolutely inactive. In addition, the Greek state has tolerated Skopje's propaganda on the name issue. These and some other similar sheepish responses of the Greek state reinforce Skopje's belief that everything is possible if one insists, persists, provokes, and harasses the Greeks. Everything has its limits and so does the patience of the Greek people.

9. Conclusion

The development of the national security policy and consequently strategy entails the full and undivided attention of every government, including countries who are members of the EU and NATO. No matter how strong the union and no matter how trustworthy the alliance, neither of them can replace the necessity of a sound national security and foreign policy based on collected intelligence.

The EU is a union of customs, commerce, and finance, not a political union. Even if one day the countries of the EU unite politically, it is doubtful if the union will last long. Since the peoples of the EU have different national heritages and goals, a future union would be as temporary as it was for the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. We saw what happened

⁶² Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," *Parameters*, XXIV, 4, Winter 1994-95, 4-18 in Selected Readings in Strategy and Force Planning, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, Vol I, SFP-3 Through SFP-18, p. 5.

with the countries that sprang up from them. Some of them resorted to war among themselves and others still have border disputes only because their federation took place under "brotherly" conditions. Only those states with clear-cut recognized borders before the federation came out of it without problems. In addition, in the last few years it became evident that the most economically powerful attempted to impose, and in some cases did impose, their will over the less fortunate countries.

NATO is an association of defense interests, an alliance that when common interests exist the organization comes into play a role. Experience has taught us that within NATO, the most powerful regard their interests as vital, while the same powers consider the interests of the less powerful as insignificant even when they are related to the member's national security.

Although these organizations give the feeling of security to some of its members, the fact is that no country, no matter how friendly or closely connected, can offer to another a guarantee of full support in time of need. Various circumstances might impede such assistance. Over the years of Tito's rule, *Macedonianism* was nurtured, aided, grew, and elusively changed its form, but because of a constant anti-Hellenic education, its goal has remained the same. For as long as Skopje continues to offer education of all sorts to its citizens based on anti-Hellenic absurdity, an agreement with Greece might materialize, but a solution on the issue will only exist in the imagination of naïve politicians. The crisis will linger, gradually becoming Greece's living nightmare. Slavs of the FYROM and its diaspora expect that the EU membership would allow them under the free movement chapters of the *acquis* to modify the demography of the Macedonian region of Greece in order to tilt the human terrain to their advantage.

Admittedly, not all problems have solutions, even bad ones, but given the fact that the political establishment of Greece has brought the country's national security through their insular mentality into question, the politically privileged of Greece must now manage any upcoming agreement with appropriate care preventing Skopje from establishing a threshold for future territorial claims.

Since the public opinion associates the name Macedonia to an existing homonymous country, it is natural that the public opinion also associates the historical, i.e. ancient Macedonia to the same country. Consequently, in the future, the country with the exclusive designation "Macedonia" would be at ease in claiming the territories of ancient Macedonia as its own integral part. In this manner, the name issue of Skopje becomes an issue of territorial integrity and consequently the national security of Greece.

Skopje's argument that any change of the country's name would affect the identity and language of the country, and by that very act would insult the "dignity" of its Slavic population, is inconsequential and of less importance to Greece. To Greece, its own territorial integrity is much more significant than Skopje's psychological problems. After all, Skopje has created its own problems.

Since 1944, the same people who keep selling nonsense about their “ethnic” Macedonian ancestry have insulted the dignity and the intelligence not only of their own people, but indeed the world. Skopje should have thought about the dignity of its people long before it started spreading *Macedonianism* as a historical fact and not as a political ploy that aspired annexation of Greek territories.

Conversely, Skopje bears full responsibility for its people’s identity, language, and psychological heritage problems given that Skopje’s successive governments since 1944 have been behind such deceptive designation such as ethnic “Macedonian,” “Macedonian language,” and “Macedonian heritage.” After all, the fact is that the term “Macedonian” was always used as a geographic designation followed by the ethnic designation, i.e. Macedonian Slavs, even according to Misirkov, “The designation Macedonian was first used by the Macedonian Slavs as a geographical term to indicate their birth. This designation is well known to the Macedonian Slavs and all of them use it to describe themselves,”⁶³ while Dimitar Vlahov agreed,

When I talk about Macedonian people, in first place, I have in mind the Macedonian Slavs. By the name Macedonian people, the Macedonian activists at that time have in mind the entire population of Macedonia, i.e. the word Macedonians had a geographical connotation... When the revolutionary organization was founded and began operating, I started working amidst those Macedonians who called themselves Bulgarians...⁶⁴

The fact is that all the inhabitants of Macedonia used and still use the same designation for reasons of birth, not just the Slavs. The difference is that the Bulgarians in Macedonia struggled for their recognition as separate from the Bulgarians legal entity, because not only they wanted independence from the Ottomans, but simultaneously they wanted to declare a “Peoples Republic” long before the establishment of the USSR. Had the brigands declared themselves Bulgarians fighting for a People’s Republic, they would have met with resistance by their own Bulgarian kin of the Principality along with the rest of Europe and especially the Russians.

But let us reflect on the transpired events since 1991. The FYROM is a country that a quarter of a century ago did not exist as an independent state and in terms of dealing with Greece, it has dominated the political scene in Europe and North America only by selling bogus arguments based on political hot air. In addition, although it has violated the Interim Agreement in any way it could, it has managed to persuade the ICJ that it has been the victim all along. That indicates the degree of political resolve, ability, and willingness of the FYROM to use its national power, something that Greece has neglected to do.

The reason for such neglect is that the political establishment, the academia, and the press of Greece are not convinced that the FYROM has constituted a national security threat to the country. They constantly underestimate the danger from the north. Consequently, they have passed their simple-minded sentiments to the people of Greece, which, although in its majority, is unwilling to let its heritage pass along to a Slav people, in its majority the Greek

⁶³ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 159.

⁶⁴ Димитар Влахов, *Мемоари*, Скопје, 1970, 21 (translation from the original is mine).

people (ὁ λαός) is unaware that the stakes are much higher than the various pseudo-cultured members of “intelligentsia” proclaim.

The name dispute between Greece and Skopje is not simply a “national issue,” but it is a “national security issue” for Greece. Greece had better treat it as such. In the last 22 years, considering their own convenience due to their natural ineffectiveness or chosen incompetence, the political establishment of Greece has downgraded “national security issues” to “national issues.” It is a political ploy that helped politicians to conveniently sweep under the rug a matter that no Greek would have ever accepted otherwise, the compromise of their country’s territorial integrity, if not its survival.

The elected officials and influential politicians of Greece bear the sole responsibility to handle the issue of Greece’s national security and territorial integrity in a dependable and responsible manner. Naïve, indifferent, whining, and “poor me” behavior would not absolve their guilt and condemnation by future generations for their intended actions or inactions. Although communists tend to blame the Westerners for the mess of the Macedonian Question, they should know that Russia is at fault. The source of the problem of the Macedonian Question is not the Americans, not even the Westerners; the Russians are. At least, it is what the former President of the Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” has explained,

Neither Marx nor Lenin, any more than Soviet academics or the leaders of the Bulgarian socialist movement, have ever overlooked or indeed concealed the fact that tsarist Russia - although objectively aiding the Balkan peoples to gain emancipation from Turkish rule, did make this problem more difficult, turning it into a question of the Balkan interests of the European imperialists precisely because it was pursuing its own conquest rather than the actual liberation of the Balkan peoples. History has also shown that in view of the balance of forces at the time, San Stefano Bulgaria was a fiction; that the European powers could accept the liberation of Bulgaria but not also the creation of a “greater Bulgaria” as an instrument of Russian policy in the Balkans. The Peace of San Stefano was concluded (on 3 March 1878), but San Stefano Bulgaria - never materialized because the Berlin Congress (on 13 July 1878) opposed it. An outburst of megalomania was paid for by the tearing apart of the Bulgarian nation.⁶⁵

And although the communists did not start the issue, they are the ones who, instead of helping with a solution, have become part of the problem. One cannot help, but seriously consider the last sentence “an outburst of megalomania was paid for by the tearing apart of

⁶⁵ Lazar Koliševski, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1980), 152. Lazar Koliševski aka Lazar Panev Kolišev was born on February 14, 1914, in Sveti Nikole, Kingdom of Serbia (present day The FYROM) and died on July 6, 2000 in Skopje, the FYROM. He was Second President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (May 4, 1980 - May 15, 1980), First President of the Executive Council of People’s Republic of “Macedonia” (April 16, 1945 - December 19, 1953), Sixth President of the People’s Assembly of PR Macedonia (December 19, 1953 - June 26, 1962), and First Chairman of the League of Communists of Macedonia (1945 - July 1963). Lazar Koliševski served the Yugoslavian People’s Army from its inception in 1941 until 1980 achieving the Rank of Major General.

the Bulgarian nation.” That means that the author lamented that the Bulgarian nation was split into Bulgarians of the Principality and those living in Macedonia.

However, Mr. Koliševski, who wrote the above, had declared himself Bulgarian in the past. In November 1941, the Bulgarian forces of occupation arrested Lazar Koliševski (then Kolišev) along with other communist leaders and a military tribunal in the Bitola District sentenced him to death, case number 133/941. During his incarceration awaiting execution Kolišev, in a letter dated December 7, 1941, petitioned the King of Bulgaria to grant him clemency declaring, “I am the son of Bulgarian parents, I felt and feel Bulgarian and despite the dreadful [Serbian] bondage I have remained in customs, language and values Bulgarian.”⁶⁶

As for the Greek simple-minded ideologists of opportunism, they had better understand that nobody has the right to endanger the national security of Greece by aiding and abetting the adversary, which in this case is the FYROM, a nation that unquestionably wants Greece’s dismemberment.

When on February 11, 1934, the Third Communist International Association, aka Comintern, decided to recognize a Third Slavic ethnic group in the Balkans besides the Serbian and Bulgarian, the “Macedonian” Slavs, it took into consideration Stalin’s understanding of what constituted a “nation.” Ivo Banač has hit the nail on its head when he observed,

“The growing successes of Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia created new conditions in the Balkan region, favorable to Yugoslav solutions for such thorny issues as that of Macedonia. Precisely because under the Stalinist dispensation nationhood was the decisive element in territorial claims, it was very important to decide whether the Macedonians were a separate nationality or simply a Bulgarian regional group.”⁶⁷

According to Stalin, “a nation is the product of capitalism with given characteristics. And ‘people’ – these are the working men of a given nation, that is, workingmen of the same language, culture, customs.”⁶⁸ When Djilas questioned him about the above definition of a “nation” referred to in his book *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin uttered “That was Ilyich’s – Lenin’s view. Ilyich also edited the book.”⁶⁹ Thus according to Lenin, as Stalin had mentioned, a “Nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.⁷⁰ As one notices, the word “ethnicity” is missing from both Stalin’s and Lenin’s basis of the nation.

⁶⁶ Petar Hristov Petrov, “Macedonia: history and political destiny” (Петър Христов Петров “Македонија: историја и политическа судба”), *Знание*, Софија 1998, 64; Утрински Весник, Број 1475 Понеделник, 16 октомври 2006; Снимка архиве, <http://media.snimka.bg/images/003068212-big.jpg> (accessed September 16, 2013).

⁶⁷ Ivo Banač, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933 – 1949* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2003), xxxix.

⁶⁸ Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962), 156-7.

⁶⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962), 157

⁷⁰ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (Moscow: Publishing House, 1946), 11.

The new country, *Balkan Soviet Socialist Federation*, would include the territory of the newly formed Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” or present day the FYROM, the Bulgarian territory of Blagoevgrad, and of course Greece’s region of Macedonia, i.e. Macedonia Proper. Therefore, since the south Balkans would be dominated by Slavs, the new “nation” and its language would be the prevailing “nation” and its “dominant” language in the new country, despite the fact that population of the Greek region of Macedonia was by far Greek. In his *On Macedonian Matters*, Misirkov argued exactly the same, “if one asks which will be the official language, the answer is – the language of the majority. Which majority? That remains to be seen. The question goes no further. Nobody asks how this majority will be discovered.”⁷¹

Tito’s disagreement with Stalin was whether the new state of a Socialist Macedonian Federation should exist. It was not as much about the political system of a Macedonian state, nor was it about the influence of Belgrade versus that of Moscow over the new country; Stalin had already cemented the power in his USSR. Stalin’s comment to Milovan Djilas, a high ranking Yugoslav official, was that Tito was an amateur and the fact that in Moscow he treated Tito in the first months of 1948 with indignation having the opportunity to eliminate him altogether, indicates Stalin’s political security.

The resolution of the Comintern, regarding the existence of the “Macedonian” nation, reminiscent of the “May Manifesto” of 1924, was drafted in the known communist parlance. The Comintern’s resolution stated, “The bourgeoisie of the dominant nations of the three imperialist powers, which have split Macedonia among them, are trying to conceal the national oppression and deny the national characteristics of the Macedonian people and the Macedonian nation” establishing the basis for the nation and the new state under full Slav communist control.⁷² Given that the issue of *Macedonianism* is the result of a communist decision to which the Greek Communist Party had consented, the members of the same ideology also bear full responsibility for this mess.⁷³

Even Comintern’s resolution did not solve the question of the “Macedonian nation.” The opinion of delegates and the differing drafts preceding the final decision oscillated between “Macedonian people,” which included all people of Macedonia regardless of ethnicity and the “Macedonian nation,” which referred solely to the Slavic population in Macedonia other than Serbs and Bulgarians. They even debated the definition of Macedonia. Without offering specific characteristics of the new nation, it became impossible for one to understand in what way the new nation would differ from the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nations.⁷⁴ As a result, the Serbian delegation walked out of the proceedings.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Krste P. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje, 1974), 46. also see К. П. Мисирковъ, *За Македонските Работи* (София: Либерални Клуб, 1903), 9.

⁷² Lazar Koliševski, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1980), 232.

⁷³ Eleutherios Stavridis (Ελευθέριος Σταυρίδης), *Τα παρασκήνια του ΚΚΕ*, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, σελ.174-180.

⁷⁴ Spyridon Sfetas, “The Birth of ‘Macedonianism’ in the Interwar Period” in *The History of Macedonia*, ed. Ioannis Koliopoulos, Musesum of the Macedonian Struggle (Thessaloniki, 2007) 289-292.

⁷⁵ Eleutherios Stavridis (Ελευθέριος Σταυρίδης), *Τα παρασκήνια του ΚΚΕ*, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, σελ.183.

Now, Greek simple-minded ideologists of opportunism are expected to contribute to a real and concrete solution of the name issue bearing in mind the protection of the heritage and the national security of Greece, not the expansionist vision of Skopje. "The ancient Greek theory of war was that if the growing crops were threatened, the inhabitants of the walled cities would be obliged either to come to terms or to fight in order to protect them."⁷⁶ At present, the threat to the crops is very real. The stance of Greece must change and demonstrate a direct and firm position. Greece must demand a clear and viable solution, not subject to future political or legal interpretations.

Skopje is already feeling the beginning of instability due to the Slavic ultra-nationalist narrative which bypasses the reality of the 40% ethnic Albanians along with the minimum 10% of all other ethnic groups, all FYROM nationals. All minorities proclaimed their own numeric superiority over the official numbers thus making Skopje's official demographic statistics questionable. It is safer to say that its Slavic population might be a majority against individual ethnic groups, but a minority before the total; it is a minority-majority. Unless the Slavic led government of Skopje succeeds in taking the first steps in claiming the Greek region of Macedonia, i.e. history, ethnicity, language, heritage, etc., the country could implode. From Skopje's rhetoric and their actions, it is obvious that Skopje has positioned itself at the verge of an eventual, but certain claim on the land that Pavlos Melas had depicted, "Macedonia is the lung of Greece; without it the rest of Greece would be condemned to death."

⁷⁶ Sir Reginald Neville Custance, *A study of War* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), 71.

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The Greek-Americans and Balkan Wars 1912-13: Helping the old homeland

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1.0 Introduction

This study is about the reception and preparation of the Greek-American community to the Balkan Wars 1912-13 which also raised the issue of ethnic identity and divided loyalties between the old homeland and the adopted one. The Greeks, who migrated to the U.S during the period 1880-1910, were very anxious to maintain their ethnic identity and close ties with the old homeland (*patrida*) in a hostile environment dominated by sentiments of xenophobia and racial prejudice.

Heece, Greek-Americans showed their patriotism and loyalty to fight for their *patrida* against the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars 1912-13. They would have followed the events of the Balkans through the pages of their popular Greek language newspapers including *Athena*, *Loxias*, and the *Greek Star* published in Chicago (Illinois) and *Atlantis*, *Pan Hellenic* and *Satyros* in New York City , *Patris* in Lowell (Massachusetts), *Ergatis* in Manchester (New Hampshire) *Enosis* in Pittsburg (Pennsylvania) , Phos in *Salt Lake City* (Utah) and *Eirenikos* and *California* in San Francisco which reported on the war clouds gathering in a region described as “the powder keg of Europe.” The *Atlantis* published as a daily newspaper was by far the largest circulating Greek paper in the US with copies sold approaching 30,000.¹

Educated Greeks who spoke English probably kept up-to-date on Balkan affairs through the pages of both American and Greek-American newspapers. This article will not discuss the actual Balkan conflict but will focus on U.S mainstream newspapers reporting how ordinary Greeks living in New York City, Illinois and Indiana mobilized into action to the Balkan conflict. They reported also on the important role played by Greek-American organizations and Greek Consuls organizing public meetings and inspiring the Greek community into action.²

¹ Thomas Burgess, *Greeks in America*, Sherman, French & Company, Boston, 1913, pp.67&69; S. Victor Papacosma, The Greek press in America, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. V, no.4, Winter, 1979, pp.48-9 & 56; N.W. Ayer and Son's, *American Newspaper and Directory 1912*, N.W Ayer and Son, Philadelphia, 1912, pp.83,169, 175,392,595, 628, 643 and 942; Paul Koken, Theodore N. Constant and Seraphim G. Canoutas, *A History of the Greeks in the Americas 1453-1938*, Proctor Publications, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p.229

² The vast majority of the American newspapers used in this study other than the *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor* have been extracted from *Chronicling America*, Historic American newspaper via the Library of Congress website.

The Pan-Hellenic Union with its chapters throughout the US played a very important role in helping to mobilize Greek-Americans who wanted to fight in the Balkan Wars and also raised funds for the war effort. Many Greek-Americans did their military service in Greece before migrating to the U.S and their past military training proved a valuable asset for the Greek army's triumphs over the Ottoman Empire.

It should be noted that the American Red Cross and "other" Red Cross societies raised money to assist the relief efforts of the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian Red Cross societies and Turkish Red Crescent.

There is no clear cut evidence to support the notion as to how many exactly Greek-Americans repatriated participating in the Balkan campaigns and how many of them decided to remain in Greece at the end of hostilities. However estimates range from 30,000-40,000 men who volunteered to fight in the Balkans. Those who returned to America were greeted as heroes by their respective communities and quickly resumed their jobs and business activities.

1.1 Background of Greeks in America at the time of the Balkan Wars.

The great majority of the Greeks who lived in the United States in the period under review were of peasant background. They lived mainly in small villages and mountainous areas of Greece working as shepherds and small farmers with many of them being illiterate. The great wave of Greek migration was between 1880-1920 where over 370,000 of them settled in almost every corner of the United States.³ This figure excluded Greeks from Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus, Rumania and other parts of the Mediterranean.

Chicago and New York had the largest Greek concentration of any US cities with 15,000 and 20,000 respectively. In these two cities, Greeks owned restaurants, shoeshine parlors, shoe repair, florist, confectionary, ice cream parlors, hotel business, street peddlers selling fruit, barbershops, coffee-houses and importers.

The Greeks of New England (Massachusetts and Maine) were unskilled labourers employed in carpet, cotton spinning and shoe factories. In the mid-West and western regions, labour agents (padrones) played a critical role in the hire of Greeks on railroad, waterfront, construction and mining jobs in Iowa, Utah, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon and Washington. ⁴ The Greek 'padrone' system involved an individual who usually was an old

³ For a comprehensive study on the life of early Greeks see Burgess (1913), Theodore Saloutos (1963) *The Greeks in the United States*, Harvard University; A. M. Tamis (2006) *Greeks in Latin America*, Ellinika Grammata, Athens; also A. M. Tamis (2014), *Macedonian Hellenes in Oceania*, (2014); also M. G. Kassotis (2014), *The Dodecanesian presence in America*, Stegi Grammaton kai Tecnon Dodekanisou, Athens.

⁴ Andrew T. Kopan , Ch.9 Greek survival in Chicago, in Peter d'Alroy Jones [ed], *Ethnic Chicago*, Wm B. Eerdman's Publishing, Grand Rapids, MI, 1995, pp.262, 276-7,280 &283; Charles C.Moskos, *Greek Americans, struggle and success 2nd ed*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ,1990, pp.23-5,123-6 &156; JP Xenides, *The Greeks in America*, George H. Doran &Co, New York, 1922, pp.81-4; Thomas Burgess, *Greeks in*

immigrant who acted as a labour contractor finding work for new immigrants for an employer. In return, the contractor would extract a monthly fee from the wages of workers for his services. Sometimes workers were required to pay rent for accommodation provided by the employer and purchase goods from the company store where these expenses were deducted from their wages. A good example was Leon Skliris who “controlled access to nearly all mining and railroad jobs in Utah.”⁵ These immigrant workers were exploited by both the labour agent and employer.

During the period 1880-1920, the first wave of Greek immigrants to the U.S were predominately young males, from Greek rural areas and unskilled labourers from the urban centres, who maintained their ethnic identity and customs in a strange land. They preserved their ethno-linguistic and cultural identity establishing the conventional infrastructure that assisted Greeks in the Diaspora to display their loyalty to the Hellenic legacies during their 4,000 long history: at home they used exclusively the Greek, set up Orthodox Churches, Greek schools, fraternities, coffee-houses (*kafenion*), funding their own newspapers, and living in isolated and secluded linguistic and cultural clusters, their neighbourhoods known as Greek-towns. The *kafenion* was a social meeting place for Greeks to discuss politics of the old world, drink coffee, meet friends, read Greek-American newspapers and speak their language. The first generation of Greek immigrants wanted to their children to learn and speak Greek and also maintain the customs and traditions of the *patrida*. They very proud of their ancient history and saw themselves as inheritors of ancient Greece and Byzantium.⁶

The collapse of the price of Greece's principal export, currants in 1893, due to the imposition of high duties by France on Greek imports had a marked impact in the economic fortunes of many small Greek cultivators. Many of them migrated to America in the hope of making their fortunes. Economic gain was the driving force behind the transatlantic journey to America.⁷ Once settled in America, these immigrants wrote letters to their families and friends in Greece telling them of economic opportunities and encouraging male relatives to follow them. The ratio of Greek men to women entering the U.S was

America, Sherman Franks & Co, Boston, 1913, Ch.6; Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Greek Immigration to America*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1911, pp.133, 138-9, 147-50 & 258; Leara D. Rhodes, *The Ethnic Press: Shaping the American dream*, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2010, p.101; see also Saloutos (1963); also Tamis (2014).

⁵ Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free labour: Immigrant Padrones and Contract Labourers in North America, 1885-1925, *Journal of American History*, Vol.83, no.3, December, 1996, p.848; Phillip J. Mellinger, *Race and Labour in Western Copper*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1995, pp. 94, 103, 107, and 111; Helen Zeese Papanikolas, Life and Labour among the Immigrants of Bingham County, *Utah Historical Quarterly*, Vol.33, no.4, Fall 1965, pp.294-8

⁶ Andrew T. Kopan, Ch.9 Greek survival in Chicago, in Peter d'Alroy Jones [ed], *op cit*, pp.286-7; Theodore Saloutos, The Greeks of Milwaukee, *The Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol.53, no.3, Spring, 1970, pp.182-87; Ann W. Ellis, The Greek community in Atlanta, 1900-1923, *The Georgia Historical Quarterly*, Vol.58, no.4, Winter, 1974, pp.402-03; Theodore Saloutos, *The Greeks in the United States*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964, pp.78-80. Hereafter cited as *The Greeks in the United States*

⁷ Moskos, *op cit*, p.10-11; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece. A history since 1821*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.61; A. Andreades, The Currant crisis in Greece, *The Economic Journal*, Vol.16, no.61, (Mar., 1906), pp.41-2 in http://www.arts.yorku.ca/hist/tgallant/documents/andreadescurrantcrisis_000.PDF (accessed October 13, 2014)

around 20 to 1 in the period under investigation.⁸ These letters encouraged chain migration when an individual brought family members and friends to join him in America. However, these Greeks had no intention of settling permanently in the US other than making their economic fortunes and returning to their home villages by flaunting their wealth.⁹

America may have been paved with gold for some Greeks who ran successful businesses, however there was a dark side where Greeks faced racism, intolerance, xenophobia and discrimination from Americans. The Americans viewed Greeks with suspicion as the latter wasn't interested in adopting American customs, they congregated in a certain neighbourhoods of a city or town and did not want to learn English. From an economic standpoint, the American Federation of Labour considered Greeks and other South East Europeans as cheap unskilled labour who threatened wages and the standard of living of American workers. There was even talk of curbing Greek immigration but nothing ever came of this.¹⁰ This provides the background to the anti-Greek riots against Greek owned businesses and strikes by miners and lumber workers which took place just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.

The anti-Greek riots against Greek businesses occurred in Roanake (Virginia) and Omaha (Nebraska) in 1907 and 1909 respectively. In the former case, the cause of the dispute was over money between Greek restaurant employee and an American customer. With emotions running high a mob attacked nine Greek restaurants and three shoe shine parlors and two Syrian businesses.¹¹ The latter event occurred after a police officer was sent out to arrest a Greek named John Masourides for vagrancy but on the way to the police station Masourides pulled out a gun and killed the officer. However there were tensions simmering below the surface as local Americans regarded Greeks as unwelcome residents as they worked cheap, did not mix, insulted women, would not make good citizens and Q Street became Greektown.

The murder triggered an anti-Greek riot in Omaha where many Greek businesses were looted and destroyed by the mob. Some Greeks were beaten and injured by the angry rabble. A petition and newspaper articles appearing in the Omaha press did not help the situation either. Many Greeks left Ohama seeking a new place to start over again including

⁸ Stavros T. Constantinou, Ethnic residential shifts: the Greek population of Akron, 1930-2005, *GeoJournal*, (2007), pp.259-60; Moskos, *op cit.*, p.27

⁹ Nancy Kleniewski and Alexander Thomas, *City Change and Conflict 4th ed*, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 2011, pp.172-4; John D. Buenker, *The Progressive Era, 1893-1914, Vol.4*, Worzalla Publishing Co, Stevens Point, Wisconsin, pp. 204-06; Moskos, *op cit.*, p.12; Fairchild, *op cit.*, p.87

¹⁰ *The Greeks in the United States*, pp.62-3

¹¹ 'Roanake Greeks appeal to Consul for protection', *Tazewell Republic*, July 18, 1907, p. 1; 'Will Protect Greeks...Protest to State Department', *Daily Press*, July 16, 1907, p.8; 'Roanake Greeks appeal to Consul', *The Times Dispatch*, July 15, 1907, p.1; 'Twenty Indicted. Roanake Grand Jury act in Greek riot case', *Washington Herald*, July 18, 1907, p.1; For history of the Greek community in Richmond Virginia, see Nicole Kappatos, *Greek immigration to Richmond, Virginia, and the Southern Variant Theory*, Masters Thesis, Virginia Commonwealth University, Department of History, Richmond, Virginia, May 2014 in https://digarchive.library.vcu.edu/bitstream/handle/10156/4969/Kappatos_Nicole_MS.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on October 17, 2014)

workers who requested their pay from the meatpacking company. The Omaha incident triggered further anti-Greek riots on a smaller scale in Kansas City (Kansas) and Dayton (Ohio). In 1915, damages of \$40,000 were paid to the Greek Government for the Omaha riot.¹² These two anti-Greek riots showed openly the American hostility and disdain towards Greeks.

On the industrial front, Greeks were involved in lumber and mining strikes in Grays Harbor, (Washington State), Bingham (Utah) and Ely (Nevada) in 1912. At Grays Harbor lumber workers went out on strike in March seeking higher wages with the mill owner ignoring their claim. It was dubbed "the Greek strike" by the *Aberdeen Herald* showing a disdain for Greeks and other newly arrived immigrants on racial grounds. Anyone who turned an offer of employment by the mill owner was to be deported from the town. This gave the locals the opportunity to force 100 Greeks to leave the region.¹³

A miners' strike in Bingham (Utah) was over higher wages which the Western Federation of Labour (WEF) tried to negotiate with the mine owners:Utah Copper in September. Whilst the Greeks supported the strike, they would only return to work so long as 'labour contractor', Leon Skliris was dismissed and prepared to work for the same rate of pay. Utah Copper dismissed him but the Greeks tried to stop the company from bringing in strike breakers. However a battle followed "between strike breakers and deputy sheriffs and strikers" which left five men wounded. One Greek wounded died two weeks later. The strike ended in November with the miners only receiving half the increase that the WEF tried to negotiate with Utah Copper.¹⁴

In Nevada, the strikers there wanted higher wages too. It is interesting to note that on June 7, 1907 the *White Pine News* considered the Greek workers to be of "inferior intelligence" and unsuitable for citizenship. It stated that " we welcome intelligent, industrious foreigners and we will always welcome them, but our gates should be closed to

¹² John G. Bitzes, The anti-Greek riot of 1909-South Omaha, *Nebraska History*, 51 (1970), pp.202-09 in http://www.nebraskahistory.org/publish/publicat/history/full-text/1970-2-Anti_Greek_Riot.pdf (accessed October 17, 2014); *The Greeks in the United States*, pp.66-9; Paul A.Gilje, *Rioting in America*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999, pp.128-9; 'Mob attacks Greeks...', *Omaha Daily Bee*, February 22, 1909, p.1; 'Three Orators explain...Glad insolent Greeks are gone', *Omaha Daily Bee*, February 23, 1909, pp.1-2; 'Rioters attacked a store. Mob at Dayton .Demolished the front of a Business house owned by Greeks', *Marion Daily Mirror*, February 23, 1909, p.2; 'Rioters attacked a store', *Perrysburg Journal*, February 26, 1909, p.2

¹³ Philip J. Dreyfus, The IWW and the limits of Inter-Ethnic Organizing, *Labour History*, 38, Fall, 1997, pp.457-61; 'Strike closes tow big mills...Greeks resist arrest', *Aberdeen Herald*, March 18, 1912 p.1; 'Foreigners are sent away', *Aberdeen Herald*, April 1, 1912, pp.1-2; For a discussion of class struggle and class formation in Grays Harbor with special focus on International Workers World (IWW), see Aaron A. Goings, *Red Harbor: Class, Violence, and Community in Grays Harbor, Washington*, PhD Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada, 2011, 513ff in <http://libcom.org/files/redharbor.pdf> (accessed October 17, 2014)

¹⁴ Helen Papanikolas, Toil and Rage in a new land. The Greek immigrants in Utah, *Utah Historical Quarterly*, Vol.38, no.2, Spring 1970, pp.121-33; 'Complaint against Skliris refused', *Evening Standard*, October 4, 1912, p.11; 'Guard fires on strikers. Greek Miner at Bingham shot at Bingham during fight with deputies', *Evening Standard*, October 11, 1912, p.1; 'Test comes at Bingham; Armed men in ambush to thwart strike breakers', *Salt Lake Tribune*, September 20, 1912, pp.1-2; 'Striking Miners fire on Sheriffs', *New York Times*, September 19, 1912, p.6

barbarians." The article shows clearly the anti-Greek and racist stance by the press in White Pine County and the loathing of the "other." During the strike two Greek miners were shot dead.¹⁵ It is clear that Greek miners action ended the padrone system and also sought to improve their wages despite the difficulties which they encountered.

At the time of the Balkan wars 1912-13, it is estimated that some 42,000 Greeks from the US offered their services for the mother land. Many of them left their businesses and jobs in great numbers to hurry back to fight for Greece.¹⁶ It is difficult to ascertain the actual number of Greek Americans who participated in the Balkan wars; but their numbers boosted significantly the fighting strength of the Greek military and naval forces. The *Christian Science Monitor* called the Greek-Americans soldiers "magnificent", "efficient" and proved a "large factor in the Balkan struggle."¹⁷

2. Pan Hellenic Union and the mobilization of Greeks in New York City

In early October 1912, the *New York Times* published a number of articles highlighting that war was imminent in the Balkans. The Greeks who read English would have followed such stories with interest and would want to volunteer to fight for their homeland against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ Several days later, the same newspaper suggested that possibly 75,000 Greeks could return to Greece from the United States. It quoted two royal decrees which the Greek legation received in Washington . The first one stated that all reservists who served between 1900-1909 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and a part of 8th military divisions between 1896-1899 were being called up. However the second decree mobilized all non-commissioned officers in the infantry, artillery, and light infantry between 1896-1899 to report for active duty.¹⁹ Any reservist who failed to enlist faced jail and could be banished permanently from returning to Greece.

The Pan Hellenic Union was the prime Greek-American organization that handled all enlistments for the Balkan Wars. This organization was established in 1908 in Boston

¹⁵ E. D. Karampetsos, Nativism in Nevada: Greek Immigrants in White Pine County, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol.24.1 (1998), General Issue, pp.66-7; 'Mine Strikers in ugly mood.Greeks...at Ely, Nevada using guns and clubs on those who would work', *The Holt County*, October 18, 1912, p.6;'Martial Law in Ely. Warrants out for mine officers over murder of Two Greek strikers', *New York Times*, October 18, 1912, p.1; In Pocatello, Idaho the Greeks were "restricted to segregated seating in the theatres and could not live in most neighborhoods." see Dan Georgakas, The Greeks in America, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol.14 nos.1 &2, Spring-Summer 1987, p.22; For history of Pocatello, see Mary Katsilometes Scott, The Greek Community in Pocatello, 1890-1941, *Idaho Yesterdays*, 28,(Fall 1984), pp.29-36

¹⁶ Michael Walzer, *The politics of ethnicity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p.113; Andrew T. Kopan , Ch.9 Greek survival in Chicago, in Peter d'Alroy Jones [ed], *op cit*, p.296 ; 'Greeks off to war desert hotel jobs', October 22, *New York Times*, 1912, p.2

¹⁷ 'American Greeks in Balkan War are called magnificent', *Christian Science Monitor*, December 19, 1912, p.2 & 'Greek-Americans large factor in the Balkan struggle', May 28, 1914, p. 6

¹⁸ 'Danger Spot of Europe. An outbreak in the Balkans has been feared for many years'; 'Ottoman Army to be mobilized .Porte refuses Serbia's demand...' & 'War is begun in the Balkans', October 1, 2 & 4, *New York Times*, 1912, pp.3.1 &1

¹⁹ '75,000 Greeks may return. That number of residents of America are effected by Royal decrees', October 6, *New York Times*, 1912, p.4

whose aims were to assist Greeks in distress and to promote the interests of Hellenism in the United States. It acted like an "agency" of the Greek State to ensure the immigrants didn't become Americanized. The appointment of Lambros Coromilas, as Greek Minister in Washington, was part of the Greek government's strategy to work with the Pan Hellenic Union to ensure that Greeks in America remained loyal to the homeland. It was hoped that the Pan Hellenic Union with its branches all over the United States would unite all Greeks under its banner. They got a rude shock when it tried to impose a \$12 head tax on all Greeks hoping to raise \$2.5 million in 1910. All collected funds would go directly to the Pan Hellenic Union in Boston to cover its expenses with the balance being remitted to the Greek treasury in Athens. Resolutions were passed denouncing such a move.²⁰ Even at this early stage, it showed that such a monolithic organization would find it difficult to unite Greeks who identified themselves with their regional fraternal organizations.²¹

On October 6 and 7, the *New York Times* and *the Sun* (New York) reported that the Greek ship *Macedonia* had sailed for Piraeus laden with large artillery and ammunition from Bethlehem steel works and was not permitted under US law to carry passengers since it carried explosives. However, the Greek Consul General in New York, Demetrios Botassi had arranged for the transportation of 600 reservists on the Austro-American liner *Martha Washington* for Patras. Accommodation was organized for 550 reservists in boarding houses near the harbour to await the next ship to transport them to Greece.²² Over the next couple of weeks, Greek ships *Macedonia*, *Patras* and *Themistocles*, Fabre line *Madonna* and *Venezia*, Cunard liner *Ivernia* along with Austro-American ships were taking Greek reservists from New York and Boston. Those residing in Philadelphia, the Mid-West and other parts of the United States would later join the exodus to the Balkans. Meanwhile Botassi was busy registering individuals with previous military service, checking military papers showing length of service and informing reservists of any new regulations.²³

²⁰ Yiannis G. S. Papadopoulos, 'The Role of Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Shaping Greek American Identity, 1890-1927: A Historical Analysis', pp. 16-17 in

https://www.academia.edu/1098815/The_Role_of_Nationalism_Ethnicity_and_Class_in_Shaping_Greek_American_Identity_1890-1927, (accessed October 14, 2014); 'Greek Co-operation urged Minister Coromilas Counsels them to obey the laws', January 17, *The Philadelphia Record*, 1910, p.4; 'To Tax Greeks in America', January 18, *Boston Evening Transcript*, 1910, p.2; 'Greeks stand by Minister. Denounce report of Head Tax on Hellenic natives in this country', January 24, *Washington Post*, 1910, p.8; Burgess, *op cit*, pp.64-5

²¹ Yiannis G. S. Papadopoulos outlines the local divisions emerging in the Greek-American community in New York between the Ralli and Vlasto factions. He also mentions the role of Coromilas who misjudged these local divisions and centers of power. Vlasto who published the *Atlantis* used the columns of his newspaper to argue that the Greek Government had no business meddling in the affairs of Greek-American community and supported immigrants becoming naturalized citizens. See Yiannis G. S. Papadopoulos, *op cit*, pp.16-18

²² 'Six Hundred Greeks sail. But they are barred from the Macedonia, carrying war supplies', October 6, *New York Times*, 1912, p.4; '600 Greeks will leave to-day to fight the Turks....', October 7, *The Sun*, 1912, p.4

²³ 'Young Greeks in America push home to fight', October 20, *New York Times*, 1912, p.SM3; 'Greeks at Chicago', October 14, *Salt Lake Telegram*, 1912, p.8; '300 Greeks kneel to pray, Before departing Davenport, Iowa...', October 23, *The Quincy Daily*, 1912, p.1; On October 24 and 25, 1912 the *Argentina*, *Patris* and *Santa Ana* (Fabre line) sailed with about 1500 Greek reservists (approximately 500 per ship) for Greece. As the demand increased for Greeks seeking passage to Greece, shipping companies took advantage of this by increasing their fares. See 'Under the heavy Balkan War cloud. Men among New York's Greeks eager to fight for country', November 3, *The Sun*, 1912, 3rd section, p.10

The Pan Hellenic Union moved its headquarters from Boston to New York since all Greeks departed from that city. It swung immediately into action where “Greek patriots” and “American sympathizers” contributed \$70,000 to help the Greek cause. Many Greeks visited the temporary headquarters of the Pan Hellenic Union seeking information about Greek affairs and also contributing funds. Many poor Greeks gave what they could afford to assist their homeland. The Pan Hellenic Union was elated at the Montenegrin successes over the Turks.²⁴ Such victories could only entice many young Greeks to enlist for service.

Besides its enlistment activities, the Pan Hellenic Union conducted public meetings where a variety of speakers addressed huge audiences regarding the Balkan conflict and rallying Greeks to do their patriotic duty for their homeland. A public meeting conducted at the Amsterdam Opera House attracted an audience of 5,000 with another 1,000 standing outside due to insufficient seating inside the auditorium. The gathering is described as a “wildly enthusiastic affair” with many volunteers ready to go to Greece. Dr Constantine Papamichalopoulos, General Manager of the Pan Hellenic Union, told the attendees to do their patriotic duty for their homeland either by fighting or contributing funds and that “Crete must be freed.” It was reported that the Union contributed \$15,000 and the owner of the Athens hotel gave \$500 to launch the fundraising process. Constantine Zampasulis, editor of the Greek-American weekly *Satyros*, was overcome with emotion after reading out a poem. Then came the turn of Rev. Curculis, the pastor of the Greek Orthodox Church, who gave a rousing address couched in religious terms appealing to the patriotism of all Greeks. He said:

Sons and daughters of God. It is your duty to fight for the sake of God and your country. Constantinople once was held by the Christians, but now is occupied by the infidel Turks. Your brethren in Macedonia, Albania, Constantinople, and everywhere that the Turks rule are suffering from their atrocities. These Turks are at the same time the foes of all civilization. Stand up and fight them for the sake of God, your country and civilization.

The speech is about fighting for God, King and country and also liberating the unredeemed Greeks living outside the borders of the small Hellenic Kingdom. It raised the issue of the great idea which was one of the central tenets of Greek foreign policy by expanding its frontiers.²⁵

The occupation of Thessaloniki by Greek troops on November 8 and the triumphal entry of Crown Prince Constantine would have fired up the imagination of Greeks everywhere.²⁶

²⁴ ‘Raises \$70,000 for Greeks. Pan-Hellenic Union’s fund includes many gifts from the poor’, October 12, *New York Times*, 1912, p.3; For Montenegrin military reports, see ‘Montenegro’s declaration’ October 9, *New York Times*, 1912, p.6; October 11 & 13, *New York Times*, 1912, pp.1 & 18; ‘Big war now inevitable...King Nicholas of Montenegro declares a ‘Holy Undertaking’..Battle confirmed’, October 10, *The Sun*, 1912, p.1; ‘Montenegrins defeat Turks in battle’, October 10, *New York Tribune*, 1912, p.1

²⁵ ‘New York Greeks anxious for war, raise \$20,000 at one meeting and are ready to go home to serve’, October 7, *New York Times*, 1912, p.4; ‘...Pan Hellenic holds its largest meeting in America. 5,000 to go within week’, October 7, *The Sun*, 1912, p.4

²⁶ ‘Thessaloniki falls...’, & ‘Prince enters Thessaloniki. Heir to Greek throne leads division into the captured city’, November 9 & 11, *New York Times*, 1912, pp.3&2

This was reflected at another meeting organised by the Union at Grand Central Palace “to celebrate the Allies and Greek victories.” Botassi introduced US Admiral Colvocoresses to the audience. The admiral told them that he wanted the Turks driven out of Europe and that the Greeks should cast their past glories aside. Their disunity led to their downfall but “you are now united.” Other attendees included: Augustinos Synodinos, President of the Union in Boston, Harilaos Economidi, owner of the daily Greek newspaper, *Pan Hellenic*, Constantine Papamichalopoulos, Dr Thanos Alexian, C.P Ralli and Rev Curculis. Synadinos and Botassi announced that the Greek Government through finance minister, Kyriakos Diomidis had authorized a war loan for a million dollars to be raised in the US. This loan would be covered by bonds issued to lenders who would receive no interest after 10 years.²⁷ It showed the role of the Union using its influence in the Greek community and working closely with the Greek Consulate to raise funds for the war effort.

On February 12, 1913 a report titled ‘When Greek meets Greek’ appeared in the *Boston Evening Transcript* suggesting that monies collected for the Greek war loan might have been misappropriated. Eleftherios Anastastos and Greeks of Boston had filed an injunction through their lawyer Walter F. Frederick against the Union to stop them raising any further funds immediately for the Greek war effort. Some \$200,000 had been raised in New England which was then handed over to Papamichalopoulos. There were two reasons which irked the plaintiffs. Firstly, the Union had gone beyond its original charter of being a charitable social organization by raising funds for political purposes. There was no problem in raising money to pay transportation costs of Greek reservists to Greece; and as subscribers and members of the Union, they demanded Papamichalopoulos to show an account of how their money was being expended. To make matters worse, Papamichalopoulos departed for Greece who failed to produce the information sought by the plaintiffs.

The counsel for the plaintiffs would refer this matter to the Tax Commissioner and Attorney General of Massachusetts “for purpose of instituting proceedings to determine by what warrant the defendant has raised money for war uses.”²⁸ At this stage no evidence has been found to see if the Massachusetts authorities instituted formal proceedings against Michalopoulos. His departure from the U.S would have created suspicion in the minds of the plaintiffs thinking that he may absconded with their funds.

3. The American Red Cross and “other” Red Cross societies

Whilst the Union was actively engaged assisting the Greek war effort, the American Red Cross would play its part, too. On October 4, 1912 a Red Cross committee established in Athens cabled the Pan Hellenic Union that war was imminent and “ to set the machinery of

²⁷ ‘U.S Admiral wants Turks driven out.’, November 11, *New York Times*, 1912, p.3; ‘War loan for Greece. Pan-Hellenic Union of New York to authorize to issue bonds’, November 11, *Washington Post*, 1912, p.5; ‘Greeks to raise big war fund in U.S’, *Christian Science Monitor*, November 13, 1912, p.14

²⁸ ‘When Greek meets Greek. An attempt made to have Pan Hellenic Union enjoined from collecting money’, February 12, *Boston Evening Transcript*, 1913, p.4; ‘Boston Greeks ask for an accounting’, *Salt Lake Tribune*, February 13, 1913 p.14

patriotism in motion." A second cable received on October 18 stated that "war is declared. Make appeal for funds." This communication was circulated to all Greek communities politicising funds for the Red Cross throughout the U.S. A New York Greek Red Cross committee was established consisting of DM Botassi, the Greek Consul-General in New York, Constantine Papamichalopoulos, and A.P Ralli as treasurer and secretary, to handle all monies collected for war relief. During the first week of its appeal the Greek Red Cross society raised \$7,000 from both Greeks and American sympathizers. A poor Greek woman sent 31 cents in stamps in an enclosed envelope towards the relief fund.²⁹

The American Red Cross (ARC) was concerned at the intense competition in raising money from "other" Red Cross committees operating in the US. It issued a formal statement that the A.R.C was the sole legitimate organization where funds could be raised for Balkan war relief. Other so-called Red Cross societies "where claiming to act in the name of the national committees of foreign countries" where in fact violating US federal law.³⁰

On August 22, 1911 President Taft who was also honorary president of A.R.C, put it in plain language regarding A.R.C's official position in fundraising. He said:

That the American Red Cross is the only volunteer society authorized by this Government to render aid to its land and naval forces in time of war; that any other society desiring to render similar assistance can do so only through the American National Red Cross.³¹

The news articles indicate that Greek Red Cross of New York probably may have bypassed the A.R.C by remitting its subscriptions directly to Greece.

Taft made a direct appeal, on behalf of the American Red Cross, to the American public to give generously to the wounded, sick and destitute because of the Balkan conflict. He stated that the medical resources available were inadequate to cope with the rising number of wounded and sick soldiers. The A.R.C would act with "impartiality" in its dealings "to all the combatants" irrespective of race, religion or creed. European nations sent surgeons and nurses to the battlefields but due to great distance the "American Red Cross will not send expeditions of trained personnel." Subscriptions could be sent to the American Red Cross in Washington, Jacob H. Schiff, Red Cross treasurer in New York City and to any local Red Cross chapter.³²

²⁹ 'Under the heavy Balkan War Cloud ...', November 3, *The Sun*, 1912, 3rd section, p.10; 'Red Cross appeal for funds. Greek Committee asks aid from the American people', October 20, *New York Times*, 1912, p.2; 'Stamps swell war fund. Greek Red Cross gets 'widow's mite', totalling 31 cents', November 1, *New York Times*, 1912, p.2

³⁰ 'Only one legal Red Cross. Other organizations have no right to use the name here', November 29, *New York Times*, 1912, p.2; 'Red Cross issues protest against rival collections', *Washington Post*, November 29, 1912, p.3

³¹ Sarah E. Pickett, *The American National Red Cross*, The Century Co, New York, 1923, p.17

³² 'American Red Cross, Appeal of President Taft and International Relief Board', ltr to editor, November 7, *New York Tribune*, 1912, p.8; 'Call for funds by Red Cross', November 9, *Boston Daily Globe*, 1912, p.4; 'Seeks aid. American Red Cross society wants contributors for Balkan relief', November 8, *Youngstown Vindicator*, 1912, p.7; *Washington Post*, November 10, 1912, p.11

The *New York Times*' in its two editorials 'Help needed in the Balkans' and 'A Pressing appeal' of November 11 and 21, 1912 respectively echoed President Taft's comments about America being too far away to send trained personnel but implored its readers "to lose no time in sending in generous subscriptions" and to "request that any subscription be devoted to the aid of any designated nationality will be needed."³³ The press was the only medium through which politicians or the A.R.C could appeal directly to the public for funds. Readers were given the choice to nominate either the Red Crescent or Red Cross or nationality where they wanted their money directed too.

Queen Olga of Greece made a direct appeal to a Greek-American newspaper in New York seeking assistance in the U.S. Breck Trowbridge, an architect, who was well known in Athens organized a committee to raise funds in New York. The committee included some prominent women such as Mrs Vanderbilt, Mrs William Douglas Sloane, Mrs Cornelius Vanderbilt and Mrs Breck Trowbridge. Breck Trowbridge and Demetre J.Vlasto were the two males on the committee. A fund was created under the name 'American fund for the relief of the destitute families of the Greek-Turkish war' to raise money for relief of destitute Greek women and children whose villages were burned by retreating Turkish forces. The appeal was authorized by Queen Olga and the Union of Greek women of Athens with the Greek Minister in Washington "attach[ing] the official seal to it." All collected funds would be transmitted via the A.R.C.

On November 18, *New York Times* published a story that the *Atlantis* newspaper had been running its own appeal for a month at the request of the Greek Crown Princess Sophia where its readers contributed \$95,541. It stopped its appeal once hearing of Trowbridge's fund. Furthermore it is not clear whether the funds raised by the *Atlantis* newspaper were transmitted to Trowbridge but the two amounts published in the *New York Times* are almost similar.³⁴

The A.R.C forwarded \$1.000 each to the Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish Red Cross and Red Crescent societies for war relief bringing the American contribution to a total of \$53,000. Queen Olga was "profoundly touched. Grateful to all generous givers" whereas Queen Eleonore of Bulgaria stated "am most grateful for generous gifts on behalf of the wounded soldiers."³⁵ The A.R.C was true to its charter of dispensing aid regardless of nationality or religion. As stated earlier, the A.R.C did not send any of its trained personnel to the Balkans; however, they were Greek-American and American women wishing to volunteer as nurses. The most prominent of these were Anna Coromilas (nee Crockrell), the American wife of Greek Foreign Minister Lambros Coromilas, Mrs William H.Draper, Secretary of New York County Chapter of Red Cross, Mrs Miltiadi Melachrino, wife of Vice President of Tobacco

³³ 'Help needed in the Balkans', & 'A pressing appeal', November 11 & 21, *New York Times*, 1912 pp.10 & 4

³⁴ 'Women and war victims. Fund of \$95,000 raised in New York for relief of sufferers', & 'Greeks here give liberally. Fund for relief of wounded soldiers swelled to \$95,541', November 16 & 18, *New York Times*, 1912, 1912 pp.3

³⁵ '\$3,000 more sent by Red Cross', & 'Queens thanked Americans', November 26 & December 6, *New York Times*, 1912, pp.3 & 2

Products Corporation & owner of M. Melachrino & Co, Mrs Marie Economidy, wife of one editors of the Greek daily *Pan Hellenic*, and Johanna Lymberopoulos.³⁶

Each of these women could help Greece in their own way. However the three Greek-American women were keen to create a corps of trained nurse to go to the Balkans. The three were prepared to use their time and money for the Greek cause. "Women deplore war", Lymberopoulos stated. She remembered many Greek women had died in the Greek-Turkish war of 1897 when trying to take care of the wounded. Whilst the Turks was the enemy, but assistance would be given to the wounded irrespective of their nationality or religion. Marie Economidy was a journalist in her own right where she travelled across the U.S to ascertain the condition of the Greek community. She was well known to Greek – American community leaders where she could encourage them to mobilize young Greek men to do their patriotic duty. On the other hand, Mrs Miltiadi Melachrino shared the same sentiments as Lymberopoulos and Economidy. At the time of the 1897 war, she lived in Egypt where she organized several corps of nurses and provided the necessary funds for them to be attached to the Greek army.³⁷ The author has found no evidence to show that these three Greek –American women actually put into the practice of establishing a corps of trained nurses for the Balkans.

Queen Olga and Princess Sophia were the chief patrons of the Greek Red Cross with the responsibility for raising funds and distribution of relief. Another member of the Greek royal family, Princess Andrew (Princess Alice of Battenberg), worked as a nurse in the second Balkan War between Greece and Bulgaria in 1913. She set up hospitals, organized supplies and cared for the wounded. Hetty Goldman, an archaeologist, is the only American woman "who served as a volunteer nurse in a Greek hospital."³⁸ The American Red Cross played an important role in raising funds and providing relief for soldiers and civilians of the Balkans.

³⁶ 'Under the heavy Balkan War Cloud', November 3, *The Sun*, 1912, 3rd section, p.10; Anna Coromilas (nee Crockrell) was the daughter of former US Senator Frank M. Crockwell who also was a member of Interstate Commerce Commission, see 'An American and Greek', July 6, *Palestine Daily Herald* (Palestine Texas), 1910, p.6; For Miltiade Melachrino, see 'D.G.Reid President', November 1, *New York Tribune*, 1912, p.13 & 'Reid Tobacco President', November 1, *New York Times*, 1912, p.16

³⁷ 'Women patriots of Greece flock to the battle standard', November 24, *San Francisco Call*, 1912, p.8; 'Greek women as army nurses', October 24, *Washington Post*, 1912, p.5; For a brief account of Marie Economidy's sojourn across the US, see Maria Sarantopoulou Ekonomidou, *The Greeks in America as I saw them, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora* in thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/.../Economidou_20_1.pdf?...1 (accessed November 13, 2011)

³⁸ Barbara Sicherman *et al*, *Notable American Women Vol.4*, Belknap Publishing, Cambridge, MA, 1980, p.281; Gloria Teles Pushker *et al*, *Toby Belfer learns about heroes and martyrs*, Pelican Publishing Co, Gretna, 2009, p.67; Princess Andrew, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.slv.vic.gov.au/view/article/66337 (accessed November 13, 2011); Papacosma, S. Victor. "The Greek Press In America". Pella Publishing Company. 1979-01.p. 50fn9 Available electronically from <http://hdl.handle.net/10066/5208> (Accessed November 13,2011)

4. The Greeks in Chicago and surrounding towns of Illinois, Indiana and California mobilize for action

In Chicago, the Greek Consul was the main instigator in rallying his fellow countrymen as war clouds gathered in the Balkans. On October 4, 1912 the *Chicago Examiner* reported that two Greek residents George Petropoulos and John Agriostathis were engaged in drilling Greek American cadets in a hall located at Polk Street and Blue Island Avenue. The article identifies the two Greeks as “former members of the Greek army” who more than likely were ex-officers preparing their countrymen for the forthcoming conflict.³⁹ As the political situation continued to deteriorate in the Balkans, some 6,000 Greeks packed Hull House to hear to call to arms by the Greek Consul in Chicago, Nicholas Salopoulos. “When the Greek Military Company, headed by John Agriostathis brought forward the flag of Greece, there was pandemonium”, reported the *Chicago Examiner*. The Greek national flag was an important symbol which could be used to rally some 3,000 Chicago Greeks needed for the Greek army.⁴⁰

An executive committee composed of Consul Salopoulos, three Greek clergymen-L. Pegeas, A. Mandilaris and P. Panagopoulos and ice cream manufacturer, P. Rousutos was established to co-ordinate the raising of money “to cover the cost of transportation, equipment and mobilization of the forces.”⁴¹ Salopoulos was the first Greek Consul in Chicago (1898-1918) who served in the medical corps during the Greco-Turkish War 1897 and whose name was also listed under physicians and surgeons in the *Greek-American Guide and Business Directory 1911*. He was one of the owners of the weekly *Saloniki* and later *The Greek Press* and president of the Greek Educational Association established in 1908 which gave him a high profile in the Greek community of Chicago.⁴²

³⁹ ‘Greeks in Chicago Eager to defend native land’, October 4, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.2

⁴⁰ ‘Armies of the Balkans mobilizing for war’, October 1, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912; ‘Balkan States ready for war. Mobilization of troops in Servia and Bulgaria ordered by Governments’, October 1, *Chicago Tribune*, 1912, p.2; ‘Chicago Greeks Rush to arms’, *Chicago Examiner*, October 5, 1912, p.3; Jane Addams was a philhellene who encouraged the Greeks of Chicago to use Hull House for their social activities. As a pacifist, she permitted the Greeks to use its gymnasium for military training in readiness for the Balkan wars. A religious service and civil ceremony were held at Holy Trinity Orthodox Church and Hull House after the first contingent of Greeks who embarked for the Balkans. Addams attended the civil ceremony. See Andrew T. Copan, Ch.9 Greek survival in Chicago, in Peter d’Alroy Jones, op cit., pp.283-84, 296 & 298

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Some background information on L. Pegeas and A. Mandilaris. The former is listed as Archimandrite Leon Pegeas, Holy Trinity Orthodox Church, *Chicago Blue Book of Selected names of Chicago and Suburban Town for year ending 1912*, The Chicago Directory Company, Chicago, 1912, p.80 in www.archives.org/details/chicagobluebooko1912chic (accessed June 29, 2011; Mandilaris was “a pioneer priest serving Orthodox churches in Chicago. Rev Ambrose Mandilaris was known as an ‘empire builder’ because of his aggressiveness in founding churches. He served Holy Trinity and SS Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Churches in the early 20th century.” See Michael George Davros PhD, *The Greeks in Chicago*, Arcadia Publishing, Mt Pleasant, SC, 2009, p.68

⁴² Seraphim G. Canoutas, *Ellino-Amerikanikos Odigos (Greek-American Guide & Business Directory 1911)*, New York, p.428 See <http://abalinx.com/wordpress/pellana/files/2010/07/S.G.-Canoutas-Greek-American-Business-Directory-1911-Part-1-of-4.pdf> (accessed on June 28, 2011); Rivkah Shpak-Lisak, *Pluralism and progressives: Hull House and the new immigrants, 1890-1919*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, p.107

In addressing the large gathering, Salopoulos stated that “the present move would never subside until the cross of Greece once more waved over the Cathedral of St. Sofia in Constantinople, and the ancient supremacy of the Byzantine Empire is once more restored.”⁴³ The emotive language used by the Consul added a religious element to the forthcoming conflict which offered an opportunity to drive the Ottoman Turk out of Constantinople and to reclaim this historic city for Greece. Modern Greece could consider herself to be the rightful heir of the defunct Byzantine Empire. After this meeting, the Greek Consul issued a proclamation which was published in the *Chicago Examiner* on October 6, 1912 in both English and Greek appealing to the patriotism of his compatriots in Chicago. It stated:

Greece our mother country, is at this moment mobilizing her sons to fight the hated barbarian oppressor and all the reserves of the army are urged to hurry home and take up their arms. Five thousand of our countrymen Friday night met and made their arrangements for going home.

Three thousand of them will start to-morrow and thousands of others, sworn to the sacred flag and symbolizing the immortal Greek courage will go as soon as the executive committee is able to arrange transportation.

They have sworn to go back, win more wreaths of laurel, as the heroes of old, and in so doing write another golden page in our motherland’s glorious history.

The situation is a critical one and my trust is that every able man will make his earliest preparation to report for duty.

Nicholas Salopoulos, Consul of Greece to Chicago.⁴⁴

The proclamation contains such terms as “immortal Greek courage”, “wreaths of laurel”, “heroes of old” and “write another golden page in our motherland’s glorious history” which were intended to appeal to the patriotism of Greeks to do their duty for their nation against the “hated barbarian oppressor.” Many Chicago Greeks came to the Consulate to enlist whilst others contributed money to help defray transportation costs.⁴⁵ It appears that the *Chicago Examiner* may have been supportive of the Greece and her allies in the forthcoming conflict.

As many Greeks were preparing for their return to Greece, the *Chicago Examiner* reported that “considerable ill feeling [had] arisen among educated Greeks over an editorial in a morning paper urging the American public to “mind its own business” in regard to the Balkan unrest.” The *Chicago Examiner* does not identify the morning newspaper which published this editorial. However, the editor of *Greek Star*, Peter S. Lambros was quoted that the article was “unworthy of any American.” He commented that the unnamed newspaper used the slogan “Be Just and Fear Not” whose opinion seemed contradictory

⁴³ ‘Chicago Greeks Rush to arms’, October 5, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.3; ‘Greeks enlist for the war. Chicago patriots hold demonstration at Hull House’, October 5, *Chicago Tribune*, 1912, p.2

⁴⁴ ‘Proclamation appeals to Greeks of Chicago’, October 6, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.5

⁴⁵ Consul Salopoulos’ proclamation was also published in the Greek-American newspaper *Loxias*, October 12, 1912, p.1 in Chicago foreign language press survey (microform): Greek (1904), Chicago Public Library, See www.archive.org/details/5422062_6 (accessed June 28, 2011); Thousands of Chicago Greeks plan war aid, October 6, *Chicago Examiner* 1912, p.5

that on one hand it sympathized with the “eight million Greeks [who were] sighing under the Turkish yoke” and “yet this paper cries “Hands off.”⁴⁶ It could be argued that this editorial reflected the American attitude of the time in keeping out of the problems of Europe.

On October 10, Governor Woodrow Wilson stopped off in Chicago as part of his presidential campaign receiving a rousing reception by huge crowds who thronged the streets of the city. Many Chicago Greeks wanted to speak the democratic presidential candidate about the Balkan crisis. After his address earlier that evening, some 50 Greeks who were ready to leave for the Balkans wanted an interview with Wilson “so that he might give them his blessing.” Wilson sent a message to them “they would go and fight for their native land and all return to this country after the war to become good American citizens.”⁴⁷ He may have been thinking that after fulfilling their military duty to their old homeland that they would return to take out American citizenship. Wilson may have had his eye on the 1916 presidential election where naturalized Greeks might vote for him and the Democratic Party. It might be suggested that Wilson may have supported the Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbians against the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans conflict.

The Balkan allies were achieving military successes over the Turks in their respective theatres of war. William Georgopoulos, President of the Greek community and some 2000 Greeks “marched to Second Regiment Armory where they held a mass meeting to celebrate victories over the Turks.” Prominent Greek women of Chicago including Mrs Gregory Papathan and Mrs George Stamatiades raised more than \$3000 for the Red Cross Fund. Other prominent individuals such as Nicholas Salopoulos, Greek clergy, Peter S. Lampros and A. Argyris, editor of the *Athens*, addressed the audience.

“When the star spangled banner was played by the Greek band and American flag was unfurled the audience cheered wildly for 15 minutes”, *Chicago Examiner* reported.⁴⁸ This action showed some loyalty and respect for their adopted homeland despite casting their eyes across the Atlantic.

In other parts of Illinois such as Urbana, Elgin, DeKalb, Sterling and Quincy the Greeks were ready too for action or weighing up their options of enlisting or not. For Urbana Greeks any news from the Balkans formed their main topic of discussion where-ever they congregated. Many of them hadn’t made up their minds of enlisting but would have been concerned about the political crisis unfolding in the Balkans. The Greeks of Elgin had already departed without waiting for official orders.⁴⁹

The *True Republican* quoting the *DeKalb Advertiser* on October 26 stated that DeKalb Greeks had already departed for the Balkans where “only able-bodied fighting men, between the ages of 18 and 45 are allowed to join.” Furthermore the same article citing the

⁴⁶ “Thousands of Chicago Greeks plan war aid”, October 6, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.5; Peter S. Lambros was also “the leader of the Greek American (Republican) Political Club.” See Rivkah Shpak-Lisak, *op cit*, p.107

⁴⁷ “250,000 Cheer Gov Wilson’s Triumphant entry. Addresses 750,000 during visit to Chicago. Proceeds Through solid mass of humanity to hotel, met by Mayor” , October 11, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.2

⁴⁸ 2,000 Greeks here celebrate victory; \$3,000 fund raised, October 28. *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.2

⁴⁹ “Urbana Greeks are on anxious seat”, October 15, *The Urbana Courier-Herald*, 1912, p.6

Sterling Gazette mentioned that 150 Greek employees of North-western railway dropped "their picks and shovels" to wear the Greek military uniform. Obviously the company would have displeased, to lose so many of its workers all at once, leaving quite a deal of uncompleted work which wouldn't be finished until the spring of 1913.⁵⁰

Between 50-100 Greeks were supposed to get together in Quincy to decide how many wanted to return to fight and how much money to raise to cover transportation expenses. Some of these Greeks owned candy stores, shoe shining parlors and the Princess theatre. Unfortunately the meeting was postponed for another time as not enough notice had been given to members of the Greek community. It also attracted Greeks from Hannibal who wanted to contribute to the war effort.⁵¹

A Quincy resident William Spero, the owner of the Olympia candy store, who left the city some two months earlier to visit Greece, ended up being drafted in the army. Prior to his departure, he had been warned by some who arrived recently in America to be mindful of the political situation in the Balkans but he chose to ignore their advice. Spero sent a letter back to Quincy informing his friends that "he is now on the northern frontier and...expecting any day to take part in an engagement with the hated Turks." A former Quincy resident, Anton Demers who returned to live in Sparta Greece, informed his brother John, of the firm "Demers Bros shoe shiners at 504 Hampshire Street" that he had been conscripted and would be sent to the front. John Demers too would do his patriotic duty by heading off to fight in the Balkans.⁵²

Ten Greeks of the Burlington Railway company who were employed on the construction gangs received their pay on time so that they could depart for Greece. The railway company offered half fare for the Greeks to go to the front. This was a good gesture on the part of Burlington. Some labourers lacking funds for their transportation had them paid by Greek businessmen in Quincy. Greek merchants in Quincy would only depart if their services were desperately needed at the front.⁵³

Whilst the Greeks of Illinois were responding to the call of arms, Greeks in Gary and La Porte, Indiana were ready to move too. The *Chicago Examiner* reported that the steel mills in Gary faced the possibility of closure as employees from Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia) were ready to go over to fight the Turks. It was reported that "2,000 Balkan reservists in Gary served written notice upon the plants of the United Steel Corporation that they would not work next Tuesday. Mass meetings in Gary and Chicago to

⁵⁰ Greeks leave for war., October 26, *The True Republican* 1912, p.1

⁵¹ "Back to Greece! Greeks will meet in Quincy tonight..", October 24, *The Quincy Daily Journal*, 1912, p.7; "Greek meeting is postponed.", *The Quincy Daily Journal*, October 25, 1912, p.7

⁵² "Local Greeks may go back home to fight. Spartan love of country seems to prevail even in Quincy....", October 25, *The Quincy Daily Whig*, 1912, p.6; "Greek meeting is postponed.", October 25, *The Quincy Daily Journal*, 1912, p.7

⁵³ "Track workers will go to Greece. Ten local employees of the Burlington will help their country to tame the terrible Turk', October 26, *Quincy Daily Journal*, 1912, p.10

discuss the war situation will be held in the meantime.”⁵⁴ The United Steel Corporation was the major employer in Gary and the exodus of 2,000 employees would have greatly impacted on its daily operations. How many of these 2,000 went to fight in the Balkans is difficult to estimate.

At Laporte, 300 Greeks had made their plans to enlist in the Greek army without waiting for official instructions. A prominent businessman, John Moshos was advised to take command of troops so that “he [could] take his countrymen here who can raise funds to make the trip” back to Greece. Even Greeks from Valparaiso had already left for the war.⁵⁵ It would appear that Moshos was an ex-officer in the Greek army before he migrated to America. All the Greek reservists were full of enthusiasm and patriotic zeal to defend their old homeland.

5. The assassination of King George and Aleko Schinas March 1913

The next major Greek triumph was the capitulation of the Turkish garrison at Yannena in early March 1913. After many months of bitter fighting Greek persistence finally paid dividends with jubilation in Athens and Greek Diaspora. In the euphoria of the Greek success came the assassination of King George at the hands of Aleko Schinas whose dastardly act plunged Greece and Greeks of America into deep mourning.

King George was very popular and respected figure among his subjects and in the Greek Diaspora.⁵⁶ In America, the Atlanta Greeks wore black bands as a mark of respect for their dead monarch. The New York Greeks were stunned by the news of the assassination of King George and inquired continually at the offices of the *Atlantis* newspaper for news updates from Greece. Botassi stated that he owed “his continual re-appointment [as Consul-General] to King George [and] the *Atlantis*.” Church leaders and business community expressed its sorrow too. Chicago Greeks surrounded the offices of the Consulate seeking precise information on the assassination. Initially Salopoulos couldn’t fathom why would anyone commit such a terrible act. Later reports he received confirmed the King’s death. One of the proprietors of the Greek-American bank, FG Papakostas believed the reports to be “untrue” whereas George Mallers, Vice President of Naslacos Importing Co, thought King George’s death would have a “great effect on the outcome of the war.”⁵⁷

⁵⁴ ‘Rush to Balkan War May shut Gary Mills’, October 6, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p. 5; ‘Gary Steel Mills may shut down as Greeks leave to fight Turkey’, *Washington Times*, October 6, 1912, p. 6

⁵⁵ October 6, *Chicago Examiner*, 1912, p.5; ‘Urbana Greeks are on anxious seat’, October 15, *The Urbana Courier-Herald*, 1912, p.6; *Washington Times*, October 6, 1912, p.6

⁵⁶ ‘Greeks take Yannena and 32,000 troops....Great rejoicing in Athens’, March 7, *New York Times*, 1913, p.4; ‘Yannena surrenders to the Greek army...Garrison of 32,000’, March 7, *New York Tribune*, 1912, p.5; ‘Chicago Greeks praise King. Say he was loved by all his subjects...’ George was the idol of Greece says P.S. Lambros’, March 19, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 1913, p.3; the editorialist commented that the result of the siege at Yannena brought no rejoicings at Vienna, Sofia, Belgrade and Cetinje. See ‘The capture of Janina’ [editorial], March 8, *Washington Post*, 1913, p.6

⁵⁷ ‘Atlanta Greeks will wear black bands for dead King’, March 20, *Atlanta Constitution*, 1913, p.16; ‘Greeks camp in Streets. Members of Greek colony eagerly await news of assassination’, March 19, *The Evening*

The press reports gave different differing accounts about Aleko Schinas persona. Both *the Washington Times* and *El Paso Herald* (El Paso, Texas) described Schinas as “a Greek of low type and feeble mentality” whereas the *New York Tribune* called him an “evil looking fellow.”⁵⁸ According to the *Warsaw Daily Times* (Warsaw Indiana) and *The Sun*, Schinas was was known and disliked by Greeks in Chicago, Gary (Indiana) and Davenport (Iowa). C. Damascus, a journalist who worked for a Greek newspaper in New York, claimed that he met Schinas in Davenport where local Greeks detested him “because of anarchistic utterances and open declaration favouring assassination..” Schinas volunteered for the purpose of returning to Greece to assassinate the King. Damascus suggests that Schinas “was [a] wanted criminal and came to America” because the latter had “difficulties while serving in public office in Greece.”⁵⁹

There were conflicting news reports on Schinas’s origins who lived in New York before returning back to Greece. A Nick Caras, an employee in John Rompapass’s bookstore, remembered meeting Schinas several years earlier in Athens. He claimed that Schinas was possibly ‘the son of a rich merchant of Seres’ selling tobacco and spices. Furthermore Caras was uncertain whether Schinas attended university but remembered him returning back to Greece. In fact, Rompapass also acted as a shipping agent booking passages which explains Caras’s recall of Aleco Schinas’ return to the patria.⁶⁰

Another account given by Eratosthemus Charrns claims that he was a personal friend of Schinas where both of them worked in a New York hotel. Charrns mentioned that he had many discussions with Schinas “quarrel[ling] with him because of his atheistic and socialistic ideas.” Apparently Schinas was a keen reader “of all socialism works” and spent his free time “making friends with radical and fervid thinkers” on New York’s east side.

Botassi stated that Schinas sought revenge for the Greek government’s action closing down his ‘school of anarchism’ which he founded in Voloss. A government raid resulted in the seizure of books and pamphlets and arrest of two of its leaders at the school. It was also reported that Schinas considered running as a candidate for Voloss in the Greek parliament.⁶¹

He was supposedly well educated where he lectured for a time in the medical department of the University of Athens. Furthermore he spoke allegedly four languages: Greek, English,

Standard, 1913, p.1; ‘Chicago Greeks mourn death of popular monarch. Hundreds besiege office of Consul for definite reports on the assassination’, March 19, *Chicago Examiner*, 1913, p.1

⁵⁸ ‘Greeks suspect anarchist plot’, *The Washington Times*, March 19, 1913, p.5; *El Paso Herald*, March 19, 1913, p.1; ‘King George of Greece shot dead in Salonica, his conquered city’, March 19, *New York Tribune*, 1913, p.1

⁵⁹ ‘New King takes oath at Athens. Constantine is crowned ruler of the Hellenes...’ March 22, *Warsaw Daily Times*, 1913, p. 2; ‘Schinas known in Chicago. Regicide enlisted in Balkan war as patriot’, March 21, *The Sun*, 1913, p. 3

⁶⁰ ‘Regicide known here, Greeks of this city say Schinas was anarchist’, March 20, *New York Tribune*, 1913, p. 3

⁶¹ ‘The Assassin lived here. Worked in a New York hotel-well educated and an anarchist’, March 20, *New York Times*, 1913, p.3;

Italian and French fluently and was related to Lambros Coromilas.⁶² His hatred of royalty was the chief motive in King George's assassination.

Solon Vlasto, the editor of *Atlantis*, put to rest any doubts of Schinas's supposed background from the number of conflicting accounts appearing in the US press. He published Basal Batzoulis's letter which revealed some interesting details regarding Schinas. The assassin never established a school of anarchism, never entered politics, had no friends, enjoyed backgammon and was employed as a chemist's assistant in his brother's pharmacy. Schinas argued with his brother and decided to try his luck in the US. He found work physically demanding and returned to Greece. Vlasto believed Batzoulis account to be correct as it was confirmed from information of Greeks who had resided in Voloss.⁶³

6. The return of Greek Volunteers to America 1913-1914

There were various attitudes expressed in the US press regarding Greeks departing in their thousands to fight for their old homeland during the Balkan wars. Many press articles referred to these returning Greeks as 'heroes', 'patriots' and fighting the 'unspeakable Turk.' With such sentiments appeared in the US press, there were dissenting voices expressing concern with the number of immigrants arriving from SE Europe. Frederic J. Haskin wrote a series of articles for the *Milwaukee Sentinel* in December 1912 comparing the old immigrant with the new one. The old immigrants originally came from Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and other parts of Northern Europe who made the US their permanent home and later becoming naturalized citizens. Only 20% of Greek considered as new immigrants became American citizens. Many of them considered the US as a place to make plenty of money with the intention of returning back to their home villages as rich men.

The new immigrants came from poor villages who were usually illiterate and never dabbled in politics. Haskin noted that 126 Greeks entered the US in 1882 whereas 26,000 were admitted in 1911. Most of them were single men and boys who mainly lived in large cities doing jobs which American born workers would not work for e.g bootblacks. Those Greeks who had their womenfolk tended to remain whereas bachelors returned permanently to Greece.⁶⁴

Another disputing voice was a letter addressed to the editor of the *New York Times* published on October 28, 1912 where the author questioned the loyalty of some US citizens' participation in the Balkan wars. He understood the response of non-citizens doing their patriotic duty but the participation of naturalized citizens of a neutral country

⁶² 'New King at father's bier gives warlike talk to army', March 20, *Chicago Examiner*, 1913, p. 2; 'Assassin an anarchist. Often threatened King....', March 20, *Washington Post*, 1913, p. 3

⁶³ 'New York Greek tells of Assassin', March 21, *Calgary Daily Herald*, 1912, p.12; 'Schinas not in politics .Greek newspaper publishes letter regarding King George's assassin', March 21, *The Evening Standard*, 1913, p.1; 'Assassin never a candidate', March 21, *Washington Post*, 1913, p.4

⁶⁴ 'Immigration : the 'old' immigrant', & 'Immigration: the 'new' immigrant', December 11 & 12, *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 1912, pp.12 &10

was another matter. This might create a 'dangerous precedent' leading the US into a conflict of not of its own making. Once an individual became an American citizen they were obligated "to abide by [their] decision to become a citizen by remaining strictly neutral when his government is neutral."⁶⁵ It is likely that similar letters appeared in the US press with Americans expressing their concerns of naturalized citizens rushing off to fight for their former homeland.

The American Federation of Labour (AFL) opposed unrestricted immigration especially from SE Europe. They supported a literacy test for Europeans as way of restricting illiterate and unskilled labour into the US. The AFL's rested its case in maintaining wages and living standards of American workers against unskilled labour whose large numbers would lead to lower wages and exploitation by unscrupulous employers. Frank Morrison, the Secretary of AFL, criticized President Taft "for vetoing the Immigration Bill" which had been passed by the US Congress in early 1913. The AFL preferred alien workers stay home to fight labour battles in their own countries.⁶⁶ Arguments voiced supporting the literacy test was based on racist assumptions. Whilst the AFL had genuine concerns about wages and living standards of American born workers, the absence of a literacy test made it easier for Greeks to re-enter in the US after the Balkan wars.

The literacy test continued to be discussed in Congress in early 1914 without a resolution in sight and a veto from President Woodrow Wilson.⁶⁷ On January 18, the *Spartanburg Herald* reported that Dr Joseph J. O'Connell, a health official, stated that "we are likely to meet with typhus in our Mediterranean immigration for some time to come" especially with Greeks, Turks Serbians and Bulgarians returning from the Balkans.⁶⁸ Other reports published in the *Boston Evening Transcript* and *New York Times* mentioned that new immigrants and returning Greek soldiers spoke little or no English including six reported cases of passengers who died of spinal meningitis on board the steamer *Athinai*. There was 55,000 Greek soldiers waiting to return to America from the Balkan wars which worried former health official of New York Port, Dr Alvah H. Doty. "Greece was one of the main sources for the spread of this disease to various parts of world", Doty said. He pointed out that a potential epidemic could easily be avoided by introducing "modern sanitary methods" back in Greece. Doty mentioned that overcrowding and poor sanitation was responsible for the spread of this infectious disease.⁶⁹ It might be argued that these two newspapers may have dreaded the return of more Greeks bringing back disease thus threatening the health of Americans. Furthermore their underlying messages might afford an opportunity to curtail SE European immigration for a time to the US.

⁶⁵ 'Citizens of a neutral state', letter to editor signed JH, October 21, *New York Times*, 1912, p.10

⁶⁶ 'Labour demands literacy test', November 19, *Journal Miner* (Prescott, Arizona), 1913, p.1; 'Foreign unrest sends people here', November 8, *Spokane Daily Chronicle*, 1913, p.7

⁶⁷ 'Two Taft problems may worry Wilson. Literacy test and Labour trust... Each may provoke veto.', February 2, *New York Times*, 1914, p.2

⁶⁸ 'Finds another case of Typhus fever', January 18, *The Spartanburg Herald*, 1914, p.1

⁶⁹ 'Greeks bringing disease. Soldiers returning to America after war. Said to be a menace.', March 11, *Boston Evening Transcript*, 1913, p.9; 'Disease brought in Greek soldiers', March 11, *New York Times*, 1914, p. 3

On March 12, returning Greek veterans were treated as heroes by the Greek community in New York. As they proceeded on their way to Pennsylvania railway station, they were 'escorted by 10 pretty Greek maidens dressed in white' who "scattered roses in their path." Prior to their departure, they gave "three loud cheers for King Constantine and President Wilson." Then the US and Greek national anthems was sung by everyone. Many of them left by train for Chicago and other mid-west towns and cities.

Some returning Greeks on board the Austrian-American steamship, *Belvedere* brought back their wives to America with some of them having married Turkish women. A Corporal Leonidas Papamihalis who fought at Thessaloniki married a young Turkish woman whose dead husband was a Turkish officer.⁷⁰ The actual number of Greeks who returned to America from the Balkan campaign is difficult to ascertain. However many returnees resumed their businesses or jobs and became naturalized US citizens.

The First World War had a major impact on the Greek-American community with many of them realizing that they would never return to their old homeland. This raised the issue of adopting American ways and becoming naturalized citizens. Despite American apprehension towards them, they overcame this to some extent by enlisting in the U.S army and purchasing liberty bonds to fund the war effort. Both actions was an expression of loyalty to the adopted homeland and Helen Papanikolas in her article titled 'Immigrants, minorities, and the Great War', includes two pictures showing a patriotic parade and liberty bond drive with the Greek and American flags side-by-side in 1918.⁷¹

It should be noted that after the First World War, the establishment of the American Hellenic Education Progressive Association (AHEPA) played an important role in the assimilation of the Greek-American community into mainstream American society.⁷²

In conclusion, Greek Americans created socio-political and cultural institutions to mirror those that existed in the *patrida* in order to maintain their ethnic identity and language in an alien and sometimes hostile environment. The Greeks responded quickly to the call of

⁷⁰ 'Girls kiss Greek soldiers. Veterans of Balkan war leave for the west amid cheers', & 'Brides and mummies here. Greek soldiers bring Turkish wives from the Balkans', March 12 & 28, *New York Times*, 1914, pp.5 &7; It should be noted that T.T Timayenis, the editor of *Eastern and Western Review*, informed President Wilson that Greek veterans from the Balkan Wars were ready to offer their services in the advent of war between the U.S and Mexico, see 'Greeks eager for another fight', *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1914, p.12


⁷¹ Alexander Kitroeff, Greek-American Ethnicity, 1919-1939 in Jelisaveta Stanojevich *et. al.* (ed), *To Ellinikon Studies in honour of Speros Vryonis Jr* Vol.2, Aristide D. Caratzas, New Rochelle, New York, pp.358-9; Helen Z. Papanikolas, Immigrants, minorities, and the Great War, *Utah Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 58, no.4, Fall 1990, pp. 351 &355, the remainder of her article discusses the other immigrant groups that resided in Utah during the First World War; 'Greek patriots in America urged to register in N.Y. Venizelos party men of Cochise County asked to place Services at disposal of U.S. Government', *Bisbee Daily Review*, April 27, 1917, p.2; '9,000 Greeks ready to fight for the U.S', *New York Times*, April 9, 1917, p.2; 'Greeks to join American army', *Ogden Standard*, December 26, 1917, p. 1; For press accounts of the raising liberty bond, see 'Greeks march for liberty bonds', *Ogden Standard*, June 4, 1917, p. 12; 'Greeks and Japs loyal', *Ogden Standard*, April 30, 1918, p.3; 'Aliens big bond buyers', *New York Times*, September 5, 1918, p.13

⁷² Yiorgos Anagnostou, Forget the Past, Remember the Ancestors! Modernity, "Whiteness", American Hellenism, and the politics of Memory in early Greek America, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol.22, no.1,(2004), pp.25-71;Georgakas, *op cit.*, pp.14-16; Kitroeff, *op cit.*, pp.359-69

the old homeland through daily press reports of an impending conflict in the Balkans. These reservists were first generation Greek immigrants who still remained loyal and maintained connection with their families in Greece. Terrible economic conditions in Greece forced many of them to seek new opportunities in foreign lands. Those that made the transatlantic voyage to America ended up becoming naturalized citizens whilst others returned to Greece.

Many of the Greek returnees may have served in the Greek army before migrating to America. Such experience would have been invaluable at the time of mobilization for war. The Pan Hellenic Union despite its problems did a magnificent job as a recruiting agency along for the war effort. Various non-government actors like the ARC appealed for funds and relief from the American public.

Whatever the number of Greeks that returned to America from the Balkan wars, many of them became American citizens and showed their loyalty by enlisting in the US army and purchasing liberty bonds during the First World War. Greek-American volunteers with their immense patriotic input in the war fronts wrote a gallant chapter in the national history of Greece as well as in the modern history of the United States; their patriotism and loyalty to both countries comprise a significant outcome in the immigration history of the Americas.



The Kasta Tomb (Hellenica: Τύμβος Καστά), also known as the Amphipolis Tomb (Hellenica: Τάφος της Αμφίπολης), is an ancient Macedonian tomb discovered in Amphipolis, Central Macedonia, in northern Hellas. The tomb is dated at the last quarter of 4th century B.C., and it is the largest burial monument ever discovered in Hellas and by comparison dwarfs the tomb of Philip II of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, in Vergina.

The entrance to the tomb of Amphipolis





The mosaic of Amphipolis

It is a mosaic of 3 meters wide and 4.5 length depicting a man with a laurel wreath to drive a chariot dragged by horses and guided by the god Hermes.

The Culture Ministry announced that archaeologists believe that it is a mosaic of the 4th century, between 325 and 300 BC



The Caryatids

The excavation has brought to light two exceptional Caryatids. The West Caryatid has a wonderful, almost intact face, while the face of the East Caryatid has fractured, but many of the broken pieces are in place.

The total height of the Caryatids with the base/wall is 3.67 meters.



